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ABSTRACT
This study investigated the role of different leadership styles within Iran and how such leadership
changes influenced Iranian foreign policy. The study utilized event-data analysis of Iranian history and
current events and discussed the role of realist and idealist to the development of Iran into the regional
power it is today as well as how Western relations played a role in developing Iranian foreign policy,
particularly with regard to its nuclear development. The main body of the study drew from the dynamics
within Iran, its relations with the West, relations with Israel, and relations with other foreign powers.
The event-data analysis also took into account the political and socioeconomic stability and
conditions within Iran as it would readily influence the foreign policy-making within the nation. The first
part of the study analyzed Iranian society under the Shah and the under the revolutionary guidance of the
Ayatollah Khomeini; the second part analyzed the post-Khomeini period in Iran. In addition to reviewing
the role of different revolutionary leadership styles within Iran, this study considers the role that IranianWestern relations have played in Iranian policy-making. Further, this study considers the tumultuous role
that nuclear development has had in Iran’s foreign relations.
Findings showed that there is a relationship between Western presence in the Middle East and
growing aggression by Iranian leadership.

Moreover, the study demonstrates that the role of

revolutionary leadership styles is critical in accessing the manner in which foreign policy decisions are
made. The study found that the role of Islam in Iranian politics has brought much contention but found
that in the post-Khomeini years, it has not been the central reason for policy decisions. Recommendations
were made for the continued study of the role of nuclear development in Iranian-Western relations as this
study was able to find some evidence of it having some level of relevance.

Additionally,

recommendations were made that additional research be conducted with regard to the role of Islam in
shaping Iranian foreign policy in the Post-Khomeini era.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
The Middle East has been the center of much political interest since the creation of the
Israeli state in 1945. Prior to this monumental point in history, the Middle East was generally
only regarded in terms of its colonial interest to the West. However, the creation of the state of
Israel has placed a significant strain onto the Arab world as it provided a constant reminder of
their colonial past and the effect of Western influences on their society. As a regional leader,
Iran has taken on a strong front of Arab unity, often finding itself at odds with Israel and the
West due to their influences within Middle Eastern society.

Though never having been

colonized by Western powers, Iran’s history of Western infiltration in its policies and more
importantly, its understanding of how the West has been able to restrict the Middle East’s ability
to develop has often brought Iran as a leader against Western influence and presence in the
Middle East.
It is interesting to note several observations with regard to Iran and its relationship with
the West. The first observation is that there is a clear power struggle between Iran and the
United States for influence over the Middle East. Another important observation is that Iran
views Israel as being ruled and heavily influenced by the West. This influence has often put Iran
at odds with Israel and has led to inevitable conflict. A third observation one notes in reviewing
international relations is that the more focused on modernization an Iranian regime is the less
hostilities exist between Iran and Israel and there is minimal resistance to Iran’s quest for
development. A final observation regarding Iran is that under modernizing regimes, Iran’s
nuclear program is perceived as being motivated by a desire to develop and have cooperative
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relations whereas under nationalistic regimes, Iran’s nuclear program is often viewed as being
aggressive and preemptive.

Thesis Statement

Constant discontentment and conflict has risen within the Middle East over the past
several decades, all without a sound and lasting resolution. As such, one finds the region in
constant political struggle and instability. There has been much debate as to the source of the
conflict. The crux of this instability has often been likened to being a religious conflict whether
between the Jewish state of Israel versus the Muslim world or between the Sunni and Shiite
populations within the region. Another cause that one often hears as being related to the conflict
in the region is the security dilemma in the Middle East, particularly as the world enters into the
nuclear era. Issues of continuing conflict among certain nations further brings some to question
the role of leadership in producing conflict and how national interests may come into conflict
with one another. Moreover, question as to how Western involvement, particularly the US, in
the Middle East may be cause for instability in the region.
Understanding how such elements may influence relations within the Middle East is
critical in being able to make policy decisions relating to this area of the world. With many
questions as to what really causes the tensions between nations relating to the Middle East, one
should consider an analysis of the different elements to determine if perhaps one area holds more
of significance to the development of the area. This study hopes to review such elements and
make strides in understanding the dynamics between Middle Eastern states both within
themselves and with other nations, particularly the West.
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Having identified certain patterns in Iranian politics, this central thesis of this study is:
Internal regime dynamics and differences in revolutionary leadership have a strong influence in
Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. Regime dynamics in Iran will be reviewed in terms of the
relationship between the Supreme Leadership and the Presidency in Iran and how the manner in
which certain leaders are able to exert a greater level of international scrutiny than others. The
core argument in this study will consider the role of how leadership change can influence Iranian
dynamics as well as the manner in which different types of leadership style (realist vs. idealist)
can bring Iran into different directions with regard to its foreign policy.

Hypotheses

To test the thesis of this study, one will consider four hypotheses relating to Iran’s
leadership differences and the international community.

Hypothesis #1:

As the US presence in the Middle East grows, tension with Iran will also intensify.

The dependent variable in this hypothesis is Iran’s relationship with the United States and
the independent variable is US presence in the Middle East. This relationship is expected to
have a positive correlation and to be a strong relationship. The dependent variable will be
measured utilizing event data analysis of media other scholarship that discusses Iran’s foreign
policy relating to the United States and the policymaking that isolates Iran from Western
influence or leads to stronger ties with its neighbors. The relationship between the US and Iran
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will also be measured in terms of the existence of economic sanctions or incentives provided to
other nations by the US in return for their resistance to assisting in Iran’s nuclear program. The
independent variable will be measured in terms of the United States’ business ties with Middle
Eastern countries, involvement in Middle Eastern countries, internal conflict, and the presence of
American troops in the Middle East.
The next hypothesis being tested will be as follows:

Hypothesis #2:

The more idealistic the leadership within Iran, the stronger the resistance will be against
Israel.

The dependent variable is Iran’s relationship with Israel and the independent variable is
Iran’s revolutionary leadership.

The relationship between the dependent and independent

variables is predicted to be both strong and positive. To measure the hypothesis, the reader will
find that the dependent variable will be measured by Iran’s trade relations with Israel,
cooperation with Israel, and reactions to Israeli presence in Middle Eastern politics.

The

independent variable will be measured in terms of realists and idealists. Idealists are defined as
those finding it necessary to step aside from the status quo and challenge international influence
within their nation. They are often considered dangerous to international peace and security as
they will pursue their agenda even at the cost of the international community. Realists are also
focused on exporting their revolution but are focused on being a role model for other states.
Unlike idealists, realists understand the need for outside assistance to promote their agenda and

4

understand realpolitik. As such, they tend to move closer to revitalizing foreign relations. 1 In
terms of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini and President Ahmadinejad will be classified as idealists
while Ayatollah Khamenei, and Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami will be classified as realists.
The third hypothesis will consider:

Hypothesis #3:

The more cooperative Iran’s foreign policy, the more developed and stable Iran’s society
will be.

The dependent variable being used to test this hypothesis is Iran’s societal stability. The
independent variable is Iran’s foreign policy. The relationship between the two variables is
expected to be both strong and have a positive correlation. The dependent variable will be
measured by reviewing Iran’s domestic policies as they relate to social and cultural reforms. The
independent variable will be measured by Iran’s relations with the West, Middle East, and other
foreign powers.
The final hypothesis being tested in this study is:

Hypothesis #4:

The higher the anti-American sentiments are within the Iranian government, the greater
the international scrutiny against Iran’s nuclear program.
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The dependent variable in this hypothesis is the international response to Iran’s nuclear
program.

The independent variable is the level of anti-Americanism within Iran.

The

relationship between the two variables is predicted to be strong with a positive correlation. The
dependent variable will be measured through a review of overt and covert international support
or assistance to Iran’s nuclear program, international condemnation or sanctioning against Iran
due to the nuclear issue, and attempts by the international community to get involved in Iran’s
nuclear program. The independent variable will be measured through analysis of Iran’s position
on the United States throughout the different leadership in Iran.

Significance

From the theoretical perspective, this study will provide some insight into how regime
leadership may impact the foreign relations of a nation. Additionally, through the analysis of
Iran’s relationship with Israel and the United States through the course of several decades, one
may gain some understanding as to why conflict arises between the two as well as what values
are hot topics that lead to conflict. Much literature seems to question the role of Iran’s nuclear
program in igniting conflict and tension between Iran and other nations. This study will provide
a careful analysis on how much of an impact a leader can have on a nation’s foreign relations as
well as consider how significant one issue can be to the dynamics within the region.
From the policy perspective, this study will provide an analysis of how a nation’s
domestic situation may influence its foreign policy and vice-versa. Further, this study will
consider the changing dynamics between Iran, Israel, US, Russia, and China through the scope of
several leaders in hopes to comprehend patterns in Iran’s foreign policy. Understanding the
political atmosphere within Iran is important to the further development of foreign policy
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making. Iranian national security interests are central to its policy decision-making. This is
caused by issues of territorial integrity and physical security. 2 If this study demonstrates that
there is indeed some relationship between the type of regime within Iran and US relations and
the role of the nuclear program in this relationship, this may provide incentive from the policy
perspective to promote better US ties with Iran, particularly under more nationalistic regimes as
a means of preventing unnecessary tension. Further, if it is found that under Iran’s realist
leadership that the nuclear program is driven towards the assistance of potentially dangerous
allies, the United States may wish to reconsider its strategy for approaching the Iranian nuclear
program.

Literature Review

Current literature on this topic spans from the evolution of Iranian society from a
invasion and corruption by the Qajars to the development of a stable albeit controversial society
with a strong political structure and seeming independence from outside influences. For much of
its history Iran has played a significant role within the Middle Eastern and Caspian region,
exerting itself as a regional power. With its abundance of oil and gas reserves that consist of the
second largest supply in the world, Iran undoubtedly has a strong presence in the region. “Iran
has the largest economy and the strongest military in the Muslim world.” 3Throughout history,
Iran has played an integral role in the Islamic world. This role was influenced by the fact that it
was one of two Muslim nations that avoided colonization by the West. 4
Iran’s rich history tells a story of conquest and development into a strong regional power.
In the 19th century, Iran was lead by the Qajars who appeared to infiltrate all areas of Iranian
government. The Qajars conquered the land in the 1780s and founded its dynasty in 1796. 5 The
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Qajars projected an image of being the “Protectors of Shi’ism,” promoting the Koran throughout
their policy making. However, the true power of the Qajars resulted from their ability to exploit
the societal division within Iran and manipulate the various factions into agreeing to their
regulations. 6
The Russian army was the first to defeat the Qajars and to force them into treaties of
Gulestan and Turkmanchay. For much of its history, Iran was able to largely ignore Russia’s
presence as its northern neighbor, however the loss of the Russo-Persian wars (1805-1813 and
1826-1828) greatly changed the situation for Iran as it lost land and was forced into several
restrictions by the Turkmanchay Treaty of 1828. 7 The British soon followed with the 1857
Treaty of Paris. These treaties imposed borders onto Iran that continue to exist today as well as
set a precedence for other foreign nations to impose commercial and diplomatic requirements for
Iran through means of force. 8
Representatives from Great Britain and Russia were able to exert much power and
influence within Tehran. The Iranian people soon likened foreign influence as being the central
cause of every national problem and developed a “paranoid style of politics.” 9 Iran’s greatest
limitation during the Qajar dynasty was the fact that its neighbors were rival powers: Great
Britain and Russia. “The relationships between Iran and Russia and Great Britain became
strained as the Anglo-Russian contest for supremacy over Central Asia and excessive British
concern for the defense of India turned Iran into a pawn in the Great Game.” 10 Iran soon became
the central location for the power rivalry between the two great powers. Problems continued to
intensify within Iran as foreign powers continued to exert their national interests within Iran, to
the detriment of the Iranian people. Foreign occupation worsened during World War I as the
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major powers utilized Iranian soil as a battleground, despite Iran’s declaration of neutrality. 11
Iran often found itself in the middle of a great game for power struggle between the two nations.
Iranian relations with Great Britain started slowly as both nations acknowledge the
other’s potential as an ally but were distrustful of the motivations behind such a relationship.
Despite this, Iran and Great Britain maintained a seemingly stable level of cooperation in defense
and trade. 12 However, the Qajar rulers soon lost much of its control over Iran as both Russia and
Great Britain developed regulations and protocols for Iranian society. The structural weaknesses
in the government allowed for such a high level of infiltration to occur within Iran, much to the
discontentment of the Iranian people. 13
While Iran was never forced into becoming a colony of the West, it did however find
itself infiltrated and practically controlled by Great Britain and Russia. The infiltration by
Western powers into Iran brought about the beginning of the end for Qajar rule. The people of
Iran became distrustful of their influence on Iranian society and further found them to be a threat
to their sovereignty of culture and religion. 14 As Western influence began to spread throughout
the Middle East, dissenters began to organize in hopes to take over the government. This
occurred in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution as well as in 2005 with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s
victory against the then-President Rafsanjani.
Under the leadership of Reza Shah Iran found itself moving towards a modernized
society. Prior to the Shah’s rule, Iran was a tribal society with little cohesion and corruption
plaguing its domestic affairs. Through his reforms, Reza Shah was able to gain complete control
over all aspects of Iran. He is often referred to as “The Great Reformer,” “Modernizer,” “and
“Secularizer.” In maintaining control over the economic, military, social, and political arenas
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within Iran, Reza Shah was able to pursue his ideas for improvement and brought about a strong
centralized government that has influenced the current Iranian society. 15
However, the Shah’s rule was not without significant problems as many within Iran saw
the modernization practices of the Shah’s regime to be heavily influenced by the West. Fear of
the West destroying the cultural and religious identity of Iran lead to the inevitable downfall of
the Shah with the 1979 revolution.

Such became the pattern within Iranian politics as a

modernizing leader would breed corruption and consequently be replaced by a nationalistic
regime that would move away from relations with the West and with other international actors.
Iran’s relations with Israel have been inconsistent at best. Tension between Israel and
Iran has long been in existence, constituting what many refer to as “history’s last ideological
clashes.” 16

Iran’s rejection of the West and refusal to recognize the Israeli state makes

confrontation inevitable between Israel and Iran. 17 There has been much debate as to why many
Arab states maintain a strong feeling of dislike towards Israel. Though anti-Semitism may play a
part in this animosity, the more likely culprit is the continued legacy of European colonialism.
Israel is perceived as having been founded as a “European settler state formed on the ruins of
Palestinian society.” This brings about the moral question of the West legitimizing colonialism,
particularly as the Palestinian people continue to face an identity issue and a statelessness that is
at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 18
Under the Shah, Iran and Israel had a shared need to protect its land from their Arab
neighbors and even under Rasfansanji’s rule Iran maintained some degree of a business
relationship with Israel. 19 Israel was very influential in developing the Iranian nuclear program.
Perhaps the most ambitious project between Tehran and Israel was the development of Jericho, a
prototype missile that was to be built by Israel and tested in Iran. The project never reached its
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fruition as Khomenei instructed his regime to sever all ties with Israel upon taking over Iran. 20
The controversial nature of the Iranian-Israeli relationship is cause for international concern as it
brings about a level of strain in the area that can and has led to conflict.
In addition to haphazard relations with Israel, there is also much worry about US
presence in the region. Iran’s concern over US influence in the Middle East was the caused by
closer security relationships that many nations were pursuing with the United States.

This

caused some tension between Iran and its neighbors. Perhaps central to the struggle Iran had
with its Arab neighbors is the fact that “Iran was seeking to organize regional security without
outside powers, but its neighbors have concluded there can be no security without these outside
powers.” 21 Iranian leaders saw a need to be a regional power as a means of countering US
involvement in the peace process in the Middle East.
Iran found itself vulnerable to the United States as it saw the US as trying to undo its
regime and Westernize its people. The close relationship between the United States and Israel
further aggravated the situation as Iran saw it as being a means for the US to assert its power
over the Middle East, particularly due to its allowance of Israeli nuclear weapons despite its
constant rhetoric against other Middle Eastern nations obtaining such weapons. 22
As Iran has entered into the new millennium, the nuclear issue has become of grave
importance. Following the completion of the Cold War, the international community gained
some new threats to international peace and security: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
the insurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. 23 As technology has become readily accessible to the
developing world, the reality of weapons of mass destruction entering the hands of the
developing world is one that must be addressed. Many of these nations are unstable politically,
socially, and economically and consequently posed a grave risk to the international community
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should they gain access to these weapons. This is further exemplified by the strengthening of the
Islamic fundamentalism within the Middle East. The strong anti-Western sentiments that have
developed throughout the Middle East have caused much concern and have made the Middle
East the center of much international discussion.
Finding its beginning during the reign of the Shah, Iran’s nuclear program came to
existence with the help of several outside sources including the United States and Israel. Since
then, Iranian scientists have been sent to various nations abroad to learn about the newest
advancements in nuclear technology and to train in the development of nuclear power. Many
incentives have been provided to ensure interest in its development. In 1968, Iran signed the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in hopes of moving forward negotiations with the United States
regarding its nuclear program. The NPT recognizes every nations “inalienable right to develop,
research, produce, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and
acquire equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information.” 24 It is in this area
that controversy has arisen as Iran has often been found to divert international attention away
from its nuclear program while simultaneously working with nations often found to be
controversial in their own use of nuclear technology throughout their past (ie. Pakistan, China,
and North Korea). 25
Iran is a difficult nation to comprehend as its leaders have often played games with
rhetoric and action. Iran’s geostrategic positioning within the Middle East gives it an advantage
in influencing the security and economic policies of its neighbors. It continues to support
international terrorism while dismissing international condemnation and recoil. Refusing to be
intimidated by the West, Tehran has remained resilient in its nuclear efforts. 26
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Theory

After considering the literature, it is the aim of this study to build upon the scholarship
regarding Iran and its relations to the rest of the international community. Understanding the
relationship Iran has with its neighbors, Israel, and the West is integral in evaluating the
domestic and foreign policy of the nation. Considering the role of game theory in the past
relationship between Russia and Great Britain in their involvement in Iran during the Shah’s
reign and the role of the theory with regard to the current US-Iranian and Iranian-Israeli situation
will play an important role in developing how relations between nations can play a significant
role in determining their political motivations.
This study will also consider the role of realpolitik in the Middle East, particularly as it
has shaped Iranian political dynamics. The relationship between the United States and Iran is a
tumultuous one plagued by distrust and a high level of criticism. Both nations believe strongly
in their vision for the international community and have made a clear stance of how they would
like to see their influence within the Middle East.

However, such visions have often been in

conflict and both nations view the other as being detrimental to the stability and well being of
their own national interest. As such, it is unsurprising to hear of the constant showdowns
between the two nations.
In addition to the rapport between Iran and other international actors, the nuclear program
in Iran has led to much debate and disagreement with the US, Israel, and other nations. While
much discussion relating to Iran is centered on questions of the Iran’s motivation to develop its
nuclear program have been a consistent area of discussion, this study hopes to evaluate the
factors that may influence Iran’s focus on its program as well as how the development of nuclear
technology has affected Iran’s relations with other international actors through consideration of
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the security dilemma as coined by political scientist John H. Hertz which believes that states are
drawn to conflict over security concerns even despite not actually wanting to go into conflict.
The United States has taken a decisive stance against the notion of Iran developing
nuclear technology whereas the Iranian government, in accordance to their signing of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) asserts that they have the right to develop such technology for the
betterment of their civil society. However, in reviewing the nuclear program in Iran, one sees
that the direction of the program as well as its level of priority has changed throughout Iran’s
history as different leaders have taken on the issue with different goals in mind. Moreover, as
the program’s direction has changed, so has the relationship between Iranian leadership and the
United States. While some leaders have regarded the United States to be as dangerous to Iranian
society as “the Great Satan” other leaders have seen the US as a potential economic alliance from
who Iran could improve its infrastructure and national stability. As such, this paper will review
the Iranian-US relationship focusing on how the changing in leadership has influenced the
nuclear issue.
Moreover, this study will consider the role of leadership in Iran’s foreign policy-making.
This paper will delve into how dissatisfaction with Iranian leadership has lead to insurgency and
revolutionary change within the nation. Additionally, this paper will consider the differing types
of leadership in Iran. This study will interchange between the labeling of Ayatollah Khomeini
and President Ahmadinejad as “revolutionary idealists,” “charismatic radicals,” and
“conservatives.” The two leaders served as radical leaders that tried to push a feeling of national
pride and Islamism within Iran. Further, they fit the mold of revolutionary idealists as they
believe that they can take on the challenges of their nation without outside assistance and further
are distrustful of foreign influence in its policy-making. 27

14

In contrast, the leadership of Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Rafsanjani, and
President Khatami are grouped together and are labeled as “revolutionary realist,” “realist”,
“modernizers,” and “institutional pragmatists.”

In terms of “revolutionary realists” this

classification indicates a resolve by the leader to utilize foreign relations and whatever other
means necessary to promote the national interests of their society. Similarly, realist thought
finds its beginnings with Machiavelli’s The Prince and Hans Morgenthau’s works on the issue of
political power.

Morgenthau maintains that politics is all about a struggle for power. Its school

of thought operates under the assumptions of the international system is anarchic and its primary
actors, sovereign states, act in a rational manner in promotion of their national interests and that
relations between states is determined by a nation’s need to utilize the relationship to better its
own military and economic capabilities. 28
This study understands the difficulty in placing Iranian leaders into rigid classification
and further is cognizant of the fact that throughout their time in leadership roles, some may move
away from the proposed classification but considers that in the overall regard of each leader’s
policies that the above stated classification serves as a useful tool in making distinctions between
the leadership styles.
Finally while issues concerning the Sunni/Shiite dynamics may have a strong relevance
to it being a religious issue, recent scholarship suggests that the conflict between the Arab world
and Israel lies not in a religious struggle but rather is caused by the symbolism of what Israel
represents to the Middle East: the ghost of their colonial past that has led to the cultural
divisiveness and social and political instability in many nations. This study will consider the
question of whether strained relations between Iran and Israel is a truly a question of religious
difference or if, as some suggest, it is the result of a clash of cultures.
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Research Design

In terms of the research design for this study, the paper will be split into five sections: the
Shah’s reign, Iran under Khomeini, Khamenei and Realist leaders, Iran today under Khamenei
and Ahmadinejad, and the final chapter will discuss the findings and consider prospects for the
future. Within each of these sections, this study will cover various subcategories that will
provide a thorough analysis of the past and current dynamics within Iran.
Under the chapter regarding the Shah’s reign, this study will discuss a brief history of
Iran, Iran and the Middle East, the beginning of the Iranian-Israeli relationship, Iran and the US,
and the Shah, the US and nuclear development. In the second chapter of this study, one will
learn of insurgency and revolution, Iran’s new direction in its political agenda under Khomeini,
growing tensions between Iran and Israel, and moral confrontation against the United States.
The third section in this study will break into dynamics between Khamenei and Realists
Presidents, dynamics of revolutionary idealist president, restoration of foreign relations, relations
with Israel, Iran and the US, a focus on development, the nuclear showdown, and US-Iranian
relations. This chapter will be followed by an analysis of Iran under the dual leadership of the
Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad broken down into sections regarding the
relationship between the two leaders, foreign relations, relations with Israel, Iranian
development, the nuclear showdown, and the confrontation between the US and Iran.
In the final section of the paper, the findings will be discussed as well as consideration of
how different international relations theories relate to these findings. Finally, the prospects for
the future will be discussed. Understanding the current trends in Iranian foreign and domestic
policy will allow one to consider what the future has in store for Iran. This section will be the
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shortest in length but will provide both predictions for the future and concluding remarks about
the information learned through the study.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE REIGN OF MODERNIZATION
Brief History of Iran

Having an understanding of Iran’s history gives insight on the political process that
governs Iran’s policies. It is particularly beneficial to learn of the political instability in Iran’s
past as well as the insecurity in it experienced as a result of foreign presence in its land.
Reviewing Iran’s history reveals certain patterns in Iran’s relationships with other nations,
particularly Western powers. Having had to fend off international influence and infiltration into
Iranian society, Iran has often been at offs with other nations.

This past has led to Iran

developing into an assertive and uncompromising nation who will pursue its agenda relentlessly
and at any cost.
Present-day Iran finds much of its roots in the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties.

The

accession of Nasir al-Din Shah came about 126 years after the fall of the Safavid dynasty which
ruled over Iran from 1501 to 1722. During the time between Safavid and Pahlavi dynasties,
many Qajars had lost their lives in their attempt to capture the throne. Early Qajars attempted to
expand Iran’s borders past the Zagrus Range but found themselves unsuccessful in each
attempt. 1 The closeness to the Ottoman Empire, however served to expose the Qajars to the
Western ideas of reform. The Qajars did not view these measures as being preferable to its own
manner of society but rather had some hesitation as to how they may jeopardize the security and
cultural reverence of Iran in the region. 2
The death of then-ruler Nader Shah Afshar allowed for the emergence of Qajar rule in
Iran.

For fifty years there was a power struggle within the nation as various individuals

attempted to take over the role of ruler of Iran. It was not until 1794 that Aqa Mohammad Khan
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Qajar took over the throne and established the Qajar dynasty which would rule from the end of
the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century. 3

Aqa Mohammad Khan’s rule was

uncompromising as he murdered thousands in his quest for absolute rule over the land. Though
his rule was cruel, his ability to prevent Iran from falling under foreign colonial rule allowed him
to develop the foundation to which Iran would lead the region for years to come.
Aqa Mohammad Khan’s rule ended in his death caused by members of his military and
his son Fath Ali Shah succeeded the throne. Fath Ali’s term was relatively insignificant as he did
little to change or improve the nation. Rather, it was under his term that Russia was first able to
exert its influence within Iran through its takeover of all of Iran’s territorial claims on the west
coast of the Caspian Sea. 4 Iran struggled to maintain its claim to Georgia but was defeated by
the Russian army. Consequently, Fath Ali found himself having to renounce all claims to the
land in the Treaty of Golestan. Peace did not last for long as Russia’s quest for expansion led to
the further seizing of Iranian-controlled regions within the Caspian. Iran fought against this
aggression but again found itself unable to overcome the very adept Russian army and found
itself relinquishing its claim to the Caucasus in the Treaty of Turkamanchai. 5 Upon his death,
Mohammad Shah took over the throne. He ruled for about thirteen years before being succeeded
by his son Nasir al-Din Shah.
Nasir al-Din Shah ruled over Iran in the years 1848-1896.

During this time he

revolutionized Iran by bridging the Safavid and post-Safavid periods. “Iran emerged with an
expanding economy, stable central government, increased social homogeneity, and cultural and
religious revival. 6 Under Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar, Iran developed what can be described as a
skeleton of a central government with notable figureheads and royalty presiding over the central
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focus of the nation while local leaders concerned themselves with the more regional concerns of
the people. 7
In the 1800s Iran lived in an isolated manner, however by 1900, Iran was beginning to
find itself very much a part of the world economy. 8The Qajars attempted to reduce foreign
influence by focusing on defensive modernization tactics that were to assist in strengthening the
Iranian state. However such measures found little results other than to foster the roots of
revolution. 9 The revolution was triggered in large part to the economic crisis in 1904 that was
caused by government bankruptcy and inflation. 10
Further tensions grew within Iran as the Iranian Parliament, better known as Majles, tried
reforming the tax system within the nation and as the Liberals within Iran attempted to impose
secular reforms. 11 In 1906, the differing factions within Iran came together to develop a new
constitution. This constitution granted the Iranian people with a bill of rights as well as granted
authority to the Shah to govern over the people. 12 In 1907 Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar took the
throne. The beginning of his reign was rocky as the Anglo-Russian Convention forced Iran to be
split up into three zones: the north for Russia, the southwest to Great Britain, and the remaining
areas as neutral zones. These zones were meant to allow for the two major powers to prepare
against German aggression.

Through this convention came realpolitik where the two past

adversaries put aside their differences for a common purpose: to prevent Germany from gaining
too much control within Europe. 13
In 1908, Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar took action and declared martial law in Iran,
arresting members of the Majles as well as censoring all forms of communication. He declared
the constitution as being void as it went against the Koran due to its secular influences. Civil
war ensued as opposition to Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar began gain support from foreign sources
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as well as leading magnates and other critical figures within the region to fight against the unjust
martial law that was in effect. By 1910, Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar found himself in exile and
the Majles declared his twelve year old son Ahmad Shah the new leader of Iran. 14
The Majles worked quickly to democratize the electoral process as well as elect a
provisional government. However, it was soon found that despite such changes, Iran maintained
a significant limitation due to its shaky economic condition. As the central government found
itself at the crux of a financial crisis, local magnates gained power and status throughout Iran.
They began developing foreign relations and policies that gave them legitimacy within the
international community. 15 Problems continued to intensify within Iran as foreign powers
continued to exert their national interests within Iran, to the detriment of the Iranian people.
Foreign occupation worsened during World War I as the major powers utilized Iranian soil as a
battleground, despite Iran’s declaration of neutrality. 16
Iran’s greatest limitation during the Qajar dynasty was the fact that its neighbors were
rival powers: Great Britain and Russia. Iran often found itself in the middle of a great game for
power struggle between the two nations. By 1917, British presence permeated Iranian society. It
maintained a political and economic control over Iran that threatened the sovereignty of the
nation. Iran’s economy was in ruins and Britain was able to isolate Iran from the rest of the
world and make it reliant on British support. 17

In 1919, the two nations entered into an

agreement in which Britain would assist Iran in stabilizing its economy and military
infrastructure. On Iran’s side, this agreement was intended to assist in protecting Iran from
further invasion. 18 The infiltration by Western powers into Iran brought about the beginning of
the end for Qajar rule. The people of Iran became distrustful of their influence on Iranian society
and further found them to be a threat to their sovereignty of culture and religion. 19 The oil rush in
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the 1890s further accelerated the negative stigma that came about around the idea of capitalism
and Western influence. 20 During this time, various economic concessions had been provided to
these outside governments to the detriment and humiliation of the Iranian people. 21
Representatives from Great Britain and Russia were able to exert much power and
influence within Tehran. The Iranian people soon likened foreign influence as being the central
cause of every national problem and developed a “paranoid style of politics.” 22 Iran’s greatest
limitation during the Qajar dynasty was the fact that its neighbors were rival powers: Great
Britain and Russia. “The relationships between Iran and Russia and Great Britain became
strained as the Anglo-Russian contest for supremacy over Central Asia and excessive British
concern for the defense of India turned Iran into a pawn in the Great Game.” 23 Iran soon became
the central location for the power rivalry between the two great powers. Problems continued to
intensify within Iran as foreign powers continued to exert their national interests within Iran, to
the detriment of the Iranian people. Foreign occupation worsened during World War I as the
major powers utilized Iranian soil as a battleground, despite Iran’s declaration of neutrality. 24
Iran often found itself in the middle of a great game for power struggle between the two nations.
Iranian relations with Great Britain started slowly as both nations acknowledge the
other’s potential as an ally but were distrustful of the motivations behind such a relationship.
Despite this, Iran and Great Britain maintained a seemingly stable level of cooperation in defense
and trade. 25 However, the Qajar rulers soon lost much of its control over Iran as both Russia and
Great Britain developed regulations and protocols for Iranian society. The structural weaknesses
in the government allowed for such a high level of infiltration to occur within Iran, much to the
discontentment of the Iranian people. 26 Great Britain invaded Iran in 1918 under the guise of
wanting to assist the weak Persian government in maintaining order. Soon it became evident that

22

Britain intended to maintain a permanent stronghold over Iran’s economic resources, particularly
its oil industry. 27
On January 14, 1918, the Soviet government wrote to Iran to offer its assistance in
removing British and Turkish troops from Iran. 28 The Russian government further informed Iran
that its debts were being annulled and that any property or assets that had been previously been
seized by Russia were being released back to Iran.

More importantly, Russia pledged to

maintain the sovereignty of Iran and to assist them whenever needed to ensure that no other
foreign power was imposing their policies onto Iran. The Iranian government accepted such
concessions but with some skepticism as to the true intentions behind the changes in Russia’s
foreign policy. 29

Rise of the Shah

There were significant divisions in place within Iran as a consequence of the 1919
Agreement with the British. Though the Agreement had not reached its fruition, there were
already feelings of uncertainty and insecurity that was evident throughout the land as the British
presence was a significant hindrance on Iran’s sovereignty. Members of Iran’s political elite
found the current situation to benefit the British more so than Iran and sought to put a balance on
this relationship. They found that such a balance was a difficult undertaking as Ahmad Shah did
not wish to make any significant changes but rather enjoyed the benefits of British influence on
Iranian society. Further as Soviets began to infiltrate into Iranian society, the power struggle
between the two nations pushed Iran into an increasingly tense feeling of instability. 30 As such,
insurgency grew among the political minds of Iran and an underground movement to overthrow
Ahmad Shah began to form.
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There is no official record by Reza Khan nor Seyyid Zia on the actual events of the coup.
The exact details have been inconsistent and there is uncertainty regarding how Reza Khan and
Seyyid Zia came together to formulate the coup. 31 Regardless of this ambiguity, there are some
elements of the coup that are common knowledge. What is known is that one of the main
instigators of the coup, General Ironside saw a need for a strong government in Iran in order to
allow for the safe withdrawl of British troops in Iran. During one of his many meetings with
Iranian military leader Colonial Smyth, Ironside was introduced to Reza Khan.

He was

impressed with Reza Khan’s performance records and grew convinced that Reza Khan had both
the support of his men and the personality that could lead Iran to stand strong against Soviet
aggression. 32
In addition to emergence of Reza Khan as a major player in Iranian politics, Seyyid Zia
al-Din also entered the arena.

He had long been supportive of the 1919 Anglo-Iranian

Agreement and tried to exert influence in Iran to support a strong relationship with the British.
In June 1920, he proposed that he be positioned as the Governor General of the Caspian in order
to spread anti-Soviet propaganda in the area. 33 As the days went on, Seyyid Zia developed a
strong backing for what would soon become a coup d’état to takeover Iran. He gained incredible
support from the British, even despite his proclaimed intentions to conclude the Soviet-Iranian
Treaty and repeal the 1919 Anglo-Iranian Agreement upon becoming leader of Iran. 34 The
British understood that despite the rhetoric of removing such an agreement, the policy actions
that Seyyid Zia would take would be congruent to British interests in the region. They sent
Herman Norman to see Seyyid Zia in hopes of ensuring that he would in fact be the leader
necessary to usurp the king.
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Simultaneously, British actors, most notably Major General Sir Edmund Ironside, sought
out the assistance of Iranian General Reza Khan. He was a highly regarded military leader
whose unit was both cohesive and well-disciplined. The Ironside encouraged Reza Khan to take
over the Iranian military under the condition that he not turn his back on the British upon
obtaining such power. Reza Khan agreed to such conditions and began taking the critical steps
that would allow him to take over. The British viewed Ahmad Shah as being an ineffectual
leader who would undoubtedly be unable to resist Soviet aggression. This concerned them as
they sought to continue having a strong presence within Iran. These actors knew that Reza Khan
also felt that the deposition of the king was necessary for the betterment of Iranian society and
that a coup would be necessary. 35
Interestingly, Norman and Ironside did not communicate their intentions to one another
throughout much of this time. In fact, understanding that a coup could not take place without a
strong military base, Norman had suggested another military leader to assist Seyyid Zia in the
coup. However, about a week before the coup would be conducted; Norman and Ironside
confided in one another their intentions and Ironside approached Seyyid Zia with the idea of
allowing Reza Khan to serve as the military leader of the nation under Seyyid Zia. 36
On February 21, 1921, General Reza Khan and Seyyid Zia ed-Din led a coup in which
they were able to take over Tehran. 37 By the morning of February 21st the coup had put Iran
under martial law and had occupied all ministries, government buildings, police stations, and
other key establishments. 38 Seyyid Zia ed-Din, a politician with many British contacts, became
the political leader of the coup while Reza Khan stood as its military leader. 39

The two

represented a significant change for Iran as neither were members of the political elite, royalty,
or held titles. 40
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As the new leader of Iran, Seyyid Zia finalized the Soviet-Iranian treaty that had been
started in 1920 and the renouncing of the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919. Also among his
first acts was his declaration of reorganizing the Ministry of Justice to allow the people to submit
complaints, more schools, improvements on the industrial sector, and improved foreign
relations. 41 It appeared as though Iranian relations would move closer to the Soviet Union and
further from Great Britain. 42 However, Seyyid Zia was opposed to Communism and as such he
began making concessions to the British. This inconsistent behavior towards the great powers
made him unpopular among the respective nation’s leadership.

Further exacerbating his

unpopularity was his push for quick reform within Iran at any cost. His reforms were viewed as
radical and in his pursuit he neglected formulating a strong coalition with Reza Khan who had
been critical in his initial takeover.
Seyyid Zia put an order for the arrest of many important politicians. Trouble arose when
those responsible for arresting these individuals demonstrated a clear inexperience and failure to
accurately document the charges against those individuals. Thus, the public began to speculate
that the arrest were mere acts of extortion and abuse of power. Seeyid Zia was left within a
predicament as he could not put anyone to trial without charges but also could not afford to allow
for their release. Consequently, the arrested remained in jail until Seeyid Zia’s resignation. 43
Seeyid Zia also had problems with achieving any of his objectives. Other than the appointment
of some individuals to revise the existing laws of the nation, the Ministry of Justice was not
significantly improved.

More importantly, his foreign policy was under criticism as his

proclaimed directive of appeasing both the British and Soviet government was thwarted by his
actions of selecting many British officials as his “advisers” and the apparent allowance of British
influence over Iran’s finances and military. 44 However, when Seeyid Zia sought out American
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employees to Iran, he strained relations with Britain who grew concerned that the employment of
other foreign powers would challenge its prominence in the nation. Tensions grew between
himself and Reza Khan when he employed British officers into the military without first
discussing the matter with Reza Khan. 45 Reza Khan objected to this employment and after
hundred days of being in power, Seyyid Zia was forced to leave Iran, leaving Reza Khan to pick
up the pieces. 46
Reza Khan had previously brought about the withdrawal of British troops from Iran as
well as created a political environment in which he was the highest authority in the land. His
ability to gather support amongst the public and political leaders within Iran placed him in the
position to rule over the nation. He pushed aside various civilian colleagues in order to over as
the complete ruler of Iran. 47 The British supported his takeover as did many of the intellectuals
within Tehran. However, there was some level of concern over Reza Khan’s authoritarian
tendencies. Reza Khan did not take over right away because he felt it necessary to demonstrate to
the Iranian people his political prowess and ability to consolidate power.
As such, he took some time to take on the role of the supreme leader of Iran. By 1923, he
finally took on the role of Prime Minister. Reza Khan garnered support by the Majlis who
crowned him Shah of Persia in 1925. 48 During his rule, Reza Khan rid Iran of many religious
leaders as he feared they would attempt to diminish his authority within Iran. He ruled with an
uncompromising attitude as did his son Mohammad Reza, his successor. 49
Reza Khan became known as Reza Shah and under his leadership which lasted until
1941; Iran developed itself into a highly centralized state. 50 Reza Shah focused much energy on
state-building with the military developing substantially during his rule and the bureaucracy
within Iran developing into a cohesive and comprehensive structure. “The state-building was
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made possible through oil royalties, extractions from tax delinquents, higher customs duties, and
new taxes on consumer goods.” 51
In 1941, as a result of the tumultuous leadership of Reza Shah during World War II in his
support for Germany, the United States and Russia forced him to step down from his position.
This brought about the beginning of Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule of Iran. Though not as prone
to violence against his opponents as his father, Mohammad Reza Shah also ruled with an iron
fist. Under his leadership relations with the United States grew stronger and corruption within
Iran was rampant.

Iran and the Middle East

Perhaps no other nation in the world has been able to preserve their cultural distinction as
well as the Iranian people. 52 Iran has always considered itself the natural hegemony of its region
due to its rich history of developing major empires dating as far back as sixth century B.C. with
the Achaemenid Empire. 53 The mindset of the Iranian people has been that its size and historical
achievements gives it the right to be the hegemonic power of the Persian Gulf region. Even in
later years as the empires grew smaller, the Iranian people still maintained a feeling of selfperceived superiority. Though it had never been colonized, every leader within Iran has felt the
struggle for power against foreign influence. 54 Consequently the invasions and conquests it has
suffered throughout its past have served to make Iranians distrustful of their neighbors. 55
Iran’s regional politics is often considered in terms of its relations with the Persian Gulf,
the Arab East, and Eurasia. 56 The Persian Gulf is of significant interest to Iran due to its linking
of Iran to a global market for its petroleum industry. 57 Russia’s proximity to the region and high

28

level of influence in the international community made it beneficial for Iran to develop a
cooperative relationship with it.
Unlike the Persian Gulf region, the Middle East was mostly regarded as a region in which
Iran had little to lose.

As one of the only nations within the Middle East that had never been

colonized, Iran felt a sense of superiority over its Arab neighbors.

Thus, Iran had little

deterrence to use caution with regard to how they approached the Middle East.
Under Nasser’s rule of Egypt, ties between the two nations became strained. Unlike the
Shah, Nasser did not support Western influence within the region. As such, he found Iran’s
support of Western-sponsored pacts a severe threat to regional sovereignty and stability. 58
Further adding to the tension was the Shah’s close ties with Israel. Iran’s anti-Arab stance was in
direct confrontation with Egypt’s agenda. The Shah developed closer ties with other states
within the region in hopes of countering Nasser’s influence. 59

The Beginning of the Iranian-Israeli Relationship

Despite popular belief to the contrary, Iran and Israel did not always have the hostile
relationship that it has today. “As far back as 1889, the Iranian king Naser al-din Shah suggested
the idea of creating a Jewish state.” 60 For the first three decades after the creation of the Israeli
state, Iran and Israel maintained close and friendly relations. 61 Israel maintained a relationship
with many Middle Eastern states on the premise of “the enemies of my enemies are my friends”
in which any nation who opposed Arab nationalism could be an ally for Israel.
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As such an

alliance developed between Israel and Iran. The Shah authorized secret flights for Iraqi Jews to
enter into Israel and entered agreements to sell oil to Israel. A strong relationship grew between
Turkey, Iran, and Israel during the years 1961 to 1978. 63
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On July 23, 1960 the Shah publically announced that Iran recognized the existence of
Israel. This proclamation angered much of the Arab world who feared that this movement was
part of a Western-driven movement against the Arab nations. As these nations banded together
and became more radical, ties between Iran and Israel grew closer as both saw it in their national
interests to prevent the spread of Arab influence in the region. 64
Until the fall of the Shah, relations between Israel and Iran were strong. In 1950 Iran
gave Israel de facto recognition of being a state and by 1960 had granted them de jure
recognition. 65

This recognition gravely added to the animosity between Iran and Egypt. 66

Nasser tried to rally other Arab nations against Iran and further pressed that the Arab League
Economic Council place pressure on Iran to stop exporting oil to Israel. 67
After the war of 1967, Iran openly supported Israel. Both nations sent important leaders
into the other’s country to discuss foreign policy and trade agreements. In terms of national
interests, Israel was concerned with obtaining oil from Iran and the Iranian government held high
interest in the Israeli intelligence relating to other Arab countries. Such intelligence was used to
train the Iranian secret service SAVAK personnel. 68
The relationship between Tehran and Israel grew closer after the June 1967 Six-Day War
where the Israeli Defense Forces won a battle against Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies.
“The Shah believed that a strong and technologically advanced army such as Israel’s would
elevate Iran’s strategic posture as a major regional power.” 69

However, such a positive

relationship was not supported by many Iranians who did not agree with the Shah’s support for
the Zionist ally.
The geopolitics in Iran assisted in further developing the relationship between Iran and
Israel. Despite national discontentment with the relationship, the Shah continued to negotiate
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contracts with Israel. By the mid-1970s, the arms relation had grown to such level that Israel had
developed a missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. This missile would never reach Iran
as a result of the 1979 revolution. 70 After the October 1973 war, the Arab world boycotted the
selling of oil to Western states. Oil prices consequently soared and Iran found itself to benefit
greatly as a result of its noninvolvement with this boycott as it provided the West with its oil
needs. Further, Iran entered into several business projects with Israel, particularly in its TransAsiatic Oil. 71
In pursuit of establishing itself as a technologically advanced nation, Iran sought out
Israeli assistance in developing its nuclear program. There was a strong alliance between the 2
states due greatly to the strategic benefit and ethical factors. Both the Shah and Israel have found
that an alliance between the two nations against their Arab neighbors was of grave necessity.
This relationship was predicated on a shared interest in preventing the spread of Arab influence
in the region, in particular, Iraqi influence. 72
The Shah’s closeness with Israel was a topic of much contention within Iran. Growing
pro-Arabism began emerging within the nation and more importantly, a strong resentment grew
against the Shah. Israel began noticing the shift within Iranian society and began to worry about
the manner in which Iran’s regional role was expanding. 73

Iran and the West

Of all the challenges and threats to Iran’s stronghold in the region, the most difficult to
overcome has been and continues to be the West. Iran felt the influence of Western infiltration
in the “Great Game” played between Great Britain and Russia for control over Central Asia. 74
Further challenging to Iran was the battle among Western powers for control over Iran during
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World War I. The end of World War I had left much of the West to increase its oil consumption
and as such Great Britain increased its presence and trade with Iran. 75 Additionally Germany
tried to gain a stronghold within Iran to assist it in its trade capabilities. 76 While it had some
success in this respect, the end of the war stifled some of its influence and by the time Reza Shah
had come into power, Germany had to reestablish its presence within Iran.
The beginning of Reza Shah’s rule brought positive improvements for Iran’s image
within the international community. Various treaties were established and Iran focused on a
system of collaboration and cooperation. Additionally adding to Iran’s improved image was its
joining of the League of Nations. While the League never fully launched as a consequence of
America’s refusal to join, the fact that Iran entered into the League was a positive development
to Iran’s foreign policy choices. 77
Iran’s ties with Russia were at odds in 1926 as a result of Iran’s failure to ratify a
commercial treaty that had been signed in 1923. Russia launched an embargo on Iranian goods
which cost Iran greatly as its exports to Russia were high. 78 However, Reza Shah remained
driven to improve its relations with all foreign powers, including Russia and on October 27,
1931, it ratified the treaty to which concessions were made to give Russia a monopoly over the
sugar, matches, and petroleum produced in northern Iran. 79
In terms of Iranian-US relations there was a significant movement towards cooperation
between the two nations.

Reza Shah understood the extent to which American influence

dominated over international politics and as such he needed to ensure a positive relationship with
the United States in order to garner support from other foreign actors. He proclaimed his desire
for the improvement of US-Iranian relations and dismissed any tensions or incidents that could
have caused negative ties to the US as having been misunderstandings and not caused or directed
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by his leadership or consultation. 80 This positive development was short-lived as Reza Shah
sought to expel all foreign influences from Iranian society. He cut off mailings of American
publications and censured many American news sources that criticized his regime. 81
The reality was that Reza Shah was willing to allow for any Western power to hold
influence in Iran so long as their influence could be contained and that they did not maintain a
position that could overtake the nation.

There were concerns of how the advancement of

technology and movement towards a Westernized democracy that Reza Shah seemed to be
interested in could lead Iran into a false sense of security that could leave it vulnerable to
uprising. 82 Surprisingly, he was receptive to American influence during the interlude leading up
to World War II but the United States’ national policy of isolationism pushed Iran into the arms
of Nazi Germany. 83 Germany supported this relationship through its investment in Iranian
communications and transportation, particularly its air transportation. 84 Germany’s assistance to
Iran brought about a surge of industrialization that helped stimulate the Iranian economy.
Iran maintained a shroud of neutrality during World War II though indirectly supporting
Germany. However, when Germany attacked Russia in 1944, Great Britain and Russia placed
pressure on Iran to expel its German influences. Needing to transport materials and supplies to
Russia, Great Britain had to cut through Iran. Reza Shah tried to ignore the demands by the
Allied forces but on August 25, Soviet and British forced invaded Iran. 85
On September 28, 1941, Reza Shah left Iran, leaving his son to rule over Iran. Soviet and
British forces were still present in Iran and the country was divided into three zones: a British, a
Soviet, and a neutral zone. With the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the
three nations, Iran was promised defense against any future German aggression and a pledge that
the foreign powers would remove their troops from Iran within six months. 86
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The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union once again demonstrated
the extent to which the West could place significant influence over Iran. 87 From as early as the
Shah’s rule, relations with the United States have been strained to a degree as the US has
attempted to maintain a significant role within the Middle East.

However, the Shah took the

challenge and developed strategies to work with the United States rather than revolt against it.
The end of World War II brought to Iran a bipolar international system motivated to
maintain power within the nation. 88 When Russia tried to demand an increase in oil concessions,
the Iranian government found itself again at odds with the great power. To resolve the crisis,
Iran found itself compromising with Russia to form a joint oil company with the Soviets in return
for withdraw of Soviet troops from Iranian territory. 89
As the Cold War rivalry grew between the US and Russia, Iran once again found itself in
the crossfire between great powers. This “New Great Game” was a fight over control in Iran and
over the Caspian region. Rivalry between the two intensified as oil needs grew among the
Western states. The Soviets grew concerned with Iran’s participation in the Baghdad Pact and its
bilateral agreement with the US. For Russia, ties with Iran were of significant geographical
importance for its exertion of power in the region. 90 Iran was uneasy of the possible
repercussions that negative relations with either the Soviet or US could cost the nation; the Shah
was resilient in trying to maintain positive ties with both. 91 The Soviet government was on high
alert by the various agreements that were made between the US and Iran.
The shared border between Iran and the Soviet Union made them likely allies in the
Persian Gulf region. In 1970 Iran and the Soviet Union signed a fifty-year trade agreement to
which Iran provided the Soviet Union with substantive amounts of oil and gas. 92 However, this
relationship was strained due to Iran’s close ties to the United States. Iran played a critical role
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in promoting US interests in the area and this limited Iran’s ability to have stronger ties with the
Soviet Union.
The United States emerged as the uncontested global superpower at the end of the Cold
War. 93 In this role, the US imposed several regulations on trade and attempted to pressure the
international community to change some of its policies regarding funding and trade relations
with nations that it deemed dangerous for its own national interest. This current system made a
difficult situation for many of the poorer states due to their reduced ability to form alliances and
to maintain leverage against global leaders such as the US. 94 The US’ interest in a strong
connection with Iran was driven by a desire to reduce Soviet influence throughout the region.
The United States government was concerned over the Communist threat that could spread and
tried diligently to put in place cooperative relations with Iran. 95
America’s role in overthrowing Mossadegh brought about an increase in US relations
with Iran. The Shah aligned himself with the United States in hopes of promoting his agenda of
developing Iran into a significant regional power. Positive relations with the US allowed for
increased security against outside threats but at the cost of straining ties with non-aligned nations
and with the USSR. 96 Further, Iran gained much economic and military support from the United
States who was willing to sell the nation military equipment that would allow Iran to protect
itself from future conflict. 97
Understanding the complex role America was playing in the international community, the
Shah developed a strategy of cooperative relations in order to pursue his agenda for Iran,
particularly in the realm of nuclear development.

His approach towards the West was

controversial for many of the more traditionalistic leaders within Iran who tended to follow a
more isolated policy for Iran. He understood Iran’s limitations in the world caused largely by its
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insufficiently formulated nuclear program, lack of a stable industrial sector, and its newness into
the global economy.

The Shah also noted the uneasy trend of many developing nations,

particularly within the Persian Gulf and Middle East, becoming unlikely allies and dependents of
the US. However, such developments came at a cost to the Shah as the Iranian people began to
resent Western infiltration into its society. They viewed the vast changes as bringing about
immorality, dependency, and corruption to Iran which ultimately led to the demise of the Shah’s
rule.

The Shah and Nuclear Development

The Shah felt some level of concern over Iran’s future energy needs and prompted the
diversification of Iran’s energy sources. 98 In 1968, Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in hopes of moving forward negotiations with the United States regarding its nuclear
program. The NPT recognizes every nations “inalienable right to develop, research, produce,
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and acquire equipment,
materials, and scientific and technological information.” 99
Iran’s nuclear program had a late beginning in comparison to Israel who began its nuclear
research in 1948. 100 Iran’s nuclear program got its beginnings with the US Atoms for Peace
program in the early 1950s. 101 The Shah had sent some students abroad to learn about nuclear
power, among who was Akbar Etemad who later became chancellor of Tehran’s New University
and helped develop the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). 102 By the time of the
forming of the AEOI, Tehran had begun its interest in moving its nuclear program from civilian
to military application. 103

36

Reza Shah was focused on building his power within the Middle East and consequently
spent a great deal of energy purchasing weapons for Iran.

Such attempts often included

purchasing weapons from the US at any cost. This exchange was profitable for both nations both
economically and in terms of their foreign relations. 104 However, the US became wary of Iran’s
ambitions with regards to its nuclear program, fearing that it too would build a nuclear weapon
under the guise of civilian purposes. 105
Recently declassified US government documents indicate that the United States has long
feared Iran’s technological advancements and how such improvements may assist in their
obtaining nuclear weapons. The report demonstrates that in the even under Mohammad Shah’s
leadership in the 1970’s the US government feared Iran’s attempts to produce plutonium as it
may lead to the onset of nuclear weapon technology within Iran.
In the 1970’s the Shah of Iran argued to the international community that Iran should
have the right to develop nuclear energy capabilities as do other nations in the world.106
Consequently, the Shah developed a plan to build twenty-three nuclear power plants with the
assistance of Western powers. These plants were intended to provide electricity to Iran and other
Gulf states.

Having signed onto the Non-Proliferation Treaty gave Iran the legitimacy of

pursuing a nuclear program for development purposes. 107
The Shah was revered as being a “regional policeman” that would serve American
interests in the region. As such, the US government had no qualms in assisting Iran with
obtaining the technology necessary to extract plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel which would
be necessary in developing a nuclear bomb. 108 However as tensions began to develop within
Iran, American leaders grew concerned over the political stability within Iran. Consequently,
Washington tried to restrict Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s by developing
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a pact with Iran that would allow Iran to buy US reactors under the condition that it cannot
produce plutonium or other nuclear weapons fuel without the support of the US government.
However, such attempts to keep Iran from nuclear technology were found to be futile as Iran
simply sought out the assistance of other nations such as Russia, China, and Pakistan to further
its program.
While the Shah focused his agenda on developing nuclear weapons and its nuclear
program, other areas of Iranian society were ignored. By the 1970s, the Shah had redefined
Iranian democracy to a condition that brought in elements of autocratic rule. 109 Corruption and
economic instability plagued the nation as an elitism developed among the imams and the
religious clerics that allowed for a grave disparity in wealth and prosperity in Iran. Moreover,
the Shah developed policies to cater to the West, particularly the United States in hopes that an
improved relationship would further his nuclear agenda. Among such concessions included the
allowance of “extra-territorial rights” to all Americans working in Iran that would exempt them
from being tried in an Iranian court system. 110 However such closeness between Iran and the
United States did little to greatly improve relations between the two countries and served to
further agitate the Iranian people against the Shah.

The Shah and Iranian Society

During his rule, Reza Khan rid Iran of many religious leaders as he feared they would
attempt to diminish his authority within Iran. Reza Khan focused much energy on state-building
with the military developing substantially during his rule and the bureaucracy within Iran
developing into a cohesive and comprehensive structure. “The state-building was made possible
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through oil royalties, extractions from tax delinquents, higher customs duties, and new taxes on
consumer goods.” 111
He put forth military conscription in which Iranians were required to speak Persian and to
have identity cards with family names. In the spirit of such rules, Reza Shah added the name
Pahlavi, thus founding the Pahlavi Dynasty. 112 Reza Shah soon began to secularize Iranian
society through such measures as replacing the Muslim lunar calendar with a solar one and
banning tribal and traditional clothes. 113 Women’s rights were greatly improved and liberalized
and the educational system within Iran had a significant overhaul. 114
He was determined to push aside any foreign influence that went against the interests of
Iran. As such, he maintained a somewhat distant relationship toward the Soviet Union and Great
Britain. 115

Reza Shah was careful with regard to the United States, understanding Iran’s

limitations caused by its socioeconomic condition and political disposition throughout the
international community. He allowed for bilateral ties with America in pursuit of Iran’s national
interests with a level of restraint to prevent Iran from falling into the role of the West’s puppet. 116
While he was somewhat resistant to completely dismissing Iran’s Persian culture, Reza
Shah did allow for such social reforms as the unveiling of women and Western dress for men. 117
In terms of social reform, the government called for the removal of any words of foreign origins
from the Persian language and the uniformity of calling the nation “Iran” rather than “Persia.”118
His greatest legacy however, would be in his education reform. He issued regulations that would
not allow for Christianity to be taught in schools, required that student be taught Islamic law, and
disallowed the use of outside languages to be used to instruct Iranian students. 119
However, in terms of developing technocrats and other specialists within Iran, Reza Shah
understood the limitations that existed within Iran. While he preferred that Iranian youth gain
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training and their education from within Iran, the reality was that Iranian society was not at the
stage of development that would allow for the best level of training for them. Consequently,
Reza Shah supported the idea of Iranian students going abroad to get educated in hopes that they
would be able to bring back the skills learned to teach future Iranians. 120

He provided

scholarships to send students to Europe, constructed thousands of school buildings, and created
Tehran University to promote the education of Iranian youth from within the nation. 121
Economically, he invested government funds to developing the industrial and commercial
sector of society. He was determined to establishing a self-sufficient Iran that could stand as an
important regional power. 122 For his short-term fixes for Iran’s economy, Reza Shah suggested
the investment in the construction of factories and dams, focusing on agriculture, and expanding
exports through use of the state budget. In preparing for the long term, he stressed the need to
overhaul Iran’s agricultural sector and diversify the economy through promotion of foreign
investments. 123 However, the regulations and limitations imposed on foreign powers under Reza
Shah’s leadership stifled the potential of foreign investments.
Through his reforms, Reza Shah was able to gain complete control over all aspects of
Iran. He is often referred to as “The Great Reformer,” “Modernizer,” “and “Secularizer.” In
maintaining control over the economic, military, social, and political arenas within Iran, Reza
Shah was able to pursue his ideas for improvement and brought about a strong centralized
government that has influenced the current Iranian society. 124 However, his reforms came at a
high price for the Iranian people as corruption grew, the Westernization of Iran was prevalent,
and the economy was unstable.
When forced to step down in 1941, his son Mohammad Reza took over the rule and
followed similar suit though he was more inclined to imprison dissenters rather than have them
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killed. By the time of Mohammad Reza Shah’s term, the Iranian populace was discontent with
the current system of government and insurgency was rising. The Shah soon began to secularize
Iranian society through such measures as replacing the Muslim lunar calendar with a solar one
and banning tribal and traditional clothes. 125

Women’s rights were greatly improved and

liberalized and the educational system within Iran had a significant overhaul. 126
Economic conditions were poor after Reza Shah’s abdication. The presence of foreign
military within Iran limited Iran’s production capabilities. Moreover, the unstable political
structure lent itself to problems of portraying a strong political system. Political parties arose
with many unleashing major criticism of Reza Shah’s rule and of the current government. 127
Mohammad Reza Shah ruled over Iran in accordance to his vision for Iran without much concern
of whether his vision was truly in the best interest of the nation.
In 1944, Mohammad Mossadegh came into the Iranian political arena through his
election into the Iranian parliament. 128 He entered the political arena at a time when nationalism
was on a rise as the Iranian people had grown tired of the government’s inability to eliminate
corruption among the political elite. 129 This nationalism sought to fight against the social and
economic inequalities made graver by the Shah’s neglect.
By the time of his being selected Prime Minister, Mossadegh had a considerable
challenge with the growing agitation against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that functioned
under British control. 130 The company functioned in a manner that antagonized the national
interests of Iranian society. Thus, Mossadegh believed it necessary to try to regain control over
the company. Under Mossadegh, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company became nationalized. This
development fueled a strong sentiment of nationalism within Iran but cost Iran to get to the point
of bankruptcy. 131 He tried to garner support within Iran by launching himself as a leader against
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the imperialistic influences of the West. 132 With Mossadegh in a position of power, relations
between the US and Iran grew strained. An oil embargo was implemented by many European
powers which served to critically impact Iran’s economy. 133
As Dr. Mossadegh continued to pursue political and societal changes within Iran, the
Shah saw his own power being challenged by the nationalist movement. As elections came
around for the Majlis, the nationalists attempted to take over power in the legislature, to the
detriment of the Shah. 134 When the National Front was able to secure the seats in parliament, the
Shah saw his power being threatened.

Consequently, the Shah attempted to dismissed

Mossadegh. Mossadegh resisted and the Shah decided to flee Iran. 135
On April 1951, Dr. Mossadegh took over as the leader of Iran. He put into place changes
to rid Iran of its British influence and strengthen Iran’s self-reliance. He was regarded as a
national hero and took on this role to make political, economic, and societal changes directed at
improving the lives of the Iranian people and ridding Iran of its reliance on foreign powers. 136
Under his leadership, some freedoms were granted such as liberalization of the press, the
allowance of various political groups to function within Iran, and the release of several political
prisoners. 137
Mossadegh was a secular liberal and as such his relations with the Iranian clergy was
strained. He stressed his belief that the clergy should be involved in Iranian society but should
not hold positions of power. This mentality brought about resistance by the clerics which
contributed to his being overthrown in 1953. 138 Further adding to the elements that led to his
removal from office was his inability to develop a clear strategy of how to rule without the
intervention of nationalism once the goals of the National Front had been accomplished. 139
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The British intelligence service SIS reached out the United States for assistance in
overthrowing Mossadegh from power. The SIS was successful in infiltrating Iran’s political
bodies and had begun preparations for the coup even prior to garnering American support in this
endeavor. 140

The US government was concerned by the growing anti-American, pro-

Communism sentiments that were developing under the nationalist movement that grew under
Mossadegh’s rule. 141 As such, the US took charge and together with Great Britain sponsored a
coup against Mossadegh in 1953 which allowed the Shah to return to Iran and continue his
rule. 142 This coup caused significant problems to public opinion that began viewing the Shah
and his son as agents of Western imperialism. 143 The coup turned Mossadegh into a national
hero and further ignited support for the nationalistic front. 144 It is believed that the fall of
Mossadegh provided the leverage for the 1979 revolution as Iranians saw how a national hero
could be brought down by foreign enemies. 145
Restored into power, the Shah tried to ally himself with the United States. Iran joined the
Baghdad Pact on October 1955 with Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain. Though not
officially a member, the US promised to assist the members of the pact in preventing the spread
of communism within the Middle East. 146 However, by 1959, Iraq had withdrawn from the pact
and it was renamed the Central Treaty Organization which pledged to promote security and
cooperation in the Middle East.
US President Kennedy was concerned over the high corruption and insufficient focus on
Iran’s domestic concerns and told the Shah that US assistance would cease going towards
military improvements and instead would go to the socioeconomic problems of Iran. Though
concerned with such conditions, the Shah conceded to the US and launched his “White
Revolution” on economic and social reform. 147 He prompted changes to Iran’s social programs,
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land reform, and women’s issues. 148 Having regained his power, the Shah ruled with complete
disregard for the constitutional limitations to his position and with little accountability. 149
There were many Iranians who were opposed to the Shah’s liberalization practices as
they fear he was leading Iran into a system of instability. The West has progressed into its
current state of development through a timely process and opponents to the liberalization of
Iran’s society were concerned that trying to force Iran into a similar mold without allowing it to
develop its infrastructure would destine Iran into a failed system. 150
Under his leadership, Iran’s economy found itself at incredible heights, fuelled by the
high oil revenues that were being generated at the time. 151 His shift in social structure, however,
further built up tensions between social classes, particularly as the intelligentsia and urban
working classes which had quadrupled in size were constantly being denied the right to
organize. 152

These social tensions served to also increase political radicalism, of which

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini played an important role within. 153
Under the Shah’s rule Iran’s educational system was strengthened greatly with more
schools being developed throughout the nation. The education system lacked a clear direction.
It appeared as though the only concern of the Shah’s regime was to build as many educational
facilities as possible without necessarily having a clear objective for what such an educational
system would result in. 154 The curriculum neglected to teach Iranian culture and history much to
the discontentment of the Iranian people. Moreover, the more people were able to get an
education, the greater the disparity grew among the political elite and the masses. Corruption
was everywhere as only select individuals from within specific family ties were given the
opportunity to lead Iran. 155
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The revolution in Iran seemed inevitable due to the Shah’s alienation of the Iranian
people and customs. In a society that prided itself on nationalism, the Shah emerged as the result
of a CIA overthrow of Mossadeq.

While other nations focused on being neutral in their

international focus, the Shah took a clear stance of support for the West, often ridiculing or
dismissing the efforts of the non-aligned movement. 156 The Shah’s inability to prevent Dr.
Mossadegh’s takeover and that the Iranian people backed him in this takeover foreshadowed his
inevitable demise. 157
The Iranian people saw the Shah’s regime as being autocratic and insignificant. Without
a real system of checks and balances, the Shah was able to rule without concern of other political
leaders countering his decisions.

Additionally, the Shah and his regime brought a seeming

laziness towards actually leading Iran and instead appeared more interested in gaining popularity
among Western states and garnering as much personal wealth as was possible. Talks of social
development programs were largely regarded as lip-service aimed to raise public opinion but the
Shah lacked a substantive plan of action for pursuing any form of social reform. 158
The Shah tried to make Iran’s oil industry an economic stronghold but did so at the cost
of other areas of Iran’s economy. He lacked the significant changes in the industrialization that
would allow for Iran to be independent and self-sufficient. 159 Additionally, Iranian’s felt that the
Shah had severely neglected Iran’s agricultural sector and rural areas. The imbalance in the
Shah’s economic reforms cost Iran greatly and launched it into a considerably poor economic
condition. 160
In regaining his power the Shah became extremely dictatorial. He ruled forcibly and any
opposition was quickly silenced. His reforms lent themselves to the alienation of many Iranian
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political leaders and infuriated the masses. 161 The public grew distrustful of the Shah’s regime
and saw it as being entirely too dependent of the US and highly corrupt.
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CHAPTER THREE:
REVOLUTION AND CHANGE: THE KHOMEINI YEARS
Insurgency and Revolution

Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was born on September 24, 1902 in a village in Khomein.
His father Sayyid Mostafa was murdered in 1903 by a landlord after not abiding by his
regulations. He came from a history of sayyids and religious scholars and knew of the struggles
that his family had gone through. 1 By the age of three, Khomeini and his family felt the effects
of British and Russian imperialism within Iran. The two nations tried to have a strong influence
in Iran’s constitutional revolution of 1905-1911 and prompted the Anglo-Russian Convention
which divided Iran into three zones. This coupled with the dissolving of the Second Majlis in
December 1911 led to significant tensions in the nation. 2 By his teen years, Khomeini had
witnessed so much injustice that he grew resistant against foreign influence within Iran and saw
it as being the cause for all the economic and sociopolitical problems within Tehran. 3
When Reza Khan Shah staged his coup d’etat in 1921, he unleashed a series of
regulations aimed at secularizing Iranian society and bringing Iran into the modernity of the
times. Such efforts often angered the religious cleric within Iran as the Shah continued to
establish regulations that went against Islamic law. When the Shah sent out troops to murder
madrasa students who were protesting the arrest of two clerics, he further caused a rift between
himself and the religious cleric.

Khomeini became angry with the disrespect and relative

dismissal towards the religious cleric in Iran by the Shah and believed that the Shah’s
modernizing program was an attempt by the West to infiltrate Iran’s political structure.
Despite being a religious cleric, Khomeini strongly believed that religious scholars
should serve as the moral guide of the nation but not as the political leaders. 4 This notion seems
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interesting when one considers the manner in which Khomeini later reconstructed the Iranian
political structure during his rule though he did reflect such sentiments in his later actions.
Khomeini acted in other ways that was vastly different from other religious clerics in that he
lived on a meager income, only took one wife, and combined his religious studies with his study
of law, philosophy, and ethics. 5 Khomeini utilized his studies in promoting his vision for Iran.
Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini spoke out against the Shah on many occasions which led to
his being exiled to Turkey. The more the Shah developed policies to provide allowances to the
“Great Satan,” the more strongly Khomeini spoke out against the Shah’s regime. He attacked
the Shah for his failure to respect Islam and went on to proclaim that his orders had no value
since they are not in line with Islamic beliefs. Public opinion in Tehran grew resentment against
the Shah and soon Khomeini was able to garner enough support to launch a revolution. 6 Led by
Khomeini, a large resistance against the Shah emerged that pinned the people against the
government.
Khomeini was successful in garnering support for the Revolution due to his ability to
relate the message of Islamic revival in the region to the reigning Iranian popular sentiment of
Iranian supremacy over the region. 7 He preached the need for justice in Iran to rid the nation of
the tyranny and corruption within the government as well as the decline in morality as a
consequence of Western imperialism. 8 Unlike the rest of the clerical community, Khomeini did
not attempt to propagate his message through a strict discourse on Islam but rather married the
ideas of leftist discourse and philosophy as a means of encouraging the Iranian populace to
embrace the changing climate of the political world. 9
Khomeini focused much energy on portraying the Shah as a weak leader due to his
reverence for Western influence to infiltrate Iranian policies. 10 Iran’s revolutionary ambitions
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were inspired in part by Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
the World Order.” Samuel Huntington proposed that “modernization in the economic and social
realms generates new demands and tensions on the political realm.” 11 This idea was supported
by the fact that the more social changes that the government imposed onto Iran, the more
political instability that came about within Iran. Copies of this essay were dispersed among the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), among which included Yahya Safavi, the presentday commander-in-chief, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the current president. The IRGC was
established by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 to combat any opposition to his regime.
He criticized the Shah for increasing the gap between the rich and the poor and for failing
to develop a sound industrial infrastructure. 12 Moreover, Khomeini argued that the inequality
among social classes was the result of the Western capitalism that the Shah allowed to have
influence Iranian society. 13 In the summer of 1941, the Soviet Union and Great Britain invaded
Iran and forced the people to assimilate various foreign customs that undermined Iran’s Islamic
traditions and forced the nation into a system of modernity, injustice, and imperialism that it had
not been accustomed to and led to the end of Reza Shah’s rule. 14 After the abdication of Reza
Shah, his son took over the country and continued to push the modernization policies.
By the fall of 1962, Khomeini took a more aggressive approach toward the Mohammad
Shah regime when he opposed a new law that would allow for elections for public office but did
not require that candidates running be Muslim and allowed women to vote. 15 Things further
became strained when the Shah granted concessions to the United States in his promotion of the
“White Revolution.”
Khomeini saw the Shah’s “White Revolution” as bringing imperialism and immorality to
Iran. When the Shah began a public campaign against the clergy, Khomeini responded by
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vehemently denouncing the regime.

Riots began to spread throughout Tehran to which

Mohammad Shah had Khomeini arrested. The Shah released him within a few weeks which
prompted Khomeini to further exacerbate the situation. He publically supported riots against the
Shah and Western influence. He supported the violent protests that erupted throughout the
country. In retaliation, the Shah proceeded to expel Khomeini to Turkey in 1964 and then to
Najaf, Iraq in January 1965. 16
During his time in Najaf, Khomeini found himself among other leftist-Islamic clerics
who promoted ideas of social justice through Islamic principles. The Arab loss of the 1967 War
with Israel gave Khomeini more fuel to inspire Arab unity. He warned of the influence and
dangers that Israel and the West could have on the Arab world. According to Khomeini, the only
means to counter this threat is through Islam. 17 Unlike other Islamic leaders and revolutionaries,
Khomeini did not put much emphasis on the differences between Shiite and Sunni Muslims but
rather focused on their common threats and on the need to promote social justice within the Arab
world.
As tensions continued within Iran, Khomeini focused on relaying his message of a
unified Islamic front against foreign aggression. He remained exiled from Iran, proclaiming his
refusal to return to Iran until the Shah’s departure. 18 Meanwhile, the Shah was continuing to
redefine Iran’s national identity through public discourses on the role of pre-Islamic religions
and cults in Iran’s history and replacing various Islamic cultural references (such as the Islamic
calendar) with pre-Islamic ones. 19 This coupled with the growing socioeconomic concerns that
were resulting from the oil-financed industrialization and Westernization that the Shah continued
to stimulate into Iranian society fueled significant discontentment within Iran. Iranians saw the
manner in which members of Iranian leadership and their families went around Tehran
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displaying their lavish Western goods. The elite developed highly corrupt practices and ruled
Iran with little regard to the social and cultural problems within the nation. 20
As the Shah continued his attack on the Shiite identity, many Iranians felt the only
manner in which to get rid of American influence and resist the Shah’s anti-Shiite developments
was to take on the Shah’s regime itself. 21 During this time, he preached of the need for a new
type of leader which would be familiar with Islamic law, be morally just, and be a religious
member. His promotion of this idea helped prompt him to the role of the Iranian religious
leader. 22 Khomeini took advantage of this growing sentiment and in 1977 he instructed his
followers to distribute tapes of his preaching throughout Iran. 23
The Shah’s inability to silence opposition forces took a toll as Khomeini’s support
continued to grow within Iran. Interestingly enough outside of Iran itself, the idea of revolution
within Iran was not one that was easily predicted.

The Shah knew there was some

discontentment among Iranians but did not consider them serious threats to his power. The
Soviets also did not believe that a revolution was on the horizon though it hoped that some
changes in Iran as the Shah had moved Iran into a direction that did not suit its interests. 24 The
Soviets were not the only ones to fail to predict the revolution brewing within Iran. The United
States’ intelligence also failed to predict the inevitable downfall of the Shah. The inability of the
Shah and of foreign powers to have seen the warning signs of the pending revolution were
surprising though there is little doubt that had they predicted Khomeini’s takeover the revolution
would have still taken place as the Iranian populace had grown tired of the Shah’s ineffectual
rule.
On October 1977, Khomeini was dealt a difficult blow with the death of his son Mostafa
who he believed had been murdered by the Shah’s SAVAK unit. He did not mourn the death
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publically but when his father-in-law Ayatollah Saqafi-Tehrani published an obituary of the
death, the Iranian public sent him very public condolences that ultimately led to the grand
ayatollahs of Qom to host memorial service in a manner that seemed to indicate Khomeini’s role
as “supreme leader” of Iran. This moment foreshadowed his future positioning within Iranian
politics. 25 The Shah tried to paint Khomeini as a homosexual and a Western spy as a means of
diminishing Khomeini’s influence within Iran but this backfired as Khomeini’s supporters took
to the streets to protest. The Shah retaliated by sending his troops to attack them and on
September 8, 1978; hundreds of Iranians were killed in Jaleh Square on a day that is remembered
as “Black Friday.” For the following weeks, over fifteen hundred Iranians were killed. On
December 10-11, 1978, a million Iranians, including officers and students attacked the Shah’s
Imperial Guard.

By January 17th, the Shah and his family left Iran and two weeks later,

Khomeini returned to Iran and took on the role of its new leader. 26
Khomeini’s triumphant takeover of Iran marked a significant development for both Iran
and the Muslim world. His revolution did more than just replace the reigning government but
also served to change the social order of the nation and of the Muslim world. 27 During his first
two years in power, Khomeini was able to establish Islamic ideology as the prevailing national
philosophy and developed a new constitution that would allow for the continuity of his ideas
long after he ceased being the leader of Iran. 28

New Leader, New Direction

Khomeini is often classified as a revolutionary idealist and a fundamentalist leader. He
emerged onto the Iranian political arena as the charismatic authority. His rule came about as a
response to the social crisis of the nation and as the leader of the Islamic Republic, he designated
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the rules for the nation. 29 Khomeini grew up witnesses the various wars that led to Western
occupation of Iran. He watched as corruption grew within the Pahlavi dynasty and the manner in
which the West attempted to infiltrate Iranian society through Western modernization. 30
Consequently he depicted his new political structure as being necessary for the prosperity of
morality within Tehran. He painted Western philosophy towards Iran as being a double-edged
sword as its style of governance would provide more freedoms to the people at the cost of an
immoral and corrupt society. 31
Khomeini developed a system of political duality in which there is a spiritual authority as
well as a political authority. This system of complex bureaucracy with differing institutions and
political factions juggling for power within Iran has become a constant within Iran. 32
Additionally, the new political structure would allow for stability and continuity within the
government as the nonelected leadership could act to counter revolt by the masses and would
allow for the promotion of Islamic values as the central force behind Iran’s politics. 33 The
Islamic Republic was divided into two centers of political authority: the religious component
consisting of the unelected Supreme Leader and Guardian Council charged with maintaining the
values of Islam through ultimate authority over the nation’s affairs and the elected component
consisting of the President, Majlis, and municipal councils. 34
In the beginning years of Khomeini’s rule, the Islamic Republic maintained many
characteristics of a totalitarian regime as defined by Juan Linz in his work Totalitarian and
Authoritarian Regimes due to Khomeini’s position as the ultimate religious and political
authority, the one party system within Iran, and the religious element of the regime. 35 Khomeini
recognized the need to gain legitimacy from the modernists within Iran and consequently was
open to cooperating with such leaders as Mehdi Bazargan and Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr during his
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early years. 36 However, as Khomeini continued working with Bazargan, he grew concerns over
Bazargan’s liberal approach to Shiism. Bazargan wanted to limit the role of the clerics and place
the legislative authority back in the hands of the parliament. Khomeini grew nervous of this and
feared that Bazargan was attempting to launch a counterrevolution. Consequently, he stopped
supporting Bazargan and his policies to the point of driving Bazargan into resignation. 37 By
November 1979, Iran had approved a new constitution that provided the manner in which
leadership would be selected. This constitution further limited the authority of the Majlis by
granting the Guardian Council veto power. Khomeini further affirmed that clerics should not
hold high leadership roles such as President or parliament as a means in which to balance the
power within Iran. 38
Khomeini’s regime confiscated the business of those who had fled the country following
the fall of the Shah. Private Banks were put under state control and were changed to adapt to the
various development programs that Khomeini wanted to pursue to improve Iranian society. 39
Khomeini felt pressure to strengthen the Islamic faith within Iranian society as well as to reform
the agricultural sector of Iran. He developed the Islamic Interest Free Loan Funds to establish
religious foundations and drafted the Land Allocation and Rehabilitation law to redistribute the
land that had been seized by the Shah. 40
All social areas were reformed to incorporate Islamic ideology throughout Iran,
particularly within schools. He eliminated all remnants of secular or liberal institutions within
the state.

Women’s rights were put under attack in the quest of removing all Western

tendencies in the Islamic state. Many women lost their jobs and lost their freedoms of marriage
and dress, as the Ayatollah imposed regulations that required them to be veiled at all times. 41
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Despite the international movement towards the developing nuclear programs, Iran’s
nuclear program was pushed to the side as Khomeini’s regime regarded nuclear weapons as a
mechanism for Western imperialism to place influence over the Middle East. 42 It is believed that
Iran was close to developing nuclear power under the Shah but was unable to do so as a result of
the 1979 Revolution. 43 However, “as a Shiite Muslim theologian, Khomeini believed nuclear
power to be evil as it is forbidden in Islam to murder innocents, even in the face of warfare.” 44
The US decision to drop nuclear bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima was evidence to Khomeini
and his followers of the evilness of West.

Consequently Khomeini canceled the plans for the

installation of nuclear power plants that had been in the works since the Shah’s rule. 45
While there is no clear evidence that confirms how Khomeini felt about nuclear weapons
after the Six-Year War with Iraq, there is growing evidence that seems to indicate that he did
move past his initial stance of complete opposition to such a program. Members of his regime
convinced him of the need to restart the nuclear program as a means of improving the scientific
and technological infrastructure in Iran to assist in challenging the Iraqis more effectively. 46
Though Khomeini took several steps to restrict Iran’s nuclear program, other leadership
with Iran continued to believe in the geostrategic merit of developing the program. However in
1979, the US stopped delivering uranium to the Tehran Nuclear Research Center as a result of
the 1979 hostage crisis. 47 The November 1979 hostage situation pushed Iran’s fledgling nuclear
program further on the backburner as the government focused on the 444 day confrontation
against the United States. 48 The situation launched a strong anti-American sentiment within Iran
as Khomeini stressed the second revolution against “the Great Satan.”
In 1980, Iran elected Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr president. At first Khomeini was able to
cooperate with Bani-Sadr but as his pro-Western and liberal tendencies became increasingly
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evident, Khomeini recognized the potential problems that could arise should Bani-Sadr continue
to allow remnants of the Pahlavi regime to influence Iranian politics and warned Bani-Sadr and
his supporters to go into exile to the West if they wish to continue supporting Western ideals.49
That same year Iraq invaded Iran in an attempt to destabilize the Islamic regime and take over
the Shatt-al Arab waterway and annex the oil province of Khuzestan. Some literature argues that
the war was driven in part by the Iranian revolution which brought into the Arab world a very
religiously-driven government that was strongly opposed to Western influence within the
region. 50 The Iraqi invasion of Iraq on September 22, 1980 gave Bani-Sadr a break from this
inner struggle for power as Khomeini needed him to take charge of the military to fight against
Iraq. 51 The invasion was intended to destroy Khomeini’s regime but instead helped strengthen
the revolution and the popular opinion towards the Ayatollah. 52
However, Iraq underestimated the Iranian military and moreover grossly erred in their
belief that the Iranian people would jump at the chance of usurping Khomeini’s regime. Instead,
the Iranian people came together to support the government and consequently caused a six year
stalemate between the two nations. 53 Within Iran the political elite proclaimed the conspiracy of
Saddam Hussein having relations with the US in order to weaken Iran. The conflict with Iraq
strengthened the people’s resolve to fight for national sovereignty and to be loyal to the
revolution.
This tumultuous time allowed for the fundamentalists within Iran to orchestrate a
campaign against President Bani-Sadr who was accused of being pro-West. The Iranian hostage
crisis and US President Carter’s failure to free the hostages cost Bani-Sadr significantly due to
his stance of reconciliation. 54 As a result, President Bani-Sadr, Iran’s first elected president fled
to France. 55 In 1981 the Iranian parliament began impeachment proceedings against Bani-Sadr
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citing poor management of the war and causing national disunity.

Mohammad Ali Rajai took

over the presidency in 1981 as a result of Bani-Sadr’s removal. However, his term was shortlived as twenty-eight days later he was assassinated. His loss brought about the opportunity for
Ali Khamenei to rule as the President. This role would assist him later on as Khomeini’s reign
came to a close.
The Ayatollah recognized the need to further silence secular opposition forces in order to
prevent insurgency among the ranks. As such, he and his followers begun a reign of terror aimed
at forcibly removing the old elite. A so-called Second Republic emerged as the regime utilized
violence in order to consolidate its power. “Liberal National Front politicians, radical MEK
supporters, intellectuals, and journalists were dismissed, imprisoned, or executed.” 56 However
the consolidation did not stop within the political realm and soon the Ayatollah began a cultural
revolution in which Islamic strictures, Islamic propaganda, and loyalty tests became
commonplace. 57
As the war with Iraq finally ended, Iran was left in a state of instability and uncertainty.
The role of nuclear power became increasingly important within the international community
and within Iran, there seemed to be a growing support for the development of a nuclear program
as a means to deter future aggression by outside powers and to put Iran into a significant regional
power in terms of its modernization and technological capabilities. While there is no clear
evidence that confirms how Khomeini felt about nuclear weapons after the Six-Year War with
Iraq, there is growing support that seems to indicate that he did move past his initial stance of
complete opposition to such a program. Members of his regime convinced him of the need to
restart the nuclear program as a means of improving the scientific and technological
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infrastructure in Iran to assist in challenging the Iraqis more effectively. 58After the Iran-Iraq war,
Iran found itself restarting its nuclear program from scratch.

Foreign Relations under Khomeini

Soon after taking over Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini pressed upon the Gulf States to sever
ties with the “Great Satan.” 59During Khomeini’s reign Iran’s relations with other Gulf States
were strained as Khomeini often denounced their monarchial societies that were dependent on
America and often suppressed their Shiite population. 60 Khomeini often terrorized its Arab
neighbors in his attempt to spread his revolution throughout the region and exploit Shiite
grievances throughout the region. Iranian-sponsored opposition groups, particularly the al-Dawa
Party, targeted Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia with bombings, targeting embassies, and other
terrorist acts. 61 Among the more antagonized states was Saudi Arabia as its close ties with the
United States and contending interpretation of Islam was generally in conflict with Iran. 62
The Iranian Revolution left many of the Persian Gulf states with a high level of insecurity
as they feared the exportation of the revolution to enter their own nation. It was with this in
mind that the Gulf State informally supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. 63 However, when Iran
took over KhorramShahr, the Gulf States feared the war would begin involving their own nations
and they called for a ceasefire. After the war ended, relations began improving between the Gulf
States and Iran.
The Soviet Union had sided with Khomeini and his opposition forces during the
Revolution, noting that its anti-imperialist sentiments and anti-American stance would suit its
own interests. 64 Relations with the Soviet Union grew tense with the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The condemnation generated by Iran concerning this invasion coupled with Soviet
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fear of Iran’s Islamic Revolution spreading to the rest of the Central Asian states was concern for
the Soviet government. 65

However as the Iran-Iraq war merged on, the Soviet Union

demonstrated support for the Iranian regime in hopes of prevent American influence to permeate
the region should Iraq win and usurp the anti-American Iranian government.

The Soviet

government offered military supplies to the Iranian government, which were subsequently
rejected by Khomeini’s regime. Later in the war, Moscow negotiated with Iraq to provide
military assistance in return for oil shipments. Khomeini’s regime had always remained wary of
Soviet interest in the war and believed correctly that the only reason for any superpower to get
involved in the war was to pursue their own national interests and such interests were more likely
to side with Saddam Hussein’s regime. 66
Under Shah, relations between Iran and Israel were strong. However, upon the fall of the
Shah and emergence of Khomeini, it became evident that this relationship would change as Iran
began taking action against Israel. 67

This confrontational relationship emerged after the

revolution of the Shah in 1979 since prior to the Islamic Revolution, both non-Arab Iran and
Israel shared an alliance against the hostile Arab nations that surrounded them. 68 It is believed
that Khomeini saw Israel and Zionism as “creations of US imperialism.” 69 Under Khomeini,
various references were made against Israel, calling giving it such labels as “occupied Palestine”
and the “illegal Zionist entity.” 70 The Islamic Republic held a staunch opposition to peace
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and was very hostile towards the nation. 71
Khomeini stopped supplying oil to Israel upon coming into power. However, by 1980,
the expensive costs of buying arms in the black market as a result of the US embargo against Iran
and the need for such equipment in their fight against the very armed Iraqi military led to a
relative cooperation between the two nations. Iran accepted collaboration with Israel during the
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Iran-Iraq war in order to obtain the military equipment necessary to combat Iraq. 72 Israel began
trade relations again with Iran, providing them with the arms and parts they needed to repair their
old Western artillery in exchange for hard currency. 73
As the war lingered on, Iran’s relations with other nations grew increasingly strained.
Regional responses were varied as many nations found the war to have strong implications for
their own national interests. Several states wanted to see Iran’s powerful position weaken but
worried about the possible ramifications of Iraqi dominance in the area. 74 The Gulf States
unofficially sided with Iraq, granting Iraq safe havens for its air force in their nations. Saudi
Arabia kept its support for Iraq as discrete as possible while providing Iraq with much material
assistance. 75 Many of the oil-rich nations felt that the most important concern was to protect
their oil fields and consequently felt that there was a need to contain Iran. Some nations made
their intentions clear. The Syrian government supported Iran in the war because of fear of
becoming isolated within the Arab community should Iraq win.

The Syrian government

condemned Iraq for beginning a war that took attention away from the Arab-Israeli conflict. 76 By
the same token, Israel found relief in the momentary break from Arab-Israeli tensions and
welcomed the Iran-Iraq war as a means to keep attention away from itself. It was in Israel’s
national interest to prolong the war and promote instability between the two countries. Thus, the
Israeli government assisted Iran in its military capabilities. 77
As the Soviets and Americans began calling for the end of the war and placed pressures
on Iran to cease the fighting, the Iranian resolve grew stronger. Tehran attacked Kuwaiti tankers
and tried to put the war into an international light. Such actions brought about an increased
denunciation by the Soviets against Iran. 78 Together with the United States, the Soviet Union
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pushed for Iran to agree upon the UN Resolution 598 to a cease-fire. It was not until the
shooting down of the Iranian airbus, however, that Khomeini agreed to this resolution. 79

The Moral Confrontation against the “Great Satan”

As Khomeini came into power, his priority was in rebuilding Iran and consolidating
power. He spoke of the role clerical rule would have in restoring the social justice and morality
that the Shah had stripped away from Iran. 80 He further went on to place the blame of Iran’s
socioeconomic plight to the West and its supporters. Khomeini felt strongly against the United
States as he viewed it as trying to replace Islamic values within Iran and impose its secular and
materialistic beliefs. Having seen the manner in which the Shah had allowed for Western values
to infiltrate Iran led to a strong denunciation of the “Great Satan.” 81 Khomeini stressed the need
to sever all ties with foreign countries and to humiliate the nation most at fault for Iran’s
troubles: the United States.

This populist theme was well received by much of Iran who

welcomed the idea of change from the economic disparity they had to live with for so long. 82
Khomeini felt strongly against the United States as he viewed it as trying to replace
Islamic values within Iran and impose its secular and materialistic beliefs. Having seen the
manner in which the Shah had allowed for Western values to infiltrate Iran led to a strong
denunciation of the “Great Satan.” 83 The IRGC, as led by Khomeini, firmly believed that “the
major clash of civilizations in today’s society is between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
United States of America.” 84 It is believed by the IRGC that America is the “Great Satan” and
that Iran must silence this adversary through the continued development of its nuclear program,
no matter the opposition. 85
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Khomeini’s strong anti-American rhetoric ignited the Iranian people into action. On
November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students took over the US embassy in Tehran and
launched the hostage crisis that would last 444 days. 86 The students initiated this takeover as a
means of revolting against the US after having learned that the US government had admitted the
sick Shah into an American medical facility. 87 The 1979 Iranian hostage situation launched a
strong anti-American sentiment within Iran as Khomeini stressed the second revolution against
“the Great Satan.” Iranians were concerned that this act was intended to launch a coup to
overthrow the newly formed government. The Ayatollah exploited the hostage crisis to promote
his domestic political agenda by painting the idea that the US was trying to usurp the new
government and that action was needed to protect Iran from such foreign infiltration. 88
President Carter retaliated by closing the Iranian embassy in the United States and
deporting many Iranian residents and students. Additionally, the US froze close to $12 billion in
Iranian assets and encouraged other governments to sever diplomatic relations with Iran. 89 The
US government discussed the imposition of economic and political sanctions against Iran that
included the restriction against exporting military supplies to Iran and to not permit the further
extension of credit to Iran by the World Bank. 90
The United States exacerbated the negative relationship between itself and Iran by
creating increasingly difficult regulations against Iran. US intervention has lead to the tightening
trade routes strict guidelines for companies transferring technology to Iran, and has pressured the
World Bank to not continue to give credits to Iran. 91 Moreover, the United States found itself
supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. Having supported the Shah’s rule, the United States
was very concerned by Khomeini’s adamant anti-Western rhetoric. Thus, as Saddam Hussein
ascended into power within Iraq about the same time as the 1979 Revolution, the United States
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government hoped that supporting Iraq would help destabilize Khomeini’s regime and would
allow for a more moderate leader to emerge. 92
The Cold War put Iran in the US’ periphery and also served to place Iraq within the
influence of the Soviet Union. This resulted in a zero-sum balance of power within the Persian
Gulf for the US and Soviet Union. However, the Iranian Revolution changed this balance, to the
determinant of the United States. Consequently, the United States felt it in its national interests
to support Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran. By the same token, the Soviet Union did not
want the United States to regain its influence within the Persian Gulf region. 93

Both

superpowers saw an Iranian victory as being detrimental to their national interests and thus they
provided Saddam Hussein with encouragement to pursue the war against Iran. 94
The United States saw Iraq as being necessary for the political stability of the region.
Additionally, the American government grew weary of the growing influence by the Soviet
Union within the Middle East. Thus, the President Reagan felt the necessity of US intervention
in the war as a means to regain its power in the developing world. The Reagan administration
promoted the building of US military infrastructure within the Middle East. 95
By 1985, the arms embargo on Iran weighted heavily on the Iranian government as the
war sent on, particularly as Iraq continued to get military support from both the United States
and Soviet Union. Iran lacked the replacements and parts to fix the American weapons that it
had acquired under the Shah and had to pay substantially high prices for their black market
weapons. 96 The United States government had learned through various intelligence reports of
the hundreds of Soviets that were residing within Iran assisting in developing its technological
and energy industries. Such reports indicated that the Khomeini regime was finding itself
vulnerable to Soviet influence and that Khomeini’s time as the leader of the Islamic Republic
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was soon coming to an end.

As such, the US’ Central Intelligence Agency’s National

Intelligence Council for the Near East and South Asia, Graham Fuller, warned that the United
States need to revise its policy regarding Iran if it were to prevent the Soviets from gaining too
much influence within the region. 97
As the war continued between Iran and Iraq, Reagan’s security advisors encouraged the
President to work out an arms deal with Iran as a means to gaining support among the moderates
in Iran and prevent Iran from falling into Soviet’s sphere of influence. 98 The arms-for-hostages
deal was to assist Iran in obtaining the weapons it would need to defeat Saddam’s army. The
deal was to release the American hostages held in Lebanon in exchange for American weapons.
The Iran-Contra affair was motivated by various factors among which was Iran’s need for arms,
Israel’s connection with Iran, US interest in preventing Soviet control within Iran, and American
desire to free the hostages being held in Lebanon. 99
However, the Iran-Contra affair ended poorly as both the American and Iranian
leadership involved were distrustful of one another. The United States government informed the
Iranian players that should the American hostages be released within ten hours Iran would
receive the agreed upon missile parts. The Iranians fought against this condition and instead
tried to persuade the American government to send the parts prior to the release. This clear
disagreement over logistics pushed the two sides into new negotiations. The revised proposal
would allow for the parts to take off for Tehran under the condition that if the hostages were not
released by 4 am Tehran time, the plane would turn around. However, at the time agreed upon,
the Iranian government was unable to secure the release of the hostages.

They tried to

renegotiate but the Americans were not willing to continue renegotiated on these terms. 100
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On November 2, 1986, news leaked out the deal between the US and Iran to the world.
The story revealed that the United States had been supplying arms to the Iranian government.
Though the two nations continued to try negotiating a deal even after this revelation, it soon
became clear that the Iran-Contra affair would not succeed.

The legacy of this failure was the

increase in anti-American sentiment among Iranians and the strengthening of Iranian-Soviet
relations. 101 Additionally, the United States became increasingly hostile towards Iran as a result
of this failed attempt at cooperation and diplomacy. President Reagan adopted a harsher stance
against Khomeini’s regime, forcing diplomatic pressure on Iran to end the war and increasing
American support for the Arab Gulf states against Khomeini.

The Final Years of Khomeini’s Rule

In his final years of his life, Khomeini made some interesting changes to Iran’s political
system that in many ways seemed to contradict his previous institutions. During the final years
of his rule, Iran suffered from great sociopolitical and economic problems caused largely in part
by the Iran-Iraq war. As the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic became threatened, Khomeini
made some swift changes that could allow for his legacy to survive even after his death. 102 To
do so, he transferred the authority of the state from a personal authority to that of political
institutions. This allowed for future leaders to be able to place the blame of any failures of the
state to the political leadership and dismiss any claim that Islam is to blame. 103
By 1981, Khomeini realized the need to shift Iran’s internal view of its own political
structure. He feared that if things did not stabilize soon, counterrevolution and discontentment
would fester within the nation. Thus he proclaimed the end of a need for the separation between
political leaders and the clerics and further adding that Iran was no longer in a revolutionary
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state. 104 In December 1983 Khomeini saw some problems with his Rule of the Jurist and
publically admitted to having made a mistake for given the religious clerics more power than the
political leadership of Iran. 105 He feared that his revolution would not be able to survive his
death and understood that changes would be necessary for the continuation of his vision for Iran.
As with all revolutions, the charismatic leader has a difficult road to pave to transition a nation
from a revolutionary state to a stable society. Consequently, it is generally found that the
charismatic leadership will look for a more rational and institutional authority to take over after
they have left. Khomeini recognized this need for institutions and laws that would outlast any
individual leader and could bring Iran to the forefront of international politics. 106
Khomeini had some significant problems in trying to find the middle ground between
pursuing his vision for Iran and searching for the rational authority he knew would be needed
once he left. He found himself in a constant state of contradiction in this pursuit, particularly
when he tried to resolve the differences between the Majlis and the Guardian Council. Though
the constitution gave little power to the Majlis, Khomeini repeatedly labeled them the ultimate
source of authority within Iran and tried to give them more power. 107 However, despite his
various attempts to give the Majlis authority, without having the constitutional authority, the
Iranian public continued to diminish their importance. 108 The Guardian Council and Majlis were
in a constant deadlock trying to exert their power within Iran. This struggle was evident by the
mid-1980s where one saw how the repeated vetoes by the Guardian Council to social reform
laws left Tehran gravely unstable.
By summer of 1987, Khomeini’s health had begun to deteriorate. He understood the
need to significantly alter Iran’s political authority in order to maintain some level of his vision
within Iran after he left. In 1988, he made an edict where he maintained that the role of clerical
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authority was to act as a “vice-regency of the Prophet” to which it could take whatever actions
necessary to protect the interests of Islam.

He chose his words carefully, linking the role of

“vice-regency” with “government” rather than a specific leader in a manner that alluded to the
notion of an institutional power of government that transcended past an individual. 109 This
ambiguity however launched a strong inner-struggle within Iran as competing forces tried to
determine how Iran’s political authority should be after Khomeini. 110 He grew frustrated by the
consistent stalemates between the Guardian Council and the Majlis which led to his bold
proclamation that “the state could replace Constitutional amendments of 1989 were passed that
would allow for the Supreme Leader to be any man of “scholarship” and piety” and got rid of
some of the power of the Guardian Council. 111 These changes managed to separate the state
from religion.
Even before his death rival factions arose trying to interpret the true intentions of the
Ayatollah. The two major divisions were the institutional pragmatists led by Rafsanjani and the
charismatic radicals led by Ali Akbar Motashemi.

The institutional pragmatists followed a

revolutionary realist approach to Iran and believed that economic and political reconstruction
was imperative for the betterment of Iranian society. They believed that the political authority
needed to be institutionalized to give more authority to the Majlis and that there needed to be
better relations with foreign powers. Though they supported state intervention of the economy,
the pragmatists were socio-politically conservative and stressed the importance of upholding
Islamic values while pursuing any reforms. 112

The charismatic radicals abided by a

revolutionary idealist mentality as they opposed any sort of reconciliation with other nations and
felt strongly of the need for clerical rule above all else. 113
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The pragmatists had some significant advantages over the radicals due largely by the
Iran-Iraq war which by 1988 had cost tens of thousands of lives and had placed a strain on
Iranian society. Further assisting the pragmatists was the poor economic conditions within Iran
which had fallen to industrial and agricultural outputs and per capita GNP levels that matched
those of the Shah’s rule.

Consequently, the pragmatists argued the need for political and

economic reconstruction and to stabilize the revolution. 114 They pushed for the revision of the
constitution in order to make such improvements. The fact that the Ayatollah supported the idea
for constitutional revision further assisted the pragmatists in their quest for control over Iran after
Khomeini.
As the speaker of the Majlis, Rafsanjani capitalized on Khomeini’s edict of 1988 as a
means of promoting the idea of reforming the constitution to diminish the power of the clerics.
He spoke of Khomeini’s edict as support for his ideas, claiming that the Ayatollah himself
believed in the rule by the people and that the role of government is to work for the people and to
uphold the principles of Islam. Rafsanjani’s opponents tried to argue that he was trying to
destroy Khomeini’s legacy by taking the authority away from the Rule of Jurists. However,
Rafsanjani argued that it was Khomeini himself who had declared that the Majlis had the right to
pass social legislation and that in reality, the system that Khomeini had developed was that of a
democratic system to which the voice of the people could be heard while still under the auspices
of Islam. 115
Khomeini demonstrated his support for the pragmatists through his advice to the Iranian
people that in their election of the Majlis, they should select those who are faithful to Islam and
to the people. He further stressed that the Majlis is the “house of all the people and the source of
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hope for the deprived.” 116 The end result: the Majlis election was won by more politicians than
by clerics.
The election was an important victory for Rafsanjani but he was still resolved to
reforming the constitution. Industrial and agricultural production had fallen short and Iran was
unable to raise the funds to allow for imports due to the Western embargo on Iran. 117 While
gaining seats within the parliament was a significant improvement for the pragmatists, there
remained a lack of institutional authority for the Majlis within the constitution and moreover,
there was a problem of succession. Concerns over who would be able to replace the charismatic
Khomeini grew as his health deteriorated.
President Khamenei agreed with Rafsanjani’s concerns and argued that the constitution
did not stipulate the institutional authority of Iran. Together with other Majlis, Khamenei wrote
to Khomeini asking for the establishment of a constitutional reform committee which would be
charged with addressing these key concerns. Khomeini agreed and formed a council to revise
the constitution in what would be one of the last significant moves he would make in his life. 118
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CHAPTER FOUR:
POST-KHOMEINI IRAN: THE REALIST YEARS
Revolutionary Realism after Khomeini

Rafsanjani Years

Iran found itself in transition in the post-Khomeini period.

Immediately following

Khomeini’s death, the differing factions within Iran vied for control over the nation. The
tensions between the different factions had often been thwarted by Khomeini but upon his death
there was little to keep the tensions from rising. 1 The religious conservatives found favor in the
leadership of Ali Khamenei. The more moderate among Iran were drawn to the leadership of
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The reformers who are often labeled as the charismatic radicals were
led y Ali Akbar Motashemi. The religious conservatives felt it necessary to focus on the nation’s
economy and its existence in the global economy. Pragmatists wanted to focus on cultural
freedom and international cooperation. The reformers felt there was a need to strengthen the
political institutions in Iran. 2 The religious conservatives and pragmatists, though differing on
their approach for Iran, both utilized a realist approach to Iran in which they understood the need
for outside influence in order to launch Iran as a relevant regional power. The reformers or
charismatic radicals approached Iran in a revolutionary idealist manner, believing in their ability
to improve Iranian society and political structure without outside influences. 3
Ali Khamenei who had served as the President of Iran from 1981-1989 found himself the
victor in obtaining the role of the new Supreme Leader of Iran. He has since served as the
Supreme Leader of Iran under the past three Presidents: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad
Khatami, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

4

As Supreme Leader, Khamenei wasted little time
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enacting amendments to the constitution that gave more power to the Majlis and diminished the
powers of the Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader.

Among the amendments included

changes that absolved the position of prime minister and granted that authority to the president,
the redefining of the requirements for the Supreme Leader, changes in how the Supreme Leader
would be selected, and the development of the Expediency Discernment Council which was
empowered with the ability to resolve conflicts and stalemates between the Majlis and Guardian
Council. 5
The leadership of Khomeini and Khamenei are often regarded as vastly different,
particularly in their goals for Iran. However, such a difference is not so much that the two
leaders differ in what they would like to see happen for Iran but rather in what manner each
leader brought about their ideas for change. Khomeini often relied on gathering support from
dissenters whereas Khamenei tended to utilize communication and openness to garner support. 6
Khamenei did not emerge as the Supreme Leader without having some opposition.
However, he did not allow for such opposition to define his leadership and was very cautious of
the radical movements within Iran. The amendments passed for the constitution gave him the
ability to hold the position of Supreme Leader that he otherwise would not have had since he was
neither a grand ayatollah nor a marja’. One must note, however, that the constitutional revisions
did also cost Khamenei the ability to develop a strong support system with the people since he
was selected by a small group of clerics and not by the people. 7
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani entered the presidency in 1989 and served for two terms.
Having been selected by the people, Rafsanjani found himself to have more power than previous
Presidents. 8 Unlike some of his political brethren, Rafsanjani was a revolutionary realist who
believed that there was a need for reform within Iran in order for the national interests to succeed
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in the changing international environment. As a realist, he believed in economic reform which
would include cooperation with the West to promote Iran’s national interests. 9 He believed that
it would be in the shared interest of foreign powers and Iran to strengthen this relationship since
Iran was finally at a politically and socially stable position that could allow for diplomacy to
exist. He fused cultural and economic reforms that at times countered the reigning theological
norms of Iran as he felt that the legitimacy and stability of the government was contingent on its
economic stability. As such, he focused much of his presidency developing institutions and
strengthening the bureaucratic system within Iran. 10 His cabinet had many technocrats of which
at least a third had gained training from abroad.
Under President Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran went through a
significant transition from the Khomeini presidency. They placed some separation between
religion and the state but whenever accused of trying to secularize the nation, they would argue
that it is not necessary for the leadership to be a source of emulation but rather, it is important
that they stress religious principles in their actions. Khamenei’s supporters tried to foster an
environment of traditional trade practices but the reality of such practices not meeting the needs
of the Iranian state soon became all too evident for Khamenei. The public was expected to
exchange spiritual salvation for the right to dissent against economic corruption. However,
Iranian society was changing and with approximately 70 percent of the population under the age
of thirty, the social structure found itself challenged. 11 Consequently, with the leadership of
Khamenei and Rafsanjani, Iran made swift changes to the economy in attempt to diversify in
many ways “liberalize” the economy by restructuring the stock exchange and developing free
trade zones. Additional changes to the economy included cutting subsidies for food and gasoline,
privatizing companies, and attempting to bring about foreign investments. 12
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Tehran began

participating in the global economy in hopes of strengthening its economy and alleviating the
problems of economic inequality. 13
Khamenei and Rafsanjani also restructured the development program within Iran
throughout focusing on urban renewal, improving the healthcare and educational system in Iran,
and restarting the nuclear program. 14 The dual leadership of President Rafsanjani and Supreme
Leader Khamenei, Tehran moved into a new direction in its international agenda through
pursuing relations with Russia and China. 15 Rafsanjani was met with opposition from the United
States due to the hostage crisis which further deteriorated as the US passed the Iran Sanctions
Act “which threatened to penalize foreign as well as American oil companies that dared to invest
more than $20 million in Iran.” 16
Under the Rafsanjani presidency, the Iranian government began to see a growing
discontentment by Iranian youth. Unlike their elders, the younger population within Iran had
never lived under the high corruption of the Shah and saw the government’s conservative
rhetoric to be antiquated and counterproductive to the development of Iran in today’s
international society. 17 President Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei began having
differences in opinion as Rafsanjani continued his pursuit of reinventing Iran. Rafsanjani’s
pursuit of loosening the cultural mandates on society was cause for serious friction between the
leaders.

Supreme Leader Khamenei led an open rebellion against Rafsanjani citing that

economic development without morality would only lead to an inevitable demise of Iranian
society. 18 As the nonelected religious leadership grew wary of Rafsanjani’s measures, the
Islamic Republic saw itself at crossfire between the two political factions.

The religious

leadership began reinforcing Islamic ordinances and arresting those who tried to push reform
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onto Iranian society. By all intensive purposes, the Islamic Republic was found paralyzed by the
conflicting values of ideology and national interests. 19
Rafsanjani’s presidency failed to succeed in liberalizing Iran’s economy and in some
ways made the economic situation worse. Borrowing from the international community brought
an incredible debt and worsened the standards of living for the poor and middle classes. Further,
the inability to attract foreign investment, secure the petroleum market, and lessen the burden of
subsidies stifled Iran’s economic growth potential. 20 One reason for his inability to succeed in
his plans for Iran stemmed from his unwillingness to take a strong stance against the religious
fundamentalists who resisted many of his ideas for change. 21
As Rafsanjani continued to try to liberalize the economy, the conservative faction began
to resist the changes. Concerned that Rafsanjani’s policies were infusing too much Western
influence, they demanded that Rafsanjani bring about more of an Islamic emphasis in his
policies. 22 As such, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warned against the continuation of
Westernization practices in the economy.
As President Rafsanjani struggled to maintain control over Iran, the reformers within Iran
found themselves looking to Hojjat-ol-Islam Seyyeed Mohammad Khatami for leadership. A
midlevel cleric, Khatami broke away from Rafsanjani’s administration and studied Western
philosophy.

As a reformer, Khatami believed that there was a need to develop political

modernity while maintaining Islamic values. Contrary to what the fundamentalist seemed to
fear, Khatami strongly believed that it was possible to merge the two, particularly as he studied
various Western philosophies. Through his studies he would later argue that “state authority
cannot be attained through coercion and dictatorship, rather it is realized through government
according to law and empowering people to participate.” 23 He felt strongly the need to merge the
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ideas of civil society, rule of law, and national sovereignty in the government. Most importantly,
he stressed that the continuation of Islamic law must adjust to changing in human dynamics and
needs.

The Khatami Presidency

By the time of the 2000 election, four candidates were in the running for the presidency.
Of these four, Mohammad Khatami was often revered as the least likely contender. 24 This
resulted in his favor as his opponents grew complacent during the election and did very little to
challenge his run for presidency. However, Khatami was an intellectual and had a strong
following among students and the press. Among his strengths was his extensive understanding
of Western philosophy mixed with his religious knowledge that was not unlike that of Khomeini.
Moreover, his sentiments of inclusiveness and of being an Iranian citizen above all else won over
many Iranians who were tired of the factional politics that had long plagued Iran. 25 He won the
presidency through his clearly distinct leadership style that moved closer to a liberal and more
Western philosophy. Despite his being the underdog in the election, Khatami was able to obtain
69 percent of the vote. This victory made it all too clear to the religious cleric of how important
elections really were as they served to provide the public with an avenue to have their agenda
pursued within the ranks of Iranian government. 26
President Khatami utilized a gradual approach to reform in order to achieve change
within Iran without having severe clashes with the conservative leadership. He harped on the
idea of having an open government and a civil society rather than continuing the sentiments of a
“clash of civilizations” that places Iran against the rest of the world. 27 Khatami recognized the

75

economic progress of the West, though he did often criticize the materialism and immorality the
West maintained. 28 Though policies did not change significantly, much of the international
community began regarding Khatami, a mid-ranking mullah, as a positive change for Iran. 29
However, within Iran the hard-lined conservatives sought to diminish Khatami’s
authority by denouncing reformers as enemies of Islam and incarcerating those who followed the
reformist philosophies. 30 They tried to dissuade the public from being involved in the political
process and disillusion them from Khatami’s leadership.

The Guardian Council voided

parliamentary legislation and the conservatives launched a campaign of terror against
intellectuals, writers, and activists. 31
For the beginning part of Khatami’s presidency, there was a unified force within Iranian
leadership to improve Iran’s economic and political standing. Supreme Leader Khamenei was
supportive of many of Khatami’s reforms and shared his view of the importance of reintegrating
Iran into international society. However, as time would continue, this relationship saw some
deterioration as Supreme Leader Khamenei grew increasingly conservative and reactionary. 32
He and his fellow conservative leaders dominated over Iran’s nonelected institutions in order to
ensure that the ambitions of the public and the elected institutions could be negated. 33 However,
the Iranian conservatives continued to push the ideals of Khomeini’s revolution and worked with
Khamenei to push aside liberal movements within Iran including several of the reforms that
President Khatami tried to pursue. 34
As Khatami continued to pursue his reforms, he highly criticized former President
Rafsanjani for permitting Iran’s economic problems to have gotten to the point it had. This
criticism caused considerable division among Iran’s political elite as the conservatives who had
supported Rafsanjani began to sense a need to bring back Rafsanjani into the presidency in order
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to prevent the complete liberalization of Iranian society. 35 However, as President Khatami’s
reforms began to improve the economy and diplomatic relations with other nations, the
conservatives found themselves unable to take over in time for the 2001 election and Khatami
was able to secure a second term as President. 36

Reconstructing Foreign Relations

The passing of Ayatollah Khomeini brought many changes and challenges to Iran,
particularly with regard to its foreign relations. The fall of the Soviet Union and the crisis in
Kuwait created a geopolitical environment that required some significant reforms in Tehran’s
foreign policy. No longer could the nation fall into a system of relative isolation but rather, the
nation found itself needed to emerge as a strong leader if it were to remain relevant within the
region as other major powers entered Caspian Sea politics. 37
President Rafsanjani took on the charge of revising Iran’s foreign policy. He opened up
communication with Western nations that had not previously existed under Khomeini’s rule and
tried to portray an image of Iran as an anti-Iraqi force within the Middle East. Questions arose of
how the foreign policy reorientation of Iran would result. Would the new regime conduct its
foreign policy under the parameters of Islam or would such Islamic values exist as a symbolic
camouflage for a new foreign policy directive under President Rafsanjani? 38 Careful study of the
foreign policy decisions made under Rafsanjani’s presidency demonstrates that, while the
leadership did pursue their Islamic agendas, such efforts were more in line with promoting Iran’s
national interest more so than in the pursuit of Islam.
The Persian Gulf was important for President Rafsanjani’s foreign policy. The Gulf
served the financial interests of Iran as it provided the ports necessary for its oil exports.39 The
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December 1990 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit demonstrated that the relationship
between the Persian Gulf states and Iran had improved greatly as the GCC announced it would
allow for Iran’s participation in regional agreements. 40 Iran then moved to improving relations
with Central Asian Republics, China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as they all were
supportive of Iran’s foreign policy. In pursuing this improvement, Rafsanjani moved for a deArabization of Iran’s policies much to the discontentment of Supreme Leader Khamenei who
believed that stronger Arabization was needed. 41
President Khatami went forth to improve Iranian foreign relations in efforts to improve
the Iranian economy and development programs. 42 In many ways, Iran has developed in such a
manner that would move it past the classification of being a “developing” or “Third World”
nation. The Iranian government has provided its citizens with a reasonable standard of living
with many amenities that launch Iran as a more developed state than many of its neighbors. 43
Iran’s role in the stability of the region was clear. Unlike Russia and Turkey, Iran was
concerned with the instability and the poor economic conditions with the Caucasus and tried to
maintain neutrality within the region as well as assist in resolving tensions between Caucasus
states. 44 Most important to Iran was the stability of the Persian Gulf. As the largest state within
the Gulf and with more than 80% of its exports going through the Gulf, instability in the area
could serious cost Iran’s economic condition. 45 Under Khatami’s presidency, Iran’s connections
with Central Asian states had improved greatly and multilateral agreements increased. 46
His foreign policy was centered on cooperative security measures, expansion of
diplomatic relations, and increase trade. While he was often criticized for his domestic policies,
he is often considered a successful leader in terms of his foreign policy. 47
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He followed

Rafsanjani’s political strategy of improving relations with the West, promoting regional stability,
and garnering stronger relations with Persian Gulf States.
Russia has always played an important role within Iran. Providing Iran with military
supplies and other key imports has assisted in helping prompt Iran’s security and military sector.
The ties between the two countries have been prompted by their mutual concern over the
stability of the region and desire to remain the strong regional players that they have been able to
maintain for decades. The end of the Soviet Union brought Russia closer to Iran who it saw as
an essential ally in countering US influence abroad. Despite growing animosity between the US
and Tehran, Russia continues to develop its foreign relations with the Islamic Republic. In
October 2000, with the election of Vladimir Putin into the Russian presidency, Russia dissolved
the Gore-Chernomyrdin accord of 1995 in which it had agreed to limit its nuclear and military
assistance to Iran. The government went a step further and restarted its nuclear project at
Bushehr and demonstrated its support of Iran’s nuclear program to be used for peaceable
purposes. 48 When concerns were raised over the intensions of the nuclear program, Putin moved
to supplying the enriched uranium for Bushehr. However, there has been some concern over the
manner in which this relationship may be forced to change as the Islamic Republic continues its
trend of aggression and defiance towards the US.
Iran’s foreign relations have been inconsistent throughout the years, particularly as other
nations grew a more powerful or relevant in international and regional affairs. Such is the case
with Turkey who shares the quest of gaining influence in the Central Asian region and has tried
to sponsor their ideals and culture onto their neighboring countries. 49 However, Turkey’s secular
state has often been at an ideological clash with the Islamic Republic. In terms of the Central
Asian Republics, Iran has always had an important trade association within the area. Iran has
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provided assistance to these poorer states by providing them a road, rail, and pipeline link for
Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. 50 The religious and ethnic commonalities found within the
Central Asian States and Iran provides a foundation for a cooperative affiliation.
Since Khomeini, Iranian-Syrian relations have been consistently cooperative. Syria saw
Iran as being integral for the maintenance of its relevance and importance in the Middle East and
Iran utilized the positive connection in developing trade and diplomatic relations. Syria found
Iran to be critical to oppose Saddam Hussein and Israel. 51 Iran worked well with the anti-Israel
and anti-American sentiments of its Arab neighbors and developed stronger ties accordingly.
The extensive economic sanctions that had been placed on Iran made it necessary for the
Iranian government to develop strong economic relations in order to sustain its economy. Under
Khatami, Iran’s relations with China had improved greatly. China’s economic growth caused it
to become the world’s second largest oil consumer. As such, China developed a trade policy
with Iran to ensure that its energy needs would be met. China provided Iran with dual-use
technology that Iran could use for the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. 52 India found itself in a similar situation with Iran. The relations between Iran and
India lent itself to the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline that would allow for the transport of
Iranian natural gas to India. However, this project has been stunted by disagreements among the
nations on the price of the pipeline’s construction and the price of the gas itself. 53
Tehran and Pakistan have consistently held positive ties due to their mutual concern over
US presence in the region, their shared Islamic values, concern over Soviet (and later Russian)
influence and their geographical proximity. 54 Relations with Syria were also strong in the postKhomeini period. Their shared concern over Saddam Hussein’s regime having too much control
over the region made Syrian-Iranian relations stronger. 55 Moreover, the two nations felt strongly
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about confronting the United States and Israel. As such, despite Khatami’s movement towards a
moderate nation, Iran became a significant source of funding for radical Palestinian groups.
Most notably was Iran’s involvement in arming the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah. 56 Both
countries provided the Lebanese group with arms and military supplies to which they have used
against Israel. 57

Confronting Israel

Iran’s rejection of the West and refusal to recognize the Israeli state makes confrontation
inevitable between Israel and Iran. 58 Moreover, the Israeli/Palestinian issue has been a heated
topic of discussion by much of the international community. Iran sees Palestine as being an
Islamic issue, thus giving Iran the right to be involved in resolving the issue and protecting
Palestinian rights. 59
In 1981, Israel launched eight F-16s at an Iraqi nuclear reactor located near Baghdad as a
preventative strike to prevent Iraq’s ability to make nuclear bombs. Israeli Premier Menachem
Begin ordered this attack on the stance that “Israel would never allow any country in the Middle
East to possess nuclear weapons that could threaten its existence. Consequently, any Israeli
attack on Iran to prevent it from having nuclear weapons would be implementing the Begin
doctrine.” 60 The success of the Israeli military to raid the Iraqi nuclear reactor site gave the
Israeli government a sense of confidence and bravado that has brought about graver stain on the
Israeli-Iranian relationship.
The United Nations inconsistent treatment towards nations for aggressive moves against
other nations has caused a sense of distrust and general disregard by the Iranian government,
particularly as the United States and Israel have consistently been permitted to act aggressively
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without much international condemnation. Further, the fact that international sanctions have
done little to significantly change national behaviors makes international organizations such as
the United Nations appear seemingly irrelevant to many Iranian leadership. 61
Iran has been accused of attacking Israeli targets on various occasions. On March 17,
1992, the Iranian government was accused of being involved with the bombing of the Israeli
embassy in Buenos Aires. There have been other accusations of Iranian involvement in terrorist
attacks, particularly against Israel and its actors. Further exacerbating Iran’s relationship with
Israel is its close relations with the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah which has been very
vocal in their animosity towards Israel. Iran and Hezbollah have a close relationship, much to
the determent and concern of the Israeli government. 62 Iran provides Hezbollah with financial,
political, and logistical support. Of particular concern for Israel is the assistance Iran has been
reported in giving to Hezbollah in terms of providing training, weapons, and explosives. 63
Hezbollah has gained support among the Lebanese people through its grassroots efforts in
educational and healthcare efforts.

By revising their image within the Lebanese people,

Hezbollah has been able to earn political clout and has been able to find a following among the
Arab world. It is under these auspices that the Iranian government can so freely support and
condone the actions of this terrorist organization. 64
During the Israel-Hezbollah negotiations in 2003, some discussion between Iran and
Israel seemed to indicate that Iran wished to get involved in trading Al-Qaeda suspects in Iran
and members of the Iranian Mujahedeen Khalq in exchange for Israeli soldiers.

65

Despite the

return of Israeli Air Force Navigator Ron Arad to Israel with the reported assistance of Iran,
there is little belief that this deal will improve relations between Iran and Israel. 66 On August
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2003, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon proclaimed “In the Middle East, Iran is now (Israel’s)
greatest threat.” 67
It is important to note, however, that Hezbollah is only one several terrorist or anti-Israeli
organizations that Iran supports and assists. Iran has developed ties with Hamas which is active
within Israel. In 1992, Hamas opened up an office within Iran and more importantly, began
training with the Iranian military. Iran has also assisted the Popular Liberation Front along with
Syria through financial and material support. 68

Focus on Development

Economic Development

Under President Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran went through a
significant transition from the Khomeini presidency. They made swift changes to the economy
in attempt to diversify in many ways “liberalize” the economy by restructuring the stock
exchange and developing free trade zones. Additional changes to the economy included cutting
subsidies for food and gasoline, privatizing companies, and attempting to bring about foreign
investments. Khamenei and Rafsanjani also restructured the development program within Iran
throughout focusing on urban renewal, improving the healthcare and educational system in Iran,
and restarting the nuclear program. 69

Rafsanjani attempted to improve Iran’s technical

infrastructure by “establishing a special task force charged with attracting scientists and easing
the political climate.” 70
Having just come out of the Iran-Iraq War, the demand for economic reform was
rampant. 71 President Rafsanjani tried to move Iran into a market-based economy and a non-
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isolationist foreign policy that would allow Iran to enter into the international economy. 72 He
launched his First Five-Year Development Plan which worked with the IMF Economic
Adjustment Program to Iran. These plans pushed for the privatization of various segments
within the economy as well as the optimizing of resource exploitation and import substitution.73
The First Five-Year Development Plan was financed through foreign credits, oil revenues, and
the banking sector. Through this development, Iran strengthened its trade relations with various
Asian, Latin American and African states. Iran was further assisted by the World Bank who
provided it with credits needed to establish the domestic development programs that Rafsanjani
tried to follow. 74
In entering the twenty-first century, Iran emerged as a significant regional power. Its
population of 70 million people makes it the largest country in the region. Moreover, through
the constant reforms that have been implemented, Iran has a strong centralized state and a mass
citizen army. 75 The economy within Iran found itself stagnated by the refusal by the clerical elite
to adopt modern economic practices and foster an environment of free market. Concerned with
pursuing their ideology, they maintained a power bloc in the trade and manufacturing sectors of
Iran’s economy that limited Tehran’s ability to have a strong free market society. 76 Through
societal pressures and dominating over major industries, the clerical elite utilized corrupt
practices that seemed to put Iran back to times of the Shah. Further adding to the corruption
were the Revolutionary Guards who had begun establishing commercial firms and had begun to
intrude upon Iran’s economic activities.

This was particularly true of Iran’s nuclear

infrastructure which found it to be procured by members of the Guards. 77
The Second Five-Year Development Plan found little success and though Rafsanjani was
able to fix some of the problems of the economy but was unable to fix the structural problems
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that had made Iran’s economy as fragile as it was. Iran economy lacked diversification and its
reliance on oil and gas revenues made it difficult for Iran to improve its economy. 78 Moreover,
Rafsanjani struggled with uncompetitive markets, a poor production sector, and improper
budgeting system. The national currency was weak, the gap between the rich and poor had
grown substantially, and there was a high inflation. In short, by the end of his presidency,
Rafsanjani had left Iran with very little improvement with regards to its economy and left
Khatami with the inheritance of a very poor economic condition. 79
During Khatami’s presidency, Iran was suffering through significant economic
difficulties. Unemployment was high, inflation was running rampant, and the cost of living was
on a rise. Khatami recognized the severity of the situation but also understood that there needed
to be a cohesive political strategy for Iran if he wanted his economic reforms to persevere. 80
Without such a change, any economic reform would find itself to assist the already wealthy
within Iran. He recognized the need to improve Iran’s image worldwide in order to garner the
long-term investments that would be necessary to make any reforms last within Iran. 81
He pushed for the diversification of Iran’s economy as well as the privatization of
businesses. 82 Additionally, Khatami argued for the cultivation of a tax culture to raise the funds
necessary to development and increased competition between banks that would allow for a more
free market society. It was with this in mind that Khatami brought what is perhaps the most
important change within the Islamic Republic: its reintegration into the international society. He
believed that such reintegration was possible since Iran had developed into a politically and
socially stable society that was no longer dependent of the West. 83

However, according to

President Khatami the volatile relationship with the West was not caused by political and
economic conditions but rather due to the ideological differences that often led to distrust and
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misunderstanding. 84

Khatami stressed that foreign investment is necessary to stimulate the

economy. 85
Under his leadership, Iran had developed its industrial sector to a degree that would allow
for it to increase its production of Iran’s industries. By 1997 Iran’s production of gas and oil
pipelines had improved greatly and there was an increase in the construction of refineries,
petrochemical complexes, and gas distribution centers. 86 Such advancements allowed for Iran to
grow its industries without the need for foreign influence.
In addition to its industrial growth, Iran also felt a considerable development of its
military industry. The war with Iraq had demonstrated the need for self-sufficient development
of military equipment.

Having seen the consequences of being overly reliant on Western

assistance to develop such technology and not having their assistance in repairing such
equipment, Khatami stressed the need to expand its own capabilities while also developing new
trade relations for such equipment. As such, Iran found itself trading with North Korea, Russia,
China, and Pakistan in hopes of making its military industry stronger. 87

Social and Cultural Development

President Rafsanjani entered the presidency with a very disillusioned Iranian population
to lead. The people were tired of the economic demise that had afflicted the nation and were
particularly tied of the socio-cultural restrictions that had been imposed by Ayatollah
Khomeini. 88 The more developed and technologically advanced that Iran had become, the
higher the level of global consciousness. Such an understanding brought a great interest in
human rights, democracy, women’s rights, and the idea of promoting a civil society. 89 A bill
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was passed that allowed women the right to obtain positions in the judiciary process. However,
while women were given more avenues to pursue employment in Iran, their rights on other levels
had not greatly improved. The marriage age of girls had been reduced to 9 years of age and
women still had a difficult time divorcing their husbands. 90 Despite the slow pace of such
improvements, however, the fact that there were improvements indicated a clear shift away from
Khomeini’s legacy and into a more liberalized society.
By the time Khatami came into the presidency, Iran tried shift its propaganda in a more
moderate direction to attempt improving its image within the international community. True to
the philosophy of a revolutionary realist, Khatami’s changes for Iran involved the developing of
political institutions to provide a legal framework for the social, political, and economic
developments that were needed to improve Iranian society. He believed in developing civil
society within the nation in such a manner that would make the people feel invested in their
government. 91 He tried to decentralize the power structure in Iran to enhance the role of the
Majlis while also allowing for the people to have direct involvement in politics. He revitalized
Khomeini’s ideals of infusing Islam as the unifying element for social and cultural improvements
within the Republic. 92
Though under Khatami women were given more rights and the dress code had become
more lax, they continued to lack substantive positioning within Iranian government. This led to
activist activity within Iran to promote women’s rights. 93 In addition to changes in women’s
rights, there were also improvements in freedom for the press. There was a surge in the number
of newspapers functioning within Iran during Khatami’s presidency. This however ignited some
concerns by the Conservative bloc, including Supreme Leader Khamenei who warned Khatami
that such press must function within the auspices of Islam if they were to be permitted to
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function or they would instead serve to antagonize the Islamic Republic and promote Western
ideals within the nation. 94
Entering the twenty -first century, Iran emerged as a significant regional power. Its
population of 70 million people makes it the largest country in the region. Through the constant
reforms that have been implemented, Iran has a strong centralized state and a mass citizen
army. 95In many ways, Iran has developed in such a manner that would move it past the
classification of being a “developing” or “Third World” nation. The Iranian government has
provided its citizens with a reasonable standard of living with many amenities that launch Iran as
a more developed state than many of its neighbors. 96

Restarting Iran’s Nuclear Program

“Rafsanjani tried to renew nuclear relations with the West, particularly with the United
States. However, President Reagan’s strong anti-Iranian, pro-Iraqi strategies made it clear that
such a relationship was unlikely to reemerge. 97 Thus, Iran moved into a new direction and
sought the assistance of China, Pakistan, and Russia. While these three nations were careful to
hide their involvement with Iran’s nuclear program, they continued to provide Iran with training,
human resources, and materials needed to enrich uranium and ultimately, develop a nuclear
program. 98
“Rafsanjani tried to renew nuclear relations with the West, particularly with the United
States. However, President Reagan’s strong anti-Iranian, pro-Iraqi strategies made it clear that
such a relationship was unlikely to reemerge. 99 Due to its inability to produce the weapons
supplies necessarily to rebuild its arsenal and military, Iran has had to develop close relationships
with Russia and China to gain an unconfirmed amount of weapons and resources. 100Thus, Iran
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moved into a new direction and sought the assistance of China, Pakistan, and Russia. While
these three nations were careful to hide their involvement with Iran’s nuclear program, they
continued to provide Iran with training, human resources, and materials needed to enrich
uranium and ultimately, develop a nuclear program. 101
Iran has a close relationship with Russia due to in part to its proximity but mostly as a
result of Russia’s source of technology and arms for Iran. 102 China provided Iran with the
engineering designs to construct a uranium conversion facility as well as several of the key
materials necessary for its being built. While the US was able to place pressure on China to
cease assisting Iran in its nuclear program, the little help that China had already provided to Iran
proved essential for Iran’s ability to launch its nuclear program. 103 Iran’s dealings with Pakistan
were kept a higher level of secrecy as Pakistan was not a signatory on the NPT and consequently
was not allowed to produce nuclear technology. By 1987, Rafsanjani had sent several Iranians to
train at Pakistan’s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology in Islamabad where they trained
with the “father of Pakistan’s atom bomb” Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. 104
The tensions between Iran and the West are of grave concern as they affect many players
in the international arena. On one side, there is Iran, a nation whose leadership has called for the
end of the Israeli state, has repeatedly ignored international sanctioning, and has sworn to pursue
its nuclear agenda. On the sidelines of the Iranian team are many Arab nations who along with
Tehran wish to see a destroyed Israeli state and do not support the Westernization of Arab
society as well as some other key economic players such as Russia and China who have both
assisted Iran in technical and economic assistance. On the other side are the Western states, led
by the United States who has been trying desperately to put an end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions
and its intention of antagonizing the Israel. Iran’s growing support, particularly among terrorist
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groups and Shiite sympathizers in Iraq and Afghanistan make the situation even more unnerving.
Unfortunately, action at this point is questionable and there is much fear that they may aggravate
further the situation. Will Iran directly act against Israel knowing the support it maintains with
the United States and knowing that an attack on Israel will likely spawn some form of retaliation
by the US? Will the United States once again act preemptively towards a Middle Eastern nation,
particularly one that is financially backed by such powerful states as Russia and China? Will
Israel attack unilaterally knowing that should Iran respond, the United States is likely to back
them and thus any conflict will not be end as a unilateral endeavor? Can the West and Israel
afford to wait back for Iran to continue to develop its nuclear program? Moreover, can one
reasonably expect that should the situation escalate by any degree that it will not result in a
global conflict?
Under Rafsanjani, Iran’s nuclear program was resurrected. He led the labeled “atomic
ayatollahs” into changing Iran’s policies to promote the science education among the Iranian
people. Soon the Iranian government was offering scholarships to those wishing to go abroad to
learn about nuclear technology as well as offered incentives for Iranian scientist to return to Iran
from their exile. 105 Thousands of specialists, scientists, and engineers returned to work on the
‘secret’ nuclear program. Various contracts had been established and nuclear experiments had
commenced. Perhaps the greatest achievement of Rafsanjani’s efforts was that “Iran was able to
conceal its true intentions from the world. While the country was reactivating its nuclear
program, the international community was fast asleep.” 106
Since 1987, Iran has attempted to improve its missile capabilities while simultaneously
obtaining missiles from China and North Korea. Though this relationship is considered to be
motivated by a commercial need rather than a strategic relationship, there is still a need to
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consider how such a relationship may play a role in Iranian foreign policy. Consequently, since
the Western states maintain a high level of suspicion and concern towards North Korea, the West
also regards Iran with concern and distrust. 107
In 1993, Iran signed onto the Chemical Weapons Convention despite its skepticism of the
convention being followed by all its signatories. 108 Since 1988, Iran is rumored to have extended
its weapons arsenal to include mustard gas, blood and nerve agents, and other biological and
chemical weapons of mass destruction. 109 There are no confirmation as to the volume and extent
of Tehran’s weaponization program but CIA and other intelligence reports have made a strong
indication of their existence within Iran. 110
From the 1990s and on, Iran has attempts to advert international attention away from its
nuclear program. However such attempts have often been viewed as futile as the concern has
continued to develop. Among the concerns came from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) who had several suspicions of the nature of Iran’s nuclear program and had doubts of its
use being strictly civilian in nature. Iranian officials dodged giving direct answers to their
questioning of Iran’s nuclear program and further restricted the IAEA’s ability to review Iran’s
facilities by delaying their admission into many of the sites being used to test and develop the
nuclear technology. 111
Alarmingly, nuclear proliferation at the global level has only been thwarted by political
concerns rather than technological capacity. The construction of nuclear weapons is no longer
too expensive for nations to afford but rather, the issue that now arises is “on the perceptions of a
state’s security in the prevailing international environment, its objectives and goals and the
contribution that a nuclear capability can make them.” 112 Tehran has taken a rigid stance against
many Western nations who have attempted to restrict or restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions by
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pointing to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to which it has been a party of since 1968
which provides that “all nations have a right to obtain nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.”
Further, Iranian leaders argue that access to atomic energy is critical in their need for a larger
power generation capacity and to improve such key industries as agriculture, medicine, and
industry. 113
There are some major divisions within Iranian politics between the religious
conservatives who wish to pursue Iran’s nuclear program aggressively and reformists who take
on a more pacifying position. 114 During Khatami’s presidency, Iran tried shift its propaganda in
a more moderate direction to attempt improving its image within the international community.
Though policies did not change significantly, much of the international community began
regarding Khatami, a mid-ranking mullah, as a positive change for Iran. 115 “The state of Iran’s
program is ambitious but rudimentary with a claimed emphasis on peaceful uses contradicted by
assessments of weapons intentions.” 116 The acquirement of nuclear weapons by Iran would
serve as a statement to the international community of Iran’s commitment to be considered a
leading regional power. Additionally, nuclear weapons could assist in reducing the cost of
defense and could divert attention away from the feeble economy. 117
The Iran-Iraq War demonstrated several weaknesses with Iran’s military power: the need
for a more structured long-range plan, the insufficient resources that were provided to the
military, and the unrealistic goals of the military due to its lack of capabilities. 118 The Iran-Iraq
War demonstrated a severe deficiency in Iran’s ability to maintain supplies for its military.
Iran’s air defenses were in dismal shape due to the war with Iraq. Iran’s naval capacity was also
in poor shape as Iran continued to be limited in its ability to protect and defend its own shipping
from outside intervention. 119 The Iraqi chemical attacks on Iran demonstrated the need for
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developing military capabilities to counter potentially threatening nations. 120 Further, Iraqi use
of chemical and biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq War left Iran vulnerable to future
attacks and strengthened its resolve to develop such weapons to ensure that they would be able to
counter any future attacks or hope to deter other nations from attacking. 121 As the United States
imposed regulations that limited Iranian access to arms material, the Iranian government learned
of the need for self-sufficiency in order to reduce dependency of outsiders for their military
ambitions. Consequently, postwar Iran grew a better sense of self-reliance through an increase in
the diversification of resources, the stockpiling of arms supplies in case of supply interruptions,
and increasing domestic production of arms supplies. 122 Iranian leadership has “acquired the
technical capacity to produce missiles.” 123
In his State of the Union address in 2000, US President Bush took a strong stance against
Iran, pinning it together with North Korea as part of the “axis of evil.” The Bush administration
supported the idea of preventative and preemptive measures against such “evil regimes.” 124 This
rhetoric recharged Iran’s resolve to develop a viable nuclear program as a means to exert its
influence within the international community. 125 However, Iran lacked the capacity to build the
nuclear power sites at the rate it wanted to do so and further have to face much confrontation by
the international community on its persistence in developing a strong nuclear program. President
Khatami did not budge from his stance of developing Iran’s nuclear sector regardless of any
opposition and further argued that Iran’s ratification of the NPT granted it the right to develop a
peaceful nuclear program. 126
As early as 2001, the international community argued that the problem with Iran was its
continued development of its nuclear program. 127 In 2004, England, France, and Germany
entered into agreement with Iran to ignore its previous violations with regard to the Nuclear

93

Proliferation Treaty in return for Khatami’s support for the suspension of Iran’s nuclear
program. 128 From the Iranian standpoint, the development of its nuclear program was motivated
by the desire to launch Iran as a regional superpower and for Iran to stand against the bullytactics of the West, particularly the United States. 129

Shifting in Us-Iranian Relations

In 1984, Iran was placed on the US State Department’s list of nations supporting
terrorism. Further, most imports from Iran were banned by the US government by 1987. Very
little diplomatic relations existed between the two powers due greatly by the Iranian hostage
crisis of 1979 and Khomeini’s strong anti-American rhetoric. Moreover the Iran-Iraq Arms
Proliferation Act of 1992 placed greater restrictions against Iran. 130

The US government

maintained a policy of containment against Iran in order to protect American interests in the
Middle East but publically claimed that such policies were not intended to promote confrontation
between the two countries. 131
Despite these restrictions, US exports to Iran have increased, particularly as the US began
purchasing Iranian oil.

This relationship brought close to $3.5 billion into the Iranian

economy. 132 Additionally, it has been revealed that the US had sold technological equipment to
Iran, even despite its embargo. Some leadership within the US tried to promote the idea of
improving relations with Iran, arguing that a cooperative approach might lessen the animosity
and consequently the threat that Iran’s presence and role in the Middle East had presented to
American interests. This often labeled “olive branch” approach towards Iran tried to stress that
under the more moderate leadership of President Rafsanjani, there was a chance for improved
changes and for a less radical political structure within Iran. 133
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The “olive-branch” approach argues that many of the tensions between the two nations
stems from misunderstanding and distrust.

While many Americans saw Iran’s quest for

strengthening and growing its military and arms as a sign of possible aggression, those believing
in the olive-branch approach argued that the reason that Iran was pursuing such improvements
was because of the manner in which its military and arms supply had been severely depleted due
to the Iran-Iraq war. The continued threat posed by other Arab nations onto Iran’s security and
sovereignty forced Iran into approaching its security interests in an aggressive manner that could
appear to some as being hostile and precarious for the Western powers. 134 They argued that the
United States could in fact sell some of its technologies and aircrafts to Iran without
compromising its position against an Iranian nuclear program. Further, they claimed that such
business transactions would have no bearing on the development of the Iranian nuclear program
and would actually serve to stimulate the American economy and provide jobs to US citizens
with jobs. 135
While the supporters of the olive branch approach stressed the notion that not moving
away from the failed policies of the past would result in promoting further radicalization within
Iran and thus, a graver insecurity to the United States, another group of political analyst stressed
the need to continue with a confrontational approach. 136 They maintained that the Islamic state
was ideologically and geopolitically at odds with the United States and that any form of
compromise would send out a signal of American weakness that would surely be exploited by
Iran. Iran’s revival of its nuclear program was viewed as an aggressive maneuver that needed to
be confronted at all cost for the protection of American and global security. 137
By 1992, the US passed the Iran Non-Proliferation Act and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
in 1995 which placed restrictions on companies to keep them from investing in Iranian and
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Libyan oil and gas sectors. Under President Clinton, the United States continued its policy of
placing diplomatic pressure on other nations to prevent their assistance to Iran and was
successful in keeping financial assistance from Iran. 138
After September 11, 2001, the United States government classified the Iranian
government with such adversarial states as Iraq and North Korea, even despite the fact that Iran
had cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan. 139

Iran had for some time been

ideologically opposed to the Taliban as their Sunni Islam went against the Shiite values that
Iran’s government used as the center force of its political behavior. 140 Though both President
Khatami and Supreme Leader Khamenei disagreed with the US’ approach to the “war on terror”
and voiced their disapproval of President Bush’s refusal to utilize the United Nations in this war,
they still assisted the United States in getting rid of the Taliban within Afghanistan. The extent
to which Iran played a role in the fall of the Taliban and in assisting the United States remains to
be revealed but there is little doubt that Iran played a part in this achievement. 141
As rumors began flooding in of the chance of US attack against Iran, Khamenei saw a
need to make an ally of the West. They conceded to the US that Iran would consider changes to
its nuclear programs and would make efforts to address concerns of its support towards antiIsraeli groups. Though they continued to criticize America’s ties with Israel, they boasted of the
US’ achievements and development. 142 Moreover, President Khatami expressed his deep regret
for the 1979 hostage crisis that had gravely severed ties between the two nations. In further
promoting the improved rapport of the two nations, Khatami tried to launch an ideological
revolution as a means of bringing about a diplomatic revolution. 143
Relations between the two seemed to be on the road towards improvement until
December 2001 when members of the Bush administration learned of Iran’s shipment of arms to
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the Palestinian National Authority. Though the shipment was legal, President Bush’s cabinet
members began to criticize the Iranian government for supporting the Palestinian Authority that
had often launched what they considered terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. 144 Tensions
were heightened on January 2002 when President Bush announced the world in his State of the
Union address his resolve to fight against the “axis of evil” to which he linked Iran to such states
as Iraq and North Korea. 145
Concerned that the United States was interested in attacking Iran after the war in Iraq was
over with, Khamenei launched a new approach to the United States in which he attempted to
deter American attack on Iran by undermining its efforts in Iraq. 146 Khatami found himself under
serious criticism by both the political leadership and the Iranian people as a consequence of this
labeling. Bush’s labeling of Iran as part of the axis of evil helped elevate the conservative’s
position within Iran and helped them gain more supporters. 147 President Khatami tried to convey
the need for opening dialogue with the United States but it appeared that the United States had
little interest in entertaining the idea. 148
Sensing that improving ties with the United States could be futile, Supreme Leader
Khamenei shifted the focus away from pursuing open dialogue and instead considered how the
Bush administration might act against Iran. Further, the Iranian government saw the US as
sponsoring terrorist acts by supporting Israel in their fight against Palestinians. As a response,
the Iranian government has provided assistance to various terrorist organizations such as Hamas
and Hezbollah. 149Iranian leaders see a need for their involvement as a means of countering US
involvement in the peace process in the Middle East. Seeing the US as sponsoring terrorist acts
by supporting Israel in their fight against Palestinians, the Iranian government has provided
assistance to various terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. 150
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There is grave tension between the United States and Iran due to the issue of Iran’s
nuclear program and Iran’s stance towards the destabilization of Iraq. 151 “Despite a quartercentury of tension with Iran, the United States has finally reached out to the Islamic Republic for
help in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq- and is getting it, according to US and Iranian
officials.” 152Iran has a clear interest in the stabilization of Iraq and has been providing it with
humanitarian supplies since the United States’ coalition against terror invaded the nation.
Further, Iran’s pledge of attendance at the donor’s conference to raise funds for humanitarian
assistance to the Iraqi people may assist in improving relations with the United States. 153
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE CLASH OF REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP STYLES
Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became active in Iranian politics during the second half of the
1970s during which time the Reza Shah began losing favor among the Iranian people. 1
Ahmadinejad focused his activities to promote his religious convictions which put him at odds
with the Shah’s policies. He became involved in anti-Shah organizations and activities. 2 By
2003, Ahmadinejad ran for mayor of Tehran. Through his religious values and conservatism, he
quickly gained favor amongst the Iranian people. Further, the disdain felt by many Iranians
towards the current corrupt government assisted in Ahmadinejad’s victory. 3
By 2005, Ahmadinejad took on the race for the presidency of Iran. Having already
served as president for two terms, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani decided to come back into the
political arena by running for a third term. Towards the end of his previous term Iran’s economy
had begun to deteriorate and Iranians had been ready for a change. However, after two terms of
President Khatami’s leadership, Iranians seemed ready to allow Rafsanjani to rule again.
Rafsanjani’s goal if elected President once again was to continue to his proposed social changes
for Iran. He wanted to continue Khatami’s movement for improved collaboration between Iran
and the international community. 4 It appeared that Rafsanjani would be able to ride the coattails
of President Khatami’s popularity among Iranians and win the election.
Consequently Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s run for the presidency was not very supported
throughout Iranian political elite. He had little international recognition and was very much
outside of the more known Iranian politicians. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was involved with the
conservative bloc within Iran but his run for presidency was met with some hesitation among
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these individuals. Some conservative groups felt that Ahmadinejad would take away votes from
more known candidates and that this would serve to assist Rafsanjani in securing the presidency.
This fear prompted an underground campaign to convince Ahmadinejad to remove himself from
the race. 5
The groundwork for Ahmadinejad’s victory came about from 2003 as the US pursued
aggressive policies with regard to the Middle East and consequently presented a threat to the
Iranian government.

Khamenei attempted to dissuade American hostility towards Iran by

proclaiming to be open for discussion regarding Iran’s nuclear policy and other such topics that it
had been in conflict with the US. However, US leadership chose to ignore this gesture and
continued to take the aggressive stance against Iran and all others deemed a part of the “Axis of
Evil.” Realizing that little could be done to improve relations with the US, Khamenei shifted
tactics to deter American aggression. He did so by sending 10,000 IRGC-trained soldiers in Iraq
to assist the Shiite population in Iraq in their struggle against the US. 6 Seeing the manner in
which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remained true to his Islamic faith and remained steadfast against
the Reformist faction, Khamenei decided to support Ahmadinejad’s candidacy. Khamenei saw
this election as an opportunity to regain conservative control over Iran. 7
To improve his chances of winning, Ahmadinejad focused his campaign on eliminating
the corruption within Iran.

Ahmadinejad’s campaign for presidency focused on garnering

resentment against the rich and the mullahs. In his presidential election, Ahmadinejad made a
series of promises to the Iranian people that he would improve the economy and developmental
programs. 8 Ahmadinejad spoke against the moral and cultural demise that had overcome Iranian
society. 9 He also promised a fairer distribution of Iran’s oil revenues. 10 He cited the various
economic problems within the nation and highlighted the problems of corruption within the
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Iranian government. As the public grew weary of this corruption, Rafsanjani began finding
himself losing support as many viewed him as being one of the several corrupt leaders within
Iran. 11
Rafsanjani held a plurality vote in the initial election with Ahmadinejad holding the
second highest percentage of votes.

However, Iranian regulations require that a candidate

receive a majority vote or a runoff election is needed. As such, there was a new election held
pinning Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad against each other. Unlike the first round of elections, the
runoff election brought about many key differences between the two candidates. Rafsanjani
made many mistakes that pushed people to support Ahmadinejad.

His carelessness with

spending money when so many of the Iranian people were struggling to make ends meet pushed
many to side with Ahmadinejad. To the Iranian people, Rafsanjani represented the elitism and
corruption in Iran, particularly as it was reported that he had several interests within foreign
nations. 12
Despite himself not being a religious cleric, Ahmadinejad utilized a strategy of pleading
to the poor’s religious duty to get involved in government. The poor tended to be very religious
and often visited their mosques for both religious and social reasons as a means of escape from
the perils of their lives. The Iranian populace had been supported the 1979 revolution and the
return to Islam that came about during Khomeini’s reign. Consequently, they grew distrustful of
the current political atmosphere within Iran as it appeared to be moving in a secular direction.
Ahmadinejad acknowledged the sentiments of the general population and used it to his
advantage by focusing much of his campaigning to taking a strong stance against the corruption
and immorality that had plagued Iran and pledging to bring back the Islamic law into Iranian
politics. 13
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Ahmadinejad filmed a television commercial in which a reporter asked questions of his
son Ali Reza which helped to demonstrate the modest ways in which his family lived and then
demonstrated the lavish lifestyle of Rafsanjani. In doing so, Ahmadinejad was able to reach out
to more Iranians in demonstrating that he was just like the rest of the population. 14 Meanwhile
Rafsanjani attempted to portray Ahmadinejad in a bad light by highlighting his intolerance for
secularism. This was intended to scare away younger voters from supporting Ahmadinejad but
this ended backfiring as Ahmadinejad was able to dismiss this image as being irrelevant to what
were the real issues within Iran: the economy and the welfare of the people. 15
Rafsanjani held a plurality vote in the initial election with Ahmadinejad holding the
second highest percentage of votes.

However, Iranian regulations require that a candidate

receive a majority vote or a runoff election is needed. As such, there was a new election held
pinning Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad against each other. Unlike the first round of elections, the
runoff election brought about many key differences between the two candidates. Rafsanjani
made many mistakes that pushed people to support Ahmadinejad.

His carelessness with

spending money when so many of the Iranian people were struggling to make ends meet pushed
many to side with Ahmadinejad. To the Iranian people, Rafsanjani represented the elitism and
corruption in Iran, particularly as it was reported that he had several interests within foreign
nations. 16
The Iranian populace had been supported the 1979 revolution and the return to Islam that
came about during Khomeini’s reign. Consequently, they grew distrustful of the current political
atmosphere within Iran as it appeared to be moving in a secular direction.

Ahmadinejad

acknowledged the sentiments of the general population and used it to his advantage by focusing
much of his campaigning to taking a strong stance against the corruption and immorality that had
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plagued Iran and pledging to bring back the Islamic law into Iranian politics. 17 Ahmadinejad’s
victory marked the end of the leadership by mullahs as he became the first president since 1981
to be a nonmullah. 18
Despite Supreme Leader Khamenei’s initial support for Ahmadinejad’s run for office,
they have often found themselves in conflict with how Iran should go forth as a significant
regional power. Khamenei’s revolutionary realist approach of modernization and cooperation
has faced strong resistance from Ahmadinejad’s revolutionary idealist perspective that considers
Iran to have the potential for developing itself without outside influence. Ahmadinejad criticizes
Khamenei for imposing Islamic ordinances and for his cooperative nature towards the West. 19
Ahmadinejad is considered a revolutionary idealist as was Khomeini. Both leaders felt that Iran
could develop into a significant regional power without compromising the integrity of Iranian
society and without having to allow outside influences to determine the manner in which Iran
would pursue such development. The two leaders did differ in the methods used to achieve such
means. While Khomeini intended to dominate over the region and impose Islamic law over the
region, Ahmadinejad is more concerned with supporting nations against Western imperialism,
even if this involves supporting or condoning terrorist activities. 20 However, the duality in Iran’s
political structure serves as a limitation to President Ahmadinejad’s ability to impose his
revolutionary idealist vision onto Iran. 21
As Ahmadinejad’s rule continued, Khamenei grew weary of the manner in which
Ahmadinejad held very little interest in improving foreign relations and instead was only
concerned with making socio-economic changes. His confrontational style increased tension
within the different factions in Iran to which Khamenei found himself pressured by political elite
to empower others, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani in order to counter some of Ahmadinejad’s
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power. 22 Soon Khamenei received demands by ayatollahs for the removal of the President but
he rejected such requests.

When threatened by the ayatollah to be disposed of himself,

Khamenei responded by giving Rafsanjani increased power to a degree that could be considered
greater than that of President Ahmadinejad. 23

Development

Economic Development

President Ahmadinejad has stirred up much controversy within Iran for his ambitious
social development programs. He believes that the government needs to invest directly in
antipoverty and employment programs and has called for “banks and quick-loan agencies to
distribute money in the form of low-interest unsecured loans to Iranian businesses.” 24 Another of
Ahmadinejad’s social programs is the Justice Shares program. This program was created under
Khatami’s presidency but it was not until Ahmadinejad’s presidency that the program was able
to see results.

The idea behind the program was to privatize many of Iran’s state-owned

companies while simultaneously offering shares to the poor within Iran.

According to the

Justice Shares program, the buyer has up to ten years to pay for their shares. To finance this
program Ahmadinejad plans to utilize oil money. The goal for this plan is to “give Iran’s poor a
stake in the economy so they will be able to enjoy its profits directly while also redistributing the
national wealth.” 25
President Ahmadinejad’s focus on the nuclear program has led to many economic
problems for the Iranian people. However, the President believes that both the economy and
social welfare of the people can be addressed simultaneously and has attempted to address the
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concerns regard poverty within Iran. Wages have been raised 30% and financial assistance is
being provided to the elderly. To assist the underprivileged with housing problems, he budgeted
$1 billion for construction of low-cost housing. 26 Since most of Ahmadinejad’s supporters are
among the poor, he has made several plans to provide financial assistance to them. 27
While running for president, Ahmadinejad promised to raise the standard of living reduce
the level of inflation, and get rid of the corruption within the government. However, since he has
been president, unemployment has not reduced, inflation has continued to rise, and the gap
between the rich and the poor has continued. By 2007, he had earned grave criticism throughout
Iran for his failure to address any of the key issues of Iran’s economy. His staunch antiAmerican rhetoric and policy cost Iran substantially as the US had been successful in cutting
Iran’s financial support from various international finance institutions. 28 The shaky economy
has led to serious concerns over the future of Iran, particularly its future positioning as a regional
power.
Ahmadinejad claimed to want to reform the economy to ensure equality and justice. His
plan had the semblances of a socialist model in which the government would be empowered to
distribute the wealth among Iranians. 29

Social and Cultural Development

In terms of social and cultural development, pressure to make changes within Iran has
grown substantially since Ahmadinejad’s victory. Critics of the regime were removed from their
jobs or imprisoned. In a similar motion, educational facilities found themselves under scrutiny
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as liberal staff and rebellious students were removed from the educational system or prevented
from attending. 30
Another development that has occurred within Iran has been the regression of women’s
rights in Iran. Ahmadinejad brought back the strict dress code for women and allowed for
regulations that would keep women from participating in various recreational activities.
Moreover, under his rule, the Iranian Ministry of Education brought back the notion of
separating men and women within the university educational system. 31
Ahmadinejad wanted to rid Iran of its Western influences and return the rule of Islam to
Iran.

The movement towards democracy that began under the Rafsanjani and Khatami

presidencies was viewed as being contradictory to the values of Islam as democratic rule lent
itself to a pluralistic rule rather than the rule of one. 32 Ahmadinejad’s Third Revolution was
dedicated to this Cultural Revolution and through strict censorship and threats of imprisonment;
he was able to get many such reforms conducted. 33
Censorship was high as Ahmadinejad sought to sequester any opposition. Many news
sources were banned or closed and any cultural institutions that refused to comply with the
mandates of the government. 34 The President banned various books for their “superficiality” and
“liberalist tendencies.” Further, he made regulations that would stifle many news sources and
writers from having their works published if they made any reference to liberalist ideals. 35

Nuclear Showdown

In February 2006, Tehran mayor Bagher Ghalibaf ordered the cutting down of thousands
of trees in Lavisan. The move sent a red flag to the international community who questioned the
reasoning for such a move and further believed it was intended to hide evidence of Iranian
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nuclear development. Iran tried to deny that there was a nuclear facility in Lavisan since its
existence would demonstrate a disregard to IAEA regulations of declaring it. However after
much probing, Iran was forced to admit that there was a research center in Lavisan. “Iranian
officials followed their usual pattern of delay, evasion, and claiming complications involved
equipment that had been removed and stored, and claiming ‘lost’ equipment as a means to avoid
revealing too much information about the site.” 36 However, the IAEA remained resilient in their
efforts to uncover any Iranian nuclear development. Finally when the IAEA was able to find
dual-use equipment and traces of uranium, Iran admitted to having used the site in Lavisan for
nuclear activity. Regardless, they continued to downplay the significance of this site by claiming
that it was used solely for defensive research. 37 This claim was not easily believed as the IAEA
discovered the Parchin complex which consisted of hundreds of buildings and underground sites
used to test explosives. This concern grew even stronger still by spring of 2006 when it was
revealed that a laptop had been smuggled out of Iran to Germany with designs for nuclear
warhead. 38
Iranian officials tried to deny that this laptop originated from Iran by claiming that the
nuclear scientists in Iran were highly educated and would never have written such sensitive
information in Farsi nor in a computer but would have rather written in English and on a more
secure storage sight. Further, Iranian officials argued that the entire situation was a fabrication
by the Israeli government and Western intelligence. After much investigation, it was found that
the laptop was in fact Iranian in origin but the Iranians then claimed that the information in the
laptop was not in reference to a nuclear warhead but rather to developing a reentry vehicle for a
missile. 39
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There are no confirmation as to the volume and extent of Tehran’s weaponization
program but CIA and other intelligence reports have made a strong indication of their existence
within Iran. 40 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad believes strongly in the belief that the Mahdi (Messiah)
has spoken through him and that he will reappear sometime in the near future. According to
Islamic belief, the coming of the Mahdi will arise after a great war. It is this belief coupled with
the fact that Iran has developed the capacity for enriching uranium which could bring nuclear
weapons to Iran that has brought some concern for the international community. There is some
concern that the progress with regard to Iran’s nuclear program may give President Ahmadinejad
the confidence he needs to “engage the West in a war as a means of precipitating the Mahdi’s
reappearance.” 41
In 2006, Ahmadinejad sent Mojtaba Samare Hashemi, his senior advisor to France and
then Japan to conduct negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear program. The head of Iran’s
National Security Council, Ali Larijani was angered by this move as it took over some of his job
responsibilities.

However, Gholm Reza Aghazedeh, the head of the Atomic Energy

Organization of Iran was in full support of this move. 42 In the summer of 2006, President
Ahmadinejad attempted to open dialogue between Tehran and the U.S. He sent a letter to
President Bush inviting him to sit down to discuss Iranian-US relations.

However, when

President Bush ignored this letter, he sent a clear signal to the Iranian government of the United
States’ unnerving stance against Iran. In efforts to demonstrate to the American people that he
did not have anything against the people but rather against the Bush administration,
Ahmadinejad drafted yet another letter addressed to the American people. Such a letter never
was made public and consequently, there has been a strong public dislike towards the Iranian
president. 43
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Although the United States and much of the West has often viewed Iran’s nuclear
program with reluctance and fear, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remains strong in their
opinion that Iran does not pose a threat to the rest of the world in its nuclear ambitions so long as
such ambitions remain targeted at peaceful purposes. US intelligence predicts that Iran will have
a nuclear device by the year 2015. 44 However, the reality was that Ahmadinejad lacked the
experience to really mold the Iranian economy. Under him Tehran’s stock exchange felt an
appalling decline that had severe consequences to various sectors of Iran’s economy. Poverty
levels were on a high, housing prices jumped high, and many investors left. 45 Despite this
pattern, however, Ahmadinejad continued his spending policy under the argument that Iran’s oil
industry could support such costs. However, as inflation grew rampant throughout the nation,
Ahmadinejad began to recognize the need for revision of his economic policies. 46
Iran’s leadership continues to reject proposals by the West concerning its nuclear
program. The proposal presented by England, France, and Germany to Iran pledged various
trade and security incentives that would act to endorse Iran’s role as a regional power under the
condition that Iran cease pushing forward enriching its uranium which could be used for
bombs. 47Despite statements by the mullahs that the nuclear program will be utilized for peaceful
purposes, the international community remains skeptical of Iranian intentions. This skepticism
was strengthened as Iran broke the seals at a uranium plant in Isfahan. 48 Iran has gained the
support of several smaller nations as well as the support of Russia and China in its attempts to
develop its nuclear program on the premise that attempts by the West, most notably the United
States, act as a means of restricting the right of the developing world to reach equitable levels to
the developed nations. 49
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By 2007, Iran’s enrichment program had come under serious scrutiny by the international
community. The IAEA began demanding that the Islamic Republic to inform it of the need for
the suspension of its nuclear program. However, the Iranian government ignored such demands
as well as the various United Nations resolutions that threatened to impose sanctions on Iran if it
refused to stop its development. 50

However, President Ahmadinejad remained resilient on

pursuing his nuclear agenda which he saw as being necessary for the protection of Iranian
interests, the deterrence of outside aggression, and a possible unifier for the divisions within
Iran. 51
There is concern regarding Iran’s potential as a nuclear threat that “a deadlock in the
nuclear negotiations may lead to an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities by the US or
Israel.” 52The major news story in October 2008 was the surprising missile test that Iran ran.
Some believe this test was conducted to warn off potential attack by Israel or the US.
Some experts maintain that “peace in the Middle East will rely more on Iran’s nuclear
threat than on the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel.” 53 Iran’s recent missile test
indicates their resolve towards protecting itself from perceived aggressors. 54 The missile test
demonstrated Iran’s capacity of bombing Europe and this poses a significant problem for the
security of the international community. It is believed that should Iran’s nuclear intentions not
change, Israel will find itself unable to resist attacking. 55
Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran has garnered a tumultuous relationship
with much of the international community through its determination to continue enriching
uranium and developing its nuclear program and its intent to destroy the Israeli state. 56 The
Iranian government has reopened the doors to the uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz.
Though this facility is said to be strictly for research purposes, there are few within the
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international community who are naïve enough to not stand guarded.

Perhaps the most

concerned with this move is Israel who has maintained a monopoly over nuclear power within
the Middle East. 57
Policy analyst do not believe that Iran will have the intention of striking other nations
should it develop nuclear weapons but rather that the Iranian government will use these weapons
as leverage to pursue a more radical, and possibly more dangerous foreign policy. Further, a
nuclear presence in Iran will undoubtedly lead to the desire by other Middle Eastern states to
obtain nuclear technology which will further aggravate the tensions within the Middle East. 58 US
intelligence predicts that Iran will have a nuclear device by the year 2015. 59 US intelligence
further warns that unless there is a regime change in Iran, there will be some form of aggressive
action taken by Israel against Iran. Such an act is likely to have severe economic consequences
as Iran would likely block shipments of oil by attacking tankers intended to provide such
resources to the West. 60
The major news story in October 2008 was the surprising missile test that Iran ran. Some
believe this test was conducted to warn off potential attack by Israel or the US. Further, Iran
warned of retaliation “should it be attacked over its nuclear programs.” 61 It is believed that
“Iran’s missile test was a response to the Israeli air force exercise in which 100 aircrafts
rehearsed for long-haul strikes over the eastern Mediterranean.” 62 Iranian officials continue to
take the stance that its nuclear efforts are for energy production. 63 The missile test demonstrated
Iran’s capacity of bombing Europe and this poses a significant problem for the security of the
international community. Iran’s recent missile test indicates their resolve towards protecting
itself from perceived aggressors. 64
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It is believed that should Iran’s nuclear intentions not change, Israel will find itself unable
to resist attacking. 65 Ahmadinejad’s movement of aggression towards the West is speculated to
be motivated in part by his desire to tarnish the image of his opponents and of the ruling mullahs,
including Khatami and Rafsanjani, as being lackeys of the West whose only concern was to
further their private interests. 66 “President Ahmadinejad has said: ‘Iran will never again stop
uranium enrichment- period. Having a full nuclear fuel cycle is a national imperative.” 67 US
intelligence further warns that unless there is a regime change in Iran, there will be some form of
aggressive action taken by Israel against Iran. Such an act is likely to have severe economic
consequences as Iran would likely block shipments of oil by attacking tankers intended to
provide such resources to the West. 68
The Iranian government has long placed many of its nuclear sites in underground or hard
to access areas within the country which makes it difficult for their being attacked. Despite
threats to attack Iran’s nuclear sites, the Israeli government is cognizant of the high level of
difficulty that such an attack would be as well as the very high probability of not attacking the
correct location due to insufficient intelligence. Thus, Israel has not made any moves as of yet
towards attacking Iran other than to demonstrate it capabilities by “testing” its missiles and by
asserting itself as being powerful enough to attack Iran. However, such threats, regardless of
how empty or unrealistic they may be have led to a further strain in the Iranian-Israeli
relationship. 69
Attacking Iran would take some high level of military capabilities to which the United
States is perhaps the only global power that has the resources and know-how to conduct. The
United States would have to attack Iran’s layers of defense, centers of command and
communication, and long-range ground-to-ground missiles.70However, having such capabilities
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is only one element necessary to launching a preemptive attack on Iran. Prior to the war in Iraq,
the United States may have had the support to take such a recourse and even in the earlier years
following the war the US may have been able to garner the domestic and international support
needed. Since 2005, both the American and international public support for such aggressive
action by the US was severely jeopardized.

Without the assistance of the international

community, the United States would not have the military resources needed to take on Iran while
simultaneously having troops stabilizing Iraq and fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. 71
The Iranian government has reopened the doors to the uranium-enrichment facility in
Natanz. Though this facility is said to be strictly for research purposes, there are few within the
international community who are naïve enough to not stand guarded.

Perhaps the most

concerned with this move is Israel who has maintained a monopoly over nuclear power within
the Middle East. 72 Policy analyst do not believe that Iran will have the intention of striking other
nations should it develop nuclear weapons but rather that the Iranian government will use these
weapons as leverage to pursue a more radical, and possibly more dangerous foreign policy.
Further, a nuclear presence in Iran will undoubtedly lead to the desire by other Middle Eastern
states to obtain nuclear technology which will further aggravate the tensions within the Middle
East. 73
The United States has taken a strong stance against Iran’s nuclear ambitions and has led
the international community to support sanctions against Iran and other nations assisting Iran in
its nuclear endeavors.

Through such sanctioning, the United States hoped to prevent the

international political disaster that could arise from emergence of an established nuclear
program.

However, the current US nonproliferation policy is often regarded as being

discriminatory, unilateralist, and hypocritical.
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By targeting certain states who are in fact

signatories of the NPT but turning a blind eye to non-signatories, such as Israel, the United States
has painted a clear image of bias and contradiction. As a signatory to the NPT, Iran as does any
other signatory maintains the right to access technology so long as its use is strictly intended for
peaceful purposes. The US refusal to accept this key article in the Treaty has been a contentious
issue throughout the international community. 74
Iranian response to international sanctioning as a result of its nuclear program seems to
be that of indifference and defiance as Iran maintains the stance of having nothing to lose from
such sanctioning. In a society where hardships are considered the markings of a holier lifestyle,
economic sanctions by Western nations against Iran assist in gaining support for the radicals as
they portray themselves as victims against the “Great Satan” and the West. 75

Foreign Relations

Soon after winning the presidency, Ahmadinejad turned his focus to foreign policy as he
endorsed the improving of Iran’s nuclear program with the likely end result of nuclear weaponry.
Further, he also revived the animosity and desire of destruction of the Israeli state. 76 Though his
victory in the Presidential election made little reference to a foreign policy directive, upon taking
over, Ahmadinejad made it clear his intent to launch Iran into a significant regional power.
He made references to the Western opposition of Iran’s scientific progress and likened
this hostility to be motivated by a desire to prevent Iran from developing to its potential. Unlike
former President Khatami, Ahmadinejad realigned Iran’s foreign policy away from diplomatic
dialogue into one of uncompromising national interests. 77
There has been improvement in the Russian-Iranian relationship through the past couple
decades. Russia has strengthened its trade and diplomatic ties with Tehran and has provided it
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with technical assistance in support of Iran’s nuclear program. 78 It is in Russia’s national interest
to support Iran in its nuclear program as it could assist in positioning Russia’s geopolitical
importance in the region. 79 Despite improvements within some European states and Iran, the
relationship between England and Iran has been placed under serious strain under Ahmadinejad.
He blames England for the creation of the Israeli state as well as takes on a strong stance against
England’s stance on Iran’s nuclear program. 80
With oil and gas prices at a record high, Iran is benefitting greatly from the growing
demand for oil and gas by Western countries as well as from India and China. Oil represents
Iran’s largest and most lucrative commodity and serves as a “shield against international
sanctions or military attack on Iran’s nuclear sites as such events would likely be punished by
stemming the flow of oil in such a manner that would inevitably hurt world economies. 81
The potential threat to the global economy due to Iran’s oil dominance has not gone
unnoticed throughout the world. Iran is one of the main oil suppliers for China and the fear of
having its oil imports affected has resulted in China being very reluctant to imposing stringent
sanctions against Iran as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Likewise,
Russia has also utilized its veto power in the Security Council to block US-driven economic
sanctions against Iran. Though Russia does not rely on Iran for oil, it does maintain a strong
relationship with regards to Russian military, nuclear, and civilian goods. 82
Despite a long history of antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Iran, President
Ahmadinejad took steps to improve things between the nations. In March 2007, he met with
King Abdullah and spoke of the need to end the sectarian tension within Iraq in order to prevent
civil war in the nation. He spoke of Palestinian and Arab unity against outside aggressors.
Further, Ahmadinejad pledged to support Saudi Arabia in its confrontations with Lebanon. 83
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In trying to resist US military presence in the Persian Gulf, Ahmadinejad expanded past
just improving ties within its region and also sought out liaisons with other parts of the world,
most notably South America. In January 2007, President Ahmadinejad met with the presidents
of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador in hopes of garnering new economic connections with
these nations who themselves were known having anti-American imperialism stances. 84

Relations with Israel

Relations between Iran and Israel have become more strained since Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad “called for Israel to be ‘wiped off the map’ in October 2005.” 85
President Ahmadinejad adheres to a very extreme form of Islam which causes him to have little
respect or support towards secular societies such as Israel. Israel’s secularized governmental
policies and lack of rigid adherence to religious law angers Ahmadinejad more so than its nature
of being a Jewish state. 86 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made it evident to the world of
his belief that Israel should not exist and “he further describes it [Israel] as a weak tree that will
be uprooted by one storm.” 87
The basic position by many in the Arab world is that “as the stronger, wealthier, and
conquering partner, Israel should take the initiative and help kick-start the peace process by
withdrawing unilaterally and totally from its territories which it has occupied illegally (according
to international law) since the 1967.” 88 Tension between Israel and Iran has long been in
existence, constituting what many refer to as “history’s last ideological clashes.” 89 Despite the
fact that Iran has little to gain from supporting the Palestinian cause other than in supporting its
fellow Muslims and the fact that it is unlikely utilize its nuclear capabilities onto Israel, the
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international community has been very cautious and concerned with Ahmadinejad’s strong antiIsraeli sentiments. 90
The United States has acted in support and in protection of Israel on many occasions
relating to Israel’s Arab neighbors. With regards to Iran, it is doubtful that the United States will
take an aggressive approach, however, Israel has repeatedly indicated its intent to prevent Iran
from having nuclear weapons at all cost. However such threats have often been viewed as being
nothing more than bravado rather than soon-to-be action as Israel lacks many of the necessary
military resources to completely obliterate Iran’s nuclear program.

“Israel cannot hope to

destroy Iran’s entire nuclear arsenal but would rather need to narrow down the targets to the key
areas that would produce a significant blow to Iran’s nuclear program.” 91
Former US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton believes that action Israeli action against
Iran will likely be conducted without US involvement. 92 In December 2006, Ahmadinejad’s
administration sponsored a Holocaust cartoon competition and conference in which the central
message was on the denial of the Holocaust and blaming Israel for the exploitation of this event
in history. 93
There are many Israelis who believe that the best tactic that can be undertaken towards
Iran is an aggressive approach. 94 US ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton believes
that “Israel would likely have to act unilaterally in any military strike because the US has lost
enthusiasm to do so.” 95 “The primary objective of any Israeli or US action should be toward a
complete halt, or at least substantial delay (by several years) for Iran’s completion of its nuclear
project, with the hope that a more moderate regime will emerge, willing to regain its place in the
free world.” 96

117

When questioned about Iran being a threat to Israel, President Ahmadinejad says that “his
country has much more to fear from Israel and the United States than either had to fear from
Iran.” 97 President Ahmadinejad has stated “Iran has not attacked any country…Iran and its
leadership seeks peace and brotherhood.” 98 In December 2008, President Ahmadinejad once
again shocked the world by announcing that Iran will back the Palestinian people and their
decision on how to deal with their ongoing conflict with Israel, even if that means
acknowledging the state of Israel should the proposal of a two-state solution be accepted by the
Palestinian people. 99 However, very few within the international community believe in President
Ahmadinejad’s promise of support towards the Israeli state. 100
President Ahmadinejad has agreed to the existence of the state of Israel should Palestine
agree to the two-state solution. “If they [the Palestinians] want to keep the Zionists, they can
stay…Whatever the people decide, we will respect it. I mean it is very much in correspondence
with our proposal to allow Palestinian people to decide through free referendums.” 101 Some
skeptics believe Ahmadinejad’s statements were made to manipulate the international
community during his visit to the United Nations. 102 Others believe that perhaps his statements
are indicative of new moderate approach to international relations by the Iranian President that
may lead to openness in the negotiation of the future of Israel. 103

“Axis of Evil” V. “The Great Satan”

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s animosity towards the United States began at an
early age during the time of the Shah. Reza Shah provided Americans living in Iran with many
amenities and allowances such as immunity from Iranian prosecution for violating Iranian
regulations that allowed for the disrespect and relative dismissal of Iranian laws by Americans.
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For many Iranians such an act demonstrated a clear corruption within the Iranian government as
well as the seeming arrogance by the West to maintain a level of respect of the laws of others. 104
Ahmadinejad’s movement of aggression towards the West is speculated to be motivated
in part by his desire to tarnish the image of his opponents and of the ruling mullahs, including
Khatami and Rafsanjani, as being lackeys of the West whose only concern was to further their
private interests. 105 “President Ahmadinejad has said: ‘Iran will never again stop uranium
enrichment- period.

Having a full nuclear fuel cycle is a national imperative.” 106 Iranian

response to international sanctioning as a result of its nuclear program seems to be that of
indifference and defiance as Iran maintains the stance of having nothing to lose from such
sanctioning. In a society where hardships are considered the markings of a holier lifestyle,
economic sanctions by Western nations against Iran assist in gaining support for the radicals as
they portray themselves as victims against the “Great Satan” and the West. 107
The Iranian government views the United States’ foreign policy to be imperialistic and
expansionist. Ahmadinejad has often argued that US interest in assisting other nations is driven
purely by a desire to exploit weaker and smaller nations with their assistance through means of
making such nation reliant on the US for support for their stability. 108 The current US
nonproliferation policy is often regarded as being discriminatory, unilateralist, and hypocritical.
By targeting certain states who are in fact signatories of the NPT but turning a blind eye to
nonsignatories, such as Israel, the United States has painted a clear image of bias and
contradiction. As a signatory to the NPT, Iran as does any other signatory maintains the right to
access technology so long as its use is strictly intended for peaceful purposes. The US refusal to
accept this key article in the Treaty has been a contentious issue throughout the international
community. 109
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President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad often refers to the United States as “the Great Satan”
due in large part to its perceived “willingness to achieve its expansionist goals through use of
brute force, but if force is not in its interest, it will do so through the spread of its “neoliberalsit”
ideas such as ‘democracy’ and ‘capitalism.’” 110 Further adding to the tension between the two is
the US’ public demands that Iran cease its uranium enrichment program and its more veiled
desire for regime change within Iran. 111
On May 8, 2006, President Ahmadinejad wrote to President George W. Bush in what
some argue was an indication of a willingness to open a dialogue with America. However, the
President was unwilling to meet with Ahmadinejad citing the nuclear issue as a reason for this
refusal. It would not be until May 28, 2007 that the two nations would finally open a dialogue 112
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CHAPTER SIX:
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Findings

This study demonstrated the various dimensions of Iranian politics that can have a
significant role in developing its foreign and domestic policies. Keeping in mind the distinction
some scholars have made of the effects of different leadership styles on a nation’s policy-making
and under what circumstances certain leadership styles are likely to emerge, most notably Sadri’s
classification of revolutionary realist and revolutionary idealist and Appleby’s classification of
institutional pragmatists and charismatic radicals, this study considered how different leadership
approaches could result in the improvement or worsening of Iranian foreign policy.

To further

detail the findings, it is best to review the different hypotheses being considered in this study and
the findings for each.

Hypothesis #1:

As the US presence in the Middle East grows, tension with Iran will also intensify.

The event-data analysis utilized throughout this study indicated a clear progression in US
involvement in the Middle East since World War II, but most considerably during the Cold War
and beyond. This pattern correlates with the United States movement away from isolationism
and with its acceptance of its role as a global power following World War II. The Cold War era
marked a significant spike in American presence in the Middle East as a consequence of the
“New Great Game” played between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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Kleveman

describes this competition between the two great powers as being focused on exerting its
dominance over the international community under a realpolitik mentality. Congnizant of Soviet
influence throughout the Caspian region and the Middle East, the United States sought to serve
as counterinfluence in hopes of preventing the spread of Communism.
As tensions grew between the great powers, nations within the Middle East grew weary
of the influence that the two nations could have in their own nations. For decades Russia had
played a significant role in Middle Eastern politics due to its geographical proximity, cultural
connections, and trade partnerships. As such, its presence in the Middle East during the Cold
War confrontation with the United States did not raise alarm. However, there was a growing
level of skepticism and distrust within the region towards the United States whom the Middle
Eastern states regarded as self-interested and worried would exert its influence over Middle
Eastern society as a tool against the Soviets and would drop its relations entirely once the
conflict ended.
Unsurprising, Iran viewed the United States’ desire for infiltration into the Middle East as
imperialistic and contradictory to Iran’s national security. In reviewing US-Iranian relations
throughout the different leadership changes in Iran, however, one notes that despite the innate
tension and distrust between the two nations, there have been several instances in which the two
nations shared positive foreign relations. In fact, through the study there seemed to be a pattern
of positive relations with the United States whenever Iran’s leadership was among those who
followed revolutionary realist tendencies.

Additionally, the research conducted indicated a

relationship exists between the progresses of Iran’s nuclear program to its relations with the
United States as well as a relationship between US reactions to Iran’s policy decisions and USIranian relations. This finding seemed to counter the proposed hypothesis which surmised that
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the greater the American presence in the Middle East, the greater the tensions would be between
Iran and the US. That is not to say that this hypothesis was completely inaccurate but rather
there appeared to be an underlying influence of how the different leadership in Iran viewed the
importance of positive Western relations and how the progress of Iran’s nuclear development to
how US-Iranian relations would stand. This alternative variable of leadership dimension acts has
a spurious relationship on the independent and dependent variable. To better visualize this see
Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 1 demonstrates the proposed relationship between the independent
and dependent variable. Figure 2 demonstrates the relationship found as a result of this study in
which upon considering the alternative causes to the relationship, the correlation between the
independent variable, US presence in the Middle East, and dependent variable, Iranian-US
relations, was weakened tremendously.

In fact, a stronger relationship exists between

revolutionary leadership styles and Iran’s progression on its nuclear program respectively to the
relationship between the US and Iran.

US Presence in the
Middle East

Iranian-US
Relations

Figure 1: Proposed relationship
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Revolutionary
Leadership
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in the Middle
East

Progress of
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IrnaianUS
Relations

US Reaction
to Iran's Policy
Decision

Figure 2: Additive relationship found through the study

Hypothesis #2:

The more idealistic the revolutionary leadership within Iran, the stronger the resistance
will be against Israel.

Unlike the first hypothesis, this proposal found strong support through the course of this
study. Research indicates that Iran’s relationship with Israel began positive and cooperative.
Under the Shah the relations were very positive as both nations relied on each other for support
against the Arabization that had been growing within the region. The Shah ruled over Iran in a
very realist manner, cognizant of the limitations Iran faced as a result of the lackluster
development and industrial infrastructure. In hopes of improving in such sectors, the Shah
would reach out to foreign powers for assistance. Israel played an integral role in the beginning
of Iran’s nuclear program and further served as an important resource in the training and
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educating of Iranian students into technocrats and engineers under the Shah’s reign. However,
the Islamic Revolution marked a turnaround in this relationship as Ayatollah Khomeini saw
Israel as being the ever-present reminder of Western infiltration onto the Middle East.
In promoting his Islamic Revival within Iran, he stressed the importance of social reform
and development to push Iran away from Western influences. Khomeini accredited many of
Iran’s problems to the Shah’s failure of upholding Iran’s national interests against the meddling
of Western powers. Unlike the Shah, Khomeini did not believe that it was necessary to have
strong foreign relations and instead believed that it was more important for Iran to have a strong
domestic policy. It would not be until the emergence of the Iran-Iraq War that Khomeini would
recognize the need for some level of foreign assistance as a consequence of Iran’s lack of strong
military and production capabilities. As the United States pursued an arms embargo against Iran,
Khomeini had little recourse but to allow for the gradual collaboration with Israel for arms and
military supplies. Khomeini stressed that this relationship was only merited by the overriding
need of the Islamic Republic to counter America’s support of Iraq in the war.
Perhaps as a result of Khomeini’s inevitable allowance of a small level of foreign
relations with Israel, the following leadership would also continue a less confrontational
approach to Israel. Under the leadership of Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Rafsanjani,
and later President Khatami, relations with Israel were mostly stagnant. While they often spoke
in support of Palestinian issues, they did not put much emphasis on getting involved with the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Again following the revolutionary realist approach to foreign relations,
Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami remained cautious of how Iran’s foreign relations could
impact other areas of Iranian society and chose to limit Iran’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
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In sharp contrast, the election of the clearly revolutionary idealist President Ahmadinejad
brought Iranian-Israeli relations onto a main stage. President Ahmadinejad saw Israel as being a
danger to the security and stability of Iran. It was common knowledge that the Jewish state had
nuclear capabilities and as such, President Ahmadinejad pursued a rapid and aggressive approach
to Iran’s nuclear development. Further adding to the tension between Iran and Israel was
President Ahmadinejad’s various public proclamations calling for the elimination of the Jewish
state and labeling Israel as being a Western agent whose primary goal was to levy insecurity
within the Middle East in order to promote it as an important regional actor.
The research conducted with respect for the Iranian-Israeli relationship clearly
demonstrates a pattern of aggression towards Israel under the leadership of revolutionary
idealists. Moreover, the study demonstrates a clear support for the hypothesis that the more
idealist a leader is the graver the relationship stands between the two nations. While no one
would classify Ayatollah Khomeini as being a revolutionary realist, the reality is that his
idealistic views did hold some level of pragmatism that would allow for even him to recognize
Iran’s limitations. In contrast, the leadership of President Ahmadinejad demonstrates the manner
in which a very vocal and strictly idealistic leader can push Iran away from any positive foreign
relationship with Israel, even if such a relationship could serve a positive purpose for the Islamic
Republic.
However, one should consider the conceptualization of this hypothesis. Considering that
revolutionary idealists are characteristically prone to isolationism or to not allow for too much
foreign influence to infiltrate their society, perhaps this hypothesis question was not
conceptualized in a manner that would have really introduced a new finding to the relationship
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between Iran and Israel. That is, perhaps in future studies, one could consider other factors that
may be influencing the relationship between Israel and Iran.

Hypothesis #3:

The more cooperative Iran’s foreign policy, the more developed and stable Iran’s society
will be.

This hypothesis considered the role of Iran’s foreign policy to its economic and social
development. It is often seen in reviewing the political agenda of a nation that its foreign policy
makes a considerable impact on its domestic policy as well. It was with this in mind that the
study considers the role that foreign relations plays on Iran’s social and economic development.
Iran has always played an important role in the Middle East due to its vast resources and
geographical positioning. However, as with many Middle Eastern states, Iran has continuously
lacked the proper economic and social infrastructure to truly allow for its potential to grow
within the region. As such, one notes the ability of various foreign actors to infiltrate the Middle
Eastern region and exert their influence.
It is important to note that one of the greatest limitations to Iran’s development stems
from its slow emergence into the technological revolution. Unlike the Western states, many of
the Middle Eastern nations did not begin their development of transportation and technology
sectors until late. Consequently, these nations are forced into a race for development in order to
remain relevant in today’s international society. It is with this in mind that one considers how
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developing positive foreign relations could enhance Iran’s ability to hasten its development and
strengthen its economy.
This study demonstrates a clear influence that moving away from isolationism has had in
the development potential of Iran. Under Khomeini Iran saw itself moving towards isolationism
as Khomeini stressed the need to develop from within and not rely on outside sources. The
consequences of this led to an increased instability within Iran to which aggressive foreign actors
such as Iraq believed it could stage a confrontation against Iran and take over the reins of the
country. In fact, it was not until the Ayatollah opened up to the idea of allowing foreign
influences to permeate Iranian society that Iran found itself able to stand against Iraq in the war.
While President Rafsanjani did believe in improving Iran’s foreign relations, he inherited
Khomeini’s post-Iraq War Iran which had a very unstable economy and many societal problems.
As such, despite his efforts towards internationalism, Iran struggled to improve its social and
economic condition. It would not be until President Khatami’s leadership that Iran would
demonstrate the clear advantage of positive foreign relations to its economy and society. Under
Khatami, Iran’s economy began to improve and many social reforms were able to be carried out.
Even despite President Ahmadinejad’s repeated anti-Western rhetoric, even he has
chosen to maintain positive foreign relations with many states. Unlike his predecessors however,
Ahmadinejad has chosen to develop close ties with other revolutionary idealists such as
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan President Daniel Saaverda. Regardless of
his choice of foreign allies, the important thing to note is the role that opening up foreign
relations can have on a nation’s economic and social development.
The different leadership within Iran since the Shah has held the key issues for Iran in
different levels of importance. The following figures [Figures 3-8] will demonstrate the different
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key concerns of these leaders and the level of importance often levied upon them. Through the
course of this study, one notes the manner in which the different priorities truly make a
substantial difference in the policy-making of the country. The leadership that was concerned
with Iran’s foreign relations was more likely to be revolutionary realists and was also likely to
weigh social and economic development as more important than security issues. In contrast,
President Ahmadinejad whose focus for Iran is undoubtedly its security shows the least amount
of concern for Iran’s foreign relations. More importantly, the different priorities demonstrate the
reasons why Iran’s societal stability has often been lackluster.

Foreign
Relations

Social
Development

Economy

Security
Figure 3: The Shah’s Hierarchy of priorities for Iran
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Foreign Relations
Figure 4: The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s Hierarchy of Priorities for Iran

Foreign
Relations

Social
Development
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Security
Figure 5: The Supreme Leader Khamenei’s Hierarchy of Priorities for Iran
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Figure 6: President Rafsanjani’s Hierarchy of Priorities for Iran

Foreign
Relations

Economy
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Development
Security
Figure 7: President Khatami’s Hierarchy of Priorities for Iran

131

Security

Social
Development
Economy
Foreign Relations
Figure 8: President Ahmadinejad’s Hierarchy of Priorities for Iran

Hypothesis #4:

The higher the anti-American sentiments are within the Iranian government, the greater
the international scrutiny against Iran’s nuclear program.

The Iranian nuclear program is one that has received a grave amount of international
scrutiny and distrust. Among the strongest in opposition of Iran’s nuclear program is the United
States who views Iran’s program as being in direct contradiction to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
that Iran is party to. Despite this, the Iranian government has maintained the stance that its
nuclear development program is intended for peaceable purposes and as such is within their right
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as a sovereign nation. The crux of the nuclear issue is the constant showdown between Iran and
the US with regard to Iran’s continuation of its program. The more antagonistic and demanding
the United States is towards Iran, the more resentment and ultimately the more animosity there is
between the two states.
The relationship between the US and Iran is certainly a tumultuous one. President Bush’s
2006 State of the Union address denounced Iran’s political instability and has accused the Iranian
clerical elite of being the cause of this instability. Further, Bush proclaimed that the international
community must take on a zero tolerance policy towards Iran’s nuclear program. 1 President
Ahmadinejad responded by denouncing the hypocrisy of the US and pledging to take the US to
an international court in the future to force accountability onto the US government for the
thousands killed by the US’s invasions into other nations. 2 The current trend in US policy with
regards to Iran is a faulty one. By automatically jumping to the conclusion of Iran’s nuclear
program having malicious intent US leaders are jeopardizing the potential for positive USIranian relations. As seen throughout Iran’s past, leadership has been open to some degree to
having US and Western involvement in their program. Nevertheless, the inconsistent manner in
which the US regards a nation’s nuclear ambitions (i.e. Iran v. Israel) will continue to make it a
contentious issue when discussing the Middle East.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States had taken a strong
stance against any nation that supports terrorism or terrorist activities. In his State of the Union
address, President George W. Bush opened the floodgates with his classification of Iran and part
of the “Axis of Evil” to which such nations as North Korea and Iraq were also a part of. This
poor choice of words brought a wave of intense animosity within Iran towards the United States
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and has led to its relative indifference of America’s demands that it cease its nuclear
development.
Iranian leadership from the Shah to President Ahmadinejad have made their position
clear that Iran’s motives for developing its nuclear program is driven by its energy and
production needs and not based on a desire for military dominance. Despite this, as one reviews
Iran’s nuclear development over the past several decades, it is evident the shift in the agenda of
Iranian leadership with regards to Iran’s need for the program. It appears that the leadership that
was more inclined to allow Iran to develop some relations with the West was the ones that were
motivated by the notion of progress and modernization in their quest for the development of
nuclear technology. On the other hand, those leaders who had a strong dislike for the West were
more likely to be in support of developing Iran’s nuclear program as a defensive mechanism.
The issue lies with the perception and assumptions by the West as to what is the true motivation
for Iran’s nuclear program.
The tensions between Iran and the West are of grave concern as they affect many players
in the international arena. On one side, there is Iran, a nation whose leadership has called for the
end of the Israeli state, has repeatedly ignored international sanctioning, and has sworn to pursue
its nuclear agenda. On the sidelines of the Iranian team are many Arab nations who along with
Tehran wish to see a destroyed Israeli state and do not support the Westernization of Arab
society as well as some other key economic players such as Russia and China who have both
assisted Iran in technical and economic assistance. On the other side are the Western states, led
by the United States who has been trying desperately to put an end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions
and its intention of antagonizing the Israel.

134

This study showed a clear relationship between anti-American rhetoric by Iranian
leadership and the international community’s stance on Iran’s nuclear program.

This

relationship was found to be strong and significant to the understanding the dynamics between
the two nations and as such further study in this area is likely to be necessary.

Concerns for the Future
2009 Presidential Election
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been no stranger to controversy both within Iran
and abroad. His controversial denial of the Holocaust and stringent adherence to Islamic law has
put him at odds with the Western world. As President Ahmadinejad entered into the 2009
Presidential election, the world looked on with hope for change. However, on June 13, 2009,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of the election faring 63% of the votes to the
34% his main opposition Mir Hossein Moussavi earned. Moussavi called for a reelection
claiming major irregularities and violations in how the election was conducted. On June 14th,
Ahmadinejad gave a victory speech and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei gave his
blessing to the newly-reelected President. However, as protests began to spread throughout Iran
and thousands of Iranians took to the streets, Khamenei agreed to allow the investigation of the
election. Further Iran's Guardian Council election authority agreed to recount some of the
votes. 3
Though the relationship between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad has often been at odds, the
current situation sees a shift into a cooperative ties between the two leaders. As a realist, perhaps
Khamenei has recognized the need to preserve the Islamic Republic and sees the current situation
as having the potential of bringing about insurgency and a new revolution to Iran. Though it is
unlikely that the Supreme Leader is in complete agreement with President Ahmadinejad’s policy
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decisions or practices, it appears that he wishes to demonstrate the strength of the Islamic
Republic through a unified front to both Iranian society and the international community.
With the majority of the Iranian population consisting of an age group under the age of
37, Iranian society does not maintain the ideals of the 1979 Revolution but rather they appear
frustrated by Iran’s lagging economy and inadequate social development.

As such, it is

unsurprising the extent to which Iranian society, particularly the youth have gathered beside
Hossein Moussavi who they see as a beacon of hope for reformation and change within Iran. As
the situation continues to unfold, it will be interesting to see how the dynamics will continue
between the Supreme Leader and the President. Will Khamenei retreat into his conflicting views
towards Ahmadinejad? Will Ahmadinejad change his policy direction and possibly bring about
some reforms to Iran as a result of the growing resentment by the Iranian people?

Socioeconomic Development
Whether there will be any changes to the result of this election still remains to be seen but
many political insiders doubt that there will be a different result to this election and many have to
resolve themselves to another Ahmadinejad presidency. Should the Guardian Council uphold
Ahmadinejad as the victor to the election, the international community must concern itself with
what direction he will move Iran into in his second term. Will he continue his current policy of
anti-American rhetoric and strong focus on Iran’s security or will he move on to other sectors of
Iranian society that have been neglected, namely Iran’s economic and social development?
If however, Moussavi does result in the victor of the presidential election, how will Iran’s
domestic policies change? Will he be able to reform Iranian society and improve its image
within the international community?

Will he continue to pursue an aggressive nuclear
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development program or will his focus shift to the economic and social problems that plague the
nation? Such are important concerns that can only be answered through time.
Regardless of the winner of the Iran’s economic condition must be addressed. The severe
international economic sanctioning that has been imposed on Iran has been crippling to Iran. 4
The president must pursue more than just economic reform if he wants to improve the economy.
There must be a substantial structural reform within Iran that will promote the type of stable
environment that essential for privatization and for foreign investment. Further stifling Iran’s
potential is its volatile relations with the United States which has only worsen as Iran has
continued its pursuit of nuclear development. 5
In terms of social development, there must be a greater integration of Islamic principles
in Iranian politics in order to preserve the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. 6 Iran’s domestic
infrastructure must be strengthened in order to prevent insurgency against the government. The
current instability in Iran as a result of the presidential election demonstrates the urgency of
improving Iran’s social and cultural sector.

The Nuclear Issue
In addition to the pressing need for social and economic reform, the future of Iran must
consider how it will continue to pursue its nuclear development program. How much longer can
Iran ignore the economic sanctioning that the United States and other Western powers are
imposing on it? Such sanctioning is causing a severe decline of Iran’s economy and this is
bringing about growing unrest within the Iranian people. Moreover, the more aggressive that
Iran pursues its nuclear program, the more negative the international response has become. If the
intention behind the nuclear program is peaceful in nature, Iran must consider a less aggressive
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approach to its development. Moreover, Iran must comply with international regulations and
allow for more transparency in its program in order to demonstrate a sentiment of good faith to
the rest of the international community.
The relationship between Iran and the Lebanese-based terrorist group Hezbollah is one
that has existed for some time. For over 20 years, Hezbollah has provided human resources and
intelligence to the Iranian people to assist in its revolution. Further, the Iranian government has
been active in providing tactical assistance to Hezbollah and publically supporting its actions
against Israel. This relationship is cause for concern, particularly as Iran moves closer to
developing its nuclear program. Should Iran develop the nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons that some intelligence appears to allude to, the international community must then
worry itself with the possibility of the known terrorist group Hezbollah obtaining such weaponry.
Much of the Middle East is beginning to revisit their nuclear programs. In 2006, Saudi
Arabia and the Persian Gulf States announced that they would return to developing their
programs. As the Middle East continues to move towards nuclear proficiency, the rest of the
world looks on with concern. 7

US-Iranian Relations
Iran’s growing support, particularly among terrorist groups and Shiite sympathizers in
Iraq and Afghanistan make the situation even more unnerving. Unfortunately, action at this
point is questionable and much fear may result in aggravating the situation. Will Iran directly act
against Israel knowing the support it maintains with the United States and knowing that an attack
on Israel will likely spawn some form of retaliation by the US? Will the United States once
again act preemptively towards a Middle Eastern nation, particularly one that is financially
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backed by such powerful states as Russia and China? Will Israel attack unilaterally knowing that
should Iran respond, the United States is likely to back them and thus any conflict will not be end
as a unilateral endeavor? Can the West and Israel afford to wait back for Iran to continue to
develop its nuclear program? Moreover, can one reasonably expect that should the situation
escalate by any degree that it will not result in a global conflict?
How will this relationship change now that the US is under new leadership? One can
only venture to hope that perhaps the United States will move past its defensive positioning with
regards to Iran and move closer to a working and respectful relationship. If the US is to hope
that Iran refrain from actually using its nuclear technology for aggressive purposes, it must stop
from pigeon-holing Iran into the classification of “terrorists” and try to enter into a new world of
diplomacy and cooperation.
It is believed that there are only four ways to handle the Iranian issue: doing nothing,
engage in a mini-cold war, initiate regime chance, or implement direct engagement. 8 The current
political environment in Iran is a volatile one and the United States must review its position with
regard to Iran. The United States will not be able to correct the problem through name-calling,
threats, or regime change but will need to utilize a new approach with diplomatic, economic, and
political considerations to achieve some level of cooperation with Iran. 9
Moreover, the research suggests that perhaps a part of the strained relationship between
Iran and the US is caused by the manner in which the US has reacted or acted towards Iran.
Throughout its relationship there appears to be a reactionary stance between the nations. Further,
it seems as though whenever an Iranian leader attempted to open up the doors to diplomatic
relations, the United States government has not been receptive. The US endorsed Iraq in the
Iran-Iraq War and dismissed the opportunity of being involved in the reestablishment of Iran’s
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nuclear development program under Supreme Leader Khamenei, particularly after the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001.

Future Prospects

This study found several key variables that influence Iran’s domestic and foreign policy.
The relationship between revolutionary realism and idealism on Iran’s policy-making is an
important consideration as it may allow for future predictions for how new leadership may react
to Western powers. However, perhaps further study into this relationship should consider how
revolutionary styles may influence Iran’s domestic and economic policies as well. Another area
that could be expanded upon is the relationship between revolutionary leadership styles, US
presence in the Middle East, and Iran’s nuclear program in correlation to US-Iranian relations.
Further study of these factors could provide a better understanding of why relations between Iran
and the United States are as volatile as they have been throughout the years. A final area that
could be studied is the relationship between a nation’s poor economy to the strong focus of a
nation’s security program.
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2008
July
July 9: Iran reported test-firing nine missiles which was said to have the capability of reaching
Israel. [NYT, 7/9]
June
June 17: Iran refused to accept the terms of the incentive package developed by Britain, France,
Germany, the United States, Russia, and China which would provide assistance to development
of a civilian nuclear program at the cost of Iran’s pledge to stop its uranium enrichment program.
This refusal brought about more threats from the West of economic sanctioning. [Reuters, 6/17]
March
Mar. 24: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announced that Iran had applied to join
the Russian-Chinese regional security group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
[RFE-RL, 3/24]
Mar. 3: The United Nations Security Council more sanctions on Iran for its continuation of its
nuclear program. The new sanctions froze assets, issued travel restrictions on specific Iranian
officials, and allowed for the inspection of any suspicious equipment travelling to Iran. [US
News, 3/3]
2007
December
Dec. 17: Russia delivered its first shipment of nuclear fuel to a reactor it was helping build in
Bushehr. [BBC, 12/17]
Dec. 13: Russia and Iran agreed to a timetable for the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power
facility in Iran. The US, Israel, and some EU nations pressed Russia to drop the contract due to
suspicions that Iran was attempting to produce nuclear weapons. [Reuters, 12/13]
Dec. 4: A US National Intelligence Estimate report found that Iran halted work on nuclear
weapons programs in 2003 in response to UN investigations. [WP, 12/4]
November
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran's nuclear program was released.
The report stated that Iran was making strides in transparency and clarifying details of its past
nuclear program, but also reported that uranium enrichment had increased ten-fold since 2006.
[Reuters, 11/15]
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October
The US imposed a new set of sanctions on Iran, targeting more than 20 Iranian companies,
banks, and individuals as well as the Iranian Defense Ministry. [Reuters, 10/25]
April
The European Union (EU) imposes strict sanctions against Iran, including a total arms embargo
as a result of Iran’s continuation of its nuclear program. [BBC, 4/23]
March
Mar. 24: New sanctions against Iran were unanimously approved by the UN Security Council.
The sanctions forbade Iranian military exports, froze the financial assets of individuals and
organizations connected with Iran's nuclear program, and asked member countries to restrict aid
to Iran's government. In response, the Iranian government announced that it was partially
stopping cooperation with the IAEA. [CNN, 3/25]
Mar. 13: The Russian government announced that shipments of nuclear fuel to Iran would be
halted due to non-payment on Iran's part. [RFE, 3/13]
February
The IAEA announced that it had stopped providing technical assistance to Iran under 22 of its 55
nuclear assistance programs. [NYT, 2/10]
January
The Iranian government blocked 38 inspectors from the UN's nuclear inspection agency, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), from entering the country. [RFE, 1/22]
2006
December
The United Nations Security Council voted to impose sanctions against Iran that would oblige
member states to ban the supply of nuclear materials to Iran and freeze some overseas financial
assets until Iran ceased all uranium enrichment. Iranian President Ahmadinejad rejected the
resolution as invalid and proclaimed his intention to continue his nuclear development program.
[BBC, 12/24]
November
Nov. 24: Iran offered to allow UN access to its nuclear program following the IAEA's November
23 rejection of Iran's request for aid in constructing a heavy water reactor at its Arak facility.
[RFE, 11/24]
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Nov. 14: A report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cited Iran for not
fully cooperating with the IAEA in explaining the details of its allegedly peaceful nuclear
program. The report also revealed that IAEA inspectors had discovered traces of highly-enriched
uranium and plutonium at a nuclear facility in Iran. [RFE, 11/14]
September
Iranian and Russian officials announced that the Russian-made nuclear reactor to be built in
Bushehr would be inaugurated in November 2007. [BBC, 9/26]
August
Aug. 6: Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larjani said Iran would continue to develop nuclear
energy technology within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [BBC, 8/6]
Aug. 4: The US State Department imposed sanctions on arms manufacturers in Russia, North
Korea, India, and Cuba for allegedly supplying equipment and components to Iran. [BBC, 8/4]
July
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1696, which gave Iran one
month to suspend uranium enrichment or face potential sanctions.
April
Iran's President Ahmadinejad announced that his nation successfully produced the enriched
uranium needed to make nuclear fuel, but insisted it did not want nuclear weapons. [BBC, 4/11]
March
The UN Security Council passed a unanimous non-binding resolution calling for Iran to halt all
nuclear enrichment activities. [BBC, 3/29]
February
Feb. 28: IAEA report indicates Iran is continuing its uranium enrichment program and asks the
Iranian government to allow for more transparency. [BBC, 2/28]
Feb. 26: Iran agreed on a joint venture with Russia to enrich uranium. The Russian compromise
proposal would move all the sensitive parts of Iran's nuclear program to Russian soil [BBC,
2/26]
Feb. 4: The IAEA reported Iran’s nuclear program despite Iranian government’s claim that it was
intended for civilian purposes. [BBC, 2/6]
January
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Iran withdraws assets from European banks to protect itself from possible sanctions. [BBC, 1/20]
2005
September
Tehran says it has resumed uranium conversion at its Isfahan plant and insists it is for peaceful
purposes. The IAEA finds Iran in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
February
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami says his country will never give up nuclear technology,
but stresses it is for peaceful purposes. Russia backs Tehran, and signs a deal to supply fuel to
Iran's Bushehr reactor.
January
Europe and Iran begin trade talks. The European trio, France, Germany and the UK, demand Iran
stop its uranium enrichment programme permanently.
2004
November
Iran agrees to a European offer to suspend uranium enrichment in exchange for trade
concessions.
September
The IAEA passes a resolution giving a November deadline for Iran to suspend uranium
enrichment. Iran rejects the call and begins converting raw uranium into gas.
March
A UN resolution condemns Iran for keeping some of its nuclear activities secret. Iran reacts by
banning inspectors from its sites for several weeks.
2003
November
Tehran agrees to suspend its uranium enrichment program and allow tougher UN inspections of
its nuclear facilities.
May
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The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts a series of inspections in Iran
and reveals two nuclear sites but does not label Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
2002
September
Russian technicians begin construction of Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr despite strong
objections from US.
January
The US accuses Iran of developing a secret nuclear program and US President George W. Bush
labels Iran as one of the “axis of evils.”
1995
US impose sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program.
1968
Iran signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Note:
Chronology from 2006-2008 were gathered from “Chronology.” Middle East Journal. 2000Present
[accessed
online]
General
One
File
2
February
2009;
http://find.galegroup.com/itx/infomark.do?&serQuery=Locale(en%2CUS%2C)%3AFQE%3D(jx
%2CNone%2C21)%22Middle+East+Journal%22%24&type=pubIssues&queryType=PH&prodI
d=ITOF&userGroupName=&version=1.0
Chronology from before 2006 were obtained from “Timeline” BBC News [accessed online] 2
February 2009; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.stm
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1794
1797
1834
1848
1896
1907
1909
1921
1925
1979

1981

1989

1997
2005
2009

Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar takes over Iran and begins Qajar dynasty.
Fath Ali Shah succeeds his father Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar.
Mohammad Shah Qajar rules over Iran.
Nasser al-Din Shah takes the throne after the death of his father Mohammad Shah.
Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar rules over Iran.
Mohammad Ali Shah takes on the position of ruler.
Ahmad Shah Qajar takes the throne and becomes the last of the Qajar dynasty.
Seyyid Zia al-Din and General Reza Khan stage a coup and take over the country.
Seyyid Zia rules over the country.
After the removal of Seyyid Zia as ruler, Reza Khan takes over as ruler.
Ruhollah Khomeini launches the Islamic Revolution and becomes the Supreme
Leader of the newly named Islamic Republic of Iran with Abol-hassan Bani-sadr
becoming the Republic’s first President.
After Bani-Sadr’s forced resignation Mohammad Ali Rajai took on the role of
President. He ruled for twenty-eight days until his assassination at which time Ali
Khamenei won the position of President.
After Ayatollah Khomeini’s passing, Ali Khamenei became the new Supreme
Leader of Iran and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected the new President.
Rafsanjani would serve two terms.
Mohammad Khatami was elected President and served two terms.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President of the Islamic Republic.
After a controversial first term, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared winner of
the June 2009 election.

150

APPENDIX C:
MILITARY EXPENDITURES FROM 1988-2007

151

Military Spending as a percentage of gross domestic product
Year

1988

Value ..

1989 1990 1991 1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2.4

1.5

2.4

1.8

1.9

2.1

2.4

3

3.8

4

2.5

2.9

3.3

3.8

3.8

2.9

2

1.7

1.4

Note: Values do not reflect spending on paramilitary groups including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2009.
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Important Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties Iran has been party to
Treaty
Ratified
Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Enmod Convention

Signed
X

Year Signed/Ratified

X

Biological
and
Toxin X
Weapons Convention
Chemical
Weapons X
Convention
1925 Geneva Protocol
X

X

Partial Test-Ban Treaty

X

X

Non-Proliferation
Treaty1968
Seabed Treaty

X

X

1976 (signed not
ratified)
Signed 1971, Ratified
1973
Signed 1993, Ratified
1997
Signed 1925, In force
1928
Signed 1963, Ratified
1964
Signed 1968

X

X

X
X

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2009.
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Signed 1971, In force
1972
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